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SYNOPSIS 
 
In recent years, countries across the globe have come to realise the importance of an official corporate 
governance regime, which provides a platform for market integrity and efficiency, as well as facilitating 
economic growth. Formulating effective corporate governance measures is a complex task for 
legislators. The purpose of this paper is to provide an in depth analysis and comparison of the corporate 
governance legislative frameworks in Australia and Jordan. In 2004, the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), in conjunction with national and international governmental 
organisations, finalised a universal set of corporate governance principles. Although non-binding, the 
OECD Principles 2004 are a serious attempt to strengthen every aspect of corporate governance and, 
accordingly, have been utilised in this paper as an international benchmark.  
 
The ultimate objective of this paper is to formulate a number of detailed and specific recommendations 
to the Jordanian Government. Jordan’s legislative framework for corporations received a significant 
shake-up a decade ago when the Jordanian Government began the process of implementing a 
privatisation program under the guidance of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 
Despite a number of positive developments since this program was initiated, the Jordanian Government 
has continually failed to recognise the importance of promoting good corporate governance. There can 
be no doubt that the Jordanian companies’ legislation is in desperate need of reform. The vast majority 
of the provisions are ambiguous and lack the necessary detail to regulate the complex sphere of 
company law. In this writer’s opinion, the relevant authorities in Jordan must act immediately to bring 
the country’s legislative regime into line with internationally recognised standards and practices. 
 
Chapter 1 of the paper sets out an introductory explanation of corporate governance and corporate 
structure. Chapter 2 provides a brief account of the history of company law in Jordan and a description 
of the different types of company structures permitted under the relevant Jordanian legislation. Chapter 
3 provides a detailed discussion of the corporate governance principles formulated by the OECD. The 
process began in 1999 and was completed in 2004 after extensive revision and consultation. Chapter 4, 
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the core part of the paper, presents a comparative analysis of the implementation of the OECD principles 
in Australia and Jordan. Chapter 5 provides an explanation and analysis of two important shareholders’ 
remedies in the Australian companies’ legislation that do not exist in Jordan. Finally, Chapter 6 provides 
a summary of analysis and sets out a list of recommendations to the Jordanian Government. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate governance has become an issue of worldwide importance. The corporation has a vital role to 
play in promoting economic development and social progress. It is the engine of growth internationally 
and is increasingly responsible for providing employment, public and private sector services, goods and 
infrastructure.1 The efficiency and accountability of the corporation is now a matter of both private and 
public interest, and corporate governance has thereby come to the head of the international private 
enterprise agenda.2  
 
Corporate governance is concerned with the systems of law, regulations, and practices which promote 
enterprise and ensure accountability.3 Ensuring transparency and probity in corporate affairs makes a 
major contribution to improving business standards.4 A complex interplay of factors contributes to the 
proper functioning of a corporate governance system. There are important factors internal to the 
corporation, such as the board of directors, capital providers, stakeholders, and management. Likewise, 
there are important factors external to the corporation, such as laws and regulations, competitive 
markets, the media, and transparent external auditing measures. Governance failures or weaknesses can 
reflect aspects of both.5 
 
The evolution and importance of corporate governance started to attract attention in Jordan in 1997 
when the Jordanian Government began implementing a privatisation program under the guidance of the 
World Bank6 and the International Monetary Fund.7 The aim was to gradually privatise the public 
                                                 
1 Mallin C, Corporate Governance: An International Review (2004). 
2 Center for International Private Enterprise, Strengthening Corporate Governance (2004). 
3 Ibid. 
4 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Building Partnerships for Progress: Corporate 
Governance (2005). 
5 Caruana J, Basel II and Corporate Governance Issues (Paper Presented at 2nd Financial Service Board Summit 2005), 2. 
6 The World Bank provides a vital source of financial and technical assistance to developing countries around the world. It is 
made up of two development institutions owned by 184 member countries – the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA). The IBRD focuses on middle income and 
creditworthy poor countries, whilst the IDA focuses on the poorest countries in the world. Together they provide low-interest 
loans, interest-free credit and grants to developing countries for education, health, infrastructure, communications and many 
other purposes. For more information see www.worldbank.org.  
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sector. The principal objectives of the privatisation program were to boost the economy and reduce 
government expenditures.8 The fulfilment of these objectives would reduce the Jordanian Government’s 
budget deficit and improve productivity and efficiency generally. These economic developments were 
intended to serve as a platform to allow Jordan to compete more effectively in the global market.9  
 
Despite the adverse effects of the ongoing conflict in the Middle East, Jordan’s economy has performed 
relatively well in recent years. It has been characterised by strong export-led growth, continued low 
inflation, and increased confidence in the Jordanian Dinar (JD).10 Real gross domestic product grew by 
3.9, 4.6, and 4.9 percent in 2000, 2001 and 2002 respectively.11 The privatisation program in Jordan 
actually generated the equivalent of US$1 billion within its first five years of operation.12 Significant 
recent developments that have assisted in Jordan’s shift towards a global economy include membership 
in the World Trade Organisation in 2000,13 a free-trade agreement with the United States in 2001, and 
an association agreement with the European Union in 2002.1415 These bilateral agreements have been a 
vehicle for improving corporate governance practices in Jordan.16 Bassam Asfour, chairman of the 
Jordan Securities Commission, recently stated: ‘Jordan’s economy is becoming more and more 
interdependent on the world economy. Companies find themselves competing in a global environment 
                                                                                                                                                                         
7 The International Monetary Fund is an organisation of 184 countries working to foster global monetary cooperation, secure 
financial stability, facilitate international trade, promote high employment and sustainable economic growth, and reduce 
poverty. For more information see www.imf.org.  
8 Khoury R and Pasch P, Privatisation Efforts in Jordan (2002), 2. See also Kanaan T and Kardoosh M, The Story of 
Economic Growth in Jordan 1950-2000 (2002), 13. 
9 Ramachandran S, Jordan’s Economic Development in the 1990s and World Bank Assistance (2004), 10.  
10 Central Bank of Jordan, Summary of Economic Development in 2004 (2005). 
11 For a general discussion see World Bank, Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC): Accounting and 
Auditing (Jordan) (June 2004), 2. 
12 Ibid, 2. 
13 The World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) General Council concluded negotiations with Jordan and approved the accession 
package on 17 December 1999. On 11 April 2000, Jordan became the 136th member of the WTO. 
14 The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement with Jordan was signed on November 24, 1997. It entered into force on 
May 1, 2002, and replaces the Co-operation Agreement of 1977. The Association Agreement is part of the bilateral track of 
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and provides a comprehensive framework for the economic, political and social 
dimensions to the EU-Jordan partnership. The main aim of the Association Agreement is to create a free trade area between 
the EU and Jordan over a period of 12 years, and help increase economic growth for the businesses community. The first EU-
Jordan Association Council meeting was held in Luxembourg on June 10, 2002. 
15 The Jordan Free Trade Agreement (FTA) was signed on October 24, 2000.  It took effect as the United States’ third free 
trade agreement, and the first ever with an Arab state.  The FTA is the capstone of growing U.S.-Jordanian collaboration in 
economic relations, which began with close bilateral cooperation on Jordan’s accession to the World Trade Organization and 
was followed by the conclusion of a trade and investment framework agreement and a bilateral investment treaty.  The Jordan 
FTA achieves significant and extensive liberalisation across a wide spectrum of trade issues.  It eliminates all tariff and non-
tariff barriers to bilateral trade in virtually all industrial goods and agricultural products within ten years. 
16 MENA Regional Corporate Governance Working Group, above n 16, 2. 
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and, as such, must be able to attract low cost capital whether from local, regional, or international 
sources’.17  
 
The creation of the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) in March 1999 also greatly assisted Jordan’s 
integration into the world economy. The ASE, a private sector, non-profit organisation with legal and 
financial independence, is in charge of running the market. This significant development was the result 
of a general restructuring process that also involved the establishment of various other institutions in 
support of the ASE.18 There is no doubt that this process fuelled the general improvement of corporate 
governance practices in Jordan to some extent. The dilemma is that, despite the positive developments in 
recent years, the Jordanian Government has continually failed to recognise the importance of promoting 
good corporate governance, which is fundamental to the success of newly-privatised enterprises in 
Jordan.  
 
The Jordanian economy is dominated by family-owned businesses. This feature often defines the roles 
and responsibilities of those charged with making corporate decisions. In many ways, the fact that the 
majority of companies in Jordan are closely-held is a significant barrier to the proper implementation of 
corporate governance measures because the managers in such company structures lack the objectivity 
and flexibility necessary to properly monitor company activity and achieve company objectives.19 The 
legal framework should not be an obstacle for the establishment and development of family-owned 
companies as they have been an integral part of the Jordanian economy for a long time. The point is that 
minority protection laws in Jordan must be clearly drafted and properly enforced to stop majority 
shareholders in such companies from abusing their power to the detriment of minority shareholders. It is 
clear that proper corporate governance implementation is the only way to effectively separate ownership 
and control. Owners can only feel secure when they are certain that managers are adhering to a certain 
standard of professionalism. 
 
                                                 
17 Ibid, 59. 
18 Discussed further in Chapter 2 of this paper. 
19 MENA Regional Corporate Governance Working Group, above n 16, 21. 
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The lack of effective legal controls on managerial behaviour in newly-privatised enterprises tends to 
generate the very problems that privatisation is supposed to mitigate. Jordan’s legal institutions also 
suffer from political interference and limited enforcement capabilities. Legal regulations pertaining to 
companies are vague and ill-defined. Furthermore, illiquidity and lack of investment incentives have 
made it difficult for companies to raise additional capital, for dissatisfied owners to liquidate their 
holdings at reasonable exit prices, and for outside takeover threats to acquire these inefficient firms.20  
 
It is clear that there are many challenges to promoting the principles of corporate governance in the Arab 
world. It is an emerging discipline, and, as yet, there has been very little commentary on the debate from 
the perspective of developing and transition countries.21 Worthy of note is that fact that there is no 
Arabic word of phrase equivalent to the term ‘governance’. This issue is not just semantic. As there is no 
word to express the concept of governance, the concept itself seemingly does not exist in Jordan. 
Bringing the issue of corporate governance to the forefront of the reform agenda is clearly a difficult 
task against this backdrop. A representative from the ABC Bank of Jordan recently suggested that the 
most significant barrier to the implementation of effective corporate governance measures in Jordan is 
the fact that the majority of participants in the private sector simply do not take the issue seriously.22 In 
his opinion, investment growth in the Jordanian economy is being stifled by a continual maintenance of 
outdated business culture centred heavily around personal relationships rather than financial information 
on corporate performance.23 
 
Ensuring the implementation of effective corporate governance measures in the privatisation process is a 
vital, yet complex, task. In the absence of an adequate and enforceable corporate governance framework, 
the Jordanian market has found itself incapable of convincing potential local and foreign investors that 
the money they might invest in newly privatised enterprises will be handled responsibly by corporate 
managers and directors.24 If increasing market confidence is on its agenda, then the Jordanian 
                                                 
20 USAID Jordan, USAID/Jordan Strategy 2004-2009 (2003), 2. 
21 Mallin, above n 1. 
22 MENA Regional Corporate Governance Working Group, above n 16, 50. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Kanaan and Kardoosh, above n 8, 16. 
 14
Government must consider instituting and raising corporate governance standards concurrently with 
privatisation.25  
 
This paper serves to provide an analysis and comparison of the systems of corporate governance in 
Australia and Jordan measured against the principles of corporate governance recently formulated by the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as an international benchmark. The 
ultimate purpose of this analysis and comparison is to formulate a number of recommendations to the 
Jordanian Government in terms of corporate governance legislative reform.  
 
Chapter 1 provides an introductory explanation of the foundations of corporate governance and 
corporate structure. Chapter 2 provides a brief account of the history of company law in Jordan and a 
description of the different types of companies operating in Jordan. Chapter 3 outlines the principles of 
corporate governance formulated by the OECD. A historical background is provided, as well as a 
detailed discussion of the core standards underlying the principles and an analysis of each individual 
principle. Chapter 4 presents a detailed comparative analysis of the implementation of the OECD 
principles in Australia and Jordan. Chapter 5 provides an explanation and analysis of two important 
shareholders’ remedies in the Australian companies’ legislation which do not exist in Jordan. Finally, 
Chapter 6 provides a summary of analysis and sets out a list of recommendations to the Jordanian 
Government in the sphere of corporate governance. 
 
 
                                                 
25 Ramachandran, above n 9, 16. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE                                              
AND CORPORATE STRUCTURE  
 
1. A DEFINITION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
 
Corporations are part of every society and are the livelihood of many communities. They mobilise and 
combine capital, raw material, labour, management expertise and intellectual property from a variety of 
sources to produce goods and services that are useful to members of society. Corporations purchase 
goods and services, generate jobs and income, distribute profits, pay taxes, and contribute to foreign 
exchange.26 In general terms, corporate governance provides guidelines for all corporate participants as 
regards their rights, obligations and accountability, as well as processes for identifying and evaluating 
challenges encountered in the corporate sphere.27 Considering the purposes that corporations serve on a 
community level and the impact that they can and do have in society, it makes sense to have strong 
regulations governing how they function financially, politically, and even ethically.28  
 
Corporate governance is a fashionable, albeit ambiguous, concept.29 There is no universally accepted 
definition of corporate governance. In general terms, it refers to ‘a set of rules and incentives by which 
management of a company is directed and controlled’.30  According to Professor John Farrar, corporate 
governance, in its narrow sense, refers to control of corporations and systems of accountability.31 
Accountability is encompassed not only in terms of legal restraints, but also in terms of self-regulation 
and the norms of so-called ‘best practice’.32 An important aspect of corporate governance is the 
                                                 
26 Prentice D and Holand P, Contemporary Issues in Corporate Governance (1993), 8. 
27 Healy J, Corporate Governance and Wealth Creation in New Zealand (2003), 128. 
28 Cohen S and Boyd G, Corporate Governance and Globalization: Long Range Planning Issues (2000), 6. 
29 Farrar J, Corporate Governance: Theories, Principles, and Practice (2nd ed, 2005), 3. 
30 Du Plessis J et alia, Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance (2005), 1. 
31 Farrar, above n 29, 3. 
32 Carlsson R, Ownership and Value Creation: Strategic Corporate Governance in the New Economy (2001), 22. 
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companies’ legislation, but it also transcends the legal control of corporations to regulate de-facto 
control of corporations.33  
 
Sheridan and Kendall34 assert that achieving good corporate governance requires a system of structured 
operating and controlling to fulfil the following objectives:35 
(a) achieving a long-term strategy of goals of the owner which may be maximising 
shareholder value or controlling market shares; 
(b) securing the interests of employees all the time and ensuring that they are guaranteed a 
positive working atmosphere, further training courses, health coverage, and fair 
retirement packages; 
(c) maintaining excellent long-term relations with customers and suppliers in terms of 
service, quality and financial settlement procedures; and 
(d) complying with all of the relevant legal and regulatory requirements.  
 
Sheridan and Kendall express the view that all of the above requirements are essential in maintaining a 
well-managed and structured organisation that can operate effectively and efficiently to satisfy the needs 
of all relevant interest groups.36 
 
The importance of corporate governance lies in its contribution both to business prosperity and to 
accountability. According to Sir Adrian Cadbury, ‘corporate governance is concerned with holding the 
balance between economic and social goals, and between individual and communal goals’.37  The 
governance framework is there to encourage the efficient use of resources and, equally, to require 
accountability for the stewardship of those resources. The aim is to align as nearly as possible the 
interests of individuals, corporations and society.38  
                                                 
33 Ibid. 
34 Sherdan T and Kendall N, Corporate Governance: An Action Plan for Profitability and Business Success (1992), 12. 
35 See also Du Plessis et alia, above n 30, 7. 
36 Sherdan and Kendall, above n 34, 12.  
37 Cadbury A, Corporate Governance and Chairmanship: A Personal View (1st ed, 2002), 38. 
38 Millstein I, ‘The Evolution of Corporate Governance in the United States’, Remarks to the World Economic Forum, 
Davos, Switzerland (February 2, 1998).     
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In the Arab world the concept of corporate governance is not yet clearly understood.39 Many directors 
and managers, even academics, struggle to differentiate between corporate governance issues and 
business management issues.40 For the most part, they refer to the two issues as one. The management 
role is primarily perceived to be running the business operations efficiently and effectively. The business 
operations generally include the products, design, personnel, general management, production, 
marketing and finance functions. The governance role is not concerned with running the business of the 
company, but rather with directors giving overall direction to the enterprise. This is achieved by 
overseeing and controlling the executive actions of management and by satisfying legitimate 
expectations for accountability and regulation. If management concerns running the business, 
governance concerns seeing that it is run properly.41  
 
Participants in the Arab business community regularly consider and debate changes in the company 
regulatory system. However, corporate governance is yet to make its way onto the discussion plate to 
any real extent. This apparent ignorance in the Arab world is partly due to the definition of the term in 
Arabic, or lack thereof. In fact, as mentioned in the preceding section, there is no specific translation of 
the term ‘governance’ in Arabic.42 This dilemma of terminology is an ongoing difficulty in the 
discussion and implementation of corporate governance in Jordan. What is required is consensus on a 
precise translation that does not compromise the essence of the term. An accepted Arabic equivalent 
phrase would facilitate understanding of the topic and in-depth discussions could then be held without 
confusion. The issue should be moved to the forefront of the corporate governance movement in the 
Arab world because of its logical importance in ongoing economic debate in Arabic. 
 
                                                 
39 Boutros-Ghali Y, Corporate Governance Practices in Egypt: The Road Ahead, Paper presented at a Conference in Cairo 
sponsored by the Egyptian Capital Market Association and the Centre for International Private Enterprise, 2001, 1. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Saidi N, Corporate Governance in the Arab Countries: Role of the Banking System in Ensuring Transparency and 
Disclosure, Paper presented at the Forum on Corporate Governance in Banks and Financial Institutions in Line with 
International Standards and Practice (2005). 
42 Boutros-Ghali, above n 39, 1. 
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In summary, it is clear that corporate governance is an ambiguous concept.43 There is no universal 
consensus on its definition despite the efforts of many scholars.44 According to Professor John Farrar, 
corporate governance refers to control of corporations and the systems of accountability regulating those 
in control.45 Sheridan and Kendall46 believe that good corporate governance requires a system of 
structuring, operating and controlling to fulfil the company’s long-term strategies and to comply with 
relevant laws and regulations in the best interests of employees. Moreover, Sir Adrian Cadbury47 
believes that corporate governance is concerned with maintaining a balance between economic and 
social goals, and between individual and communal goals. Whatever definition is preferred, it is clear 
that corporate governance is a term that holds increasing significance in the modern world, and it is 
essential that governments across the globe continue to strengthen the legislative and regulatory 
frameworks that underpin corporate governance in each of their respective jurisdictions.  
 
2. FOUNDATIONS OF THE CORPORATE STRUCTURE 
 
2.1  Defining a Corporation 
 
A corporation is a simple, yet complex, entity. In Australia, a corporation is an incorporated 
association under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Upon incorporation, a company becomes a 
separate legal entity, distinct from its shareholders and directors, which remains in existence 
until it is deregistered.48 It is made up of a consolidation of individuals that contribute to its 
operation in various ways.49 These separate levels of contribution within a corporation allow 
individuals to participate in the running of the business with differing levels of responsibility and 
liability. Ambrose Bierce states, in his notorious Devil’s Dictionary, that a corporation is ‘an 
                                                 
43 Ibid. 
44 Du Plessis et alia, above n 30, 1. 
45 Farrar, above n 29, 3. 
46 Sherdan and Kendall, above n 34, 12.  
47 Cadbury, above n 37, 38. 
48 Cassidy J, Corporations Law: Text and Essential Cases (2005), 29. See also Adams P, Company Directors in Australia 
(2nd ed, 1971), 34. 
49 Adams, above n 40, 34. 
 19
ingenious device for obtaining individual profit without individual responsibility’.50 This 
statement reflects a corporation’s foundational asset; the ability to draw on a large pool of 
resources without the need to change the persona or characteristics of the corporation.51 
 
A corporation consists of five core characteristics: (1) separate legal personality; (2) limited 
liability; (3) transferable shares; (4) centralised management under a board structure; and (5) 
shared ownership by contributors of capital. In nearly all economically important jurisdictions 
there is a basic statute that provides for the formation of companies with all of these 
characteristics as a default. There are, however, sometimes provisions available for omitting one 
or more of them.52 
 
2.2  History of the Corporate Structure 
 
Prior to the 17th century, western governments generally controlled all commercial activity.53 
The need for corporations became more specific after the 17th century. For example, corporations 
were created to cater for developments such as the establishment of the American colonies and 
the settlement of India.54 Corporate establishments that were publicly beneficial prospered and 
progressed. The characteristics of the corporate structure were of such importance to 
businessmen that legislators recognised that opposing the emergence of corporatism was futile 
and generally embraced the opportunity to permit their operation and tax their income.55 
 
As society and culture evolved, so too did the nature of the corporate structure.56 Due to 
economic growth and technological advances, it was becoming obvious by the late 19th century 
that there was a need for growth in companies that had been relatively minimal up until that 
                                                 
50 As cited in Monks R and Minow N, Corporate Governance (2nd ed, 2001), 6. 
51 Monks and Minow, above note 50, 6. 
52 Kraakman R et alia, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach (2004), 5. 
53 Adams, above n 40, 36.                                                                                                                                                                                     
54 Gower L et alia, The Principles of Modern Company Law (4th ed, 1979), 39. 
55 Ibid 40. 
56 Adams, above n 40, 36. 
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point. Companies expanded rapidly and began employing people in the hundreds and then 
thousands. As the size of firms grew rapidly, so too did the need to use a more broad and diverse 
range of capital from sources other than wealthy individuals.57 Naturally, as corporations 
expanded and evolved, legal regulation was required to govern their ever-changing development. 
Corporate governance is constantly being revised to serve the needs of such expansion and 
evolution as companies grow and change with society.58 
 
2.3  Corporate Participants 
 
In order to understand the legal framework surrounding corporations, it is necessary to examine 
the role of each participant in a company. Each individual participant has a unique role to play. 
For example, a manager within a corporation has a great deal of responsibility in the running of a 
company, but he or she does not have to provide anything financially. On the other hand, an 
investor who contributes financially can reap profits from such an investment without ever 
needing to take responsibility for the day-to-day management of the company.59 Although the 
specific functioning of each individual company is unique, there are common participants within 
each company that assist in establishing guidelines for a basic regulatory framework.60  
 
These five key participants in a corporation are:61 
(a) shareholders; 
(b) creditors; 
(c) managers; 
(d) directors; and 
(e) employees. 
 
                                                 
57 Pennington R, Company Law (5th ed, 1985), 10. 
58 Monks and Minow, above n 50, 12. 
59 Monks and Minow, above n 50, 12. 
60 Davies P, Introduction to Company Law (2002), 5. 
61 Cheffins B, Company Law: Theory Structure and Operation (1997), 47. 
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The key features of each type of corporate participant will be discussed in turn. 
 
(a) Shareholders 
 
The role of a shareholder can vary depending on the distinct features of the particular 
company in which they have an interest. Most importantly, a shareholder’s role is 
affected by the classification of the relevant company. The relevant distinction is between 
a ‘closely-held company’, which has a small number of shareholders, and a ‘widely-held 
company’, which has a large number of shareholders and is often listed for trading on the 
relevant stock exchange.62 The members of a closely-held company often play more of a 
role in running the business, whereas the members of a widely-held (or public company) 
generally own smaller fractions of the company and have little or nothing to do with the 
running of the business.63 Often allowances are made for the existing differences between 
closely-held and widely-held companies. However, these allowances are generally 
limited to the filing of financial information. This is because traditionally no distinctions 
were made regarding the rules which govern shareholder relations.64  
 
Unlike managerial positions, there are no rules or stipulated guidelines outlining the 
duration of shareholdings. The patterns between closely-held corporations and widely-
held public corporations are often different as the basis of share ownership varies.65 A 
closely-held company will commonly have the majority of its shares owned by family 
members who have a more vested interest in the long-term performance of the company. 
Publicly and widely-held shares are more commonly acquired and disposed of frequently 
throughout the life span of the company.66 Further, the process of disposing of the 
acquired shares in a closely-held company is more complicated than with a publicly-held 
                                                 
62 Monks and Minow, above n 50, 80. 
63 Grantham R and Rickett C, Corporate Personality in the 20th Century (1998), 210.  
64 Cheffins, above n 61, 49. 
65 Davies, above n 60, 112. 
66 Cheffins B, US Close Corporations Legislation: A Model Canada Should Not Follow (1989), 163. 
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company. Often a shareholder in a closely-held company will be tied to the company 
until the company members buy out his or her shares. This is not a problem for 
shareholders in public companies as the shareholder is rarely linked to the company or its 
management, and shares can be disposed of more readily.67 
 
Although the variable returns that are associated with shares can make equity seem like a 
risky investment, diversification can limit risk. That is, investment in many companies 
can avert unsystematic risks due to the variable rate of successful peaks in each 
individual company throughout the course of its existence. Markets will always fluctuate 
and cause variations in returns.68 Profits gained by shareholdings are often directly 
related to the level of risk involved in the shares being purchased. High returns on shares 
often come only by way of substantially risky equity investments. Shareholders, 
especially those in listed public companies, need to be well informed and understand the 
dynamics of the stock market in order to understand the risks involved in the purchase of 
shares.69 
 
Under Australian company law, shareholders in public companies retain the authority to 
select who sits on the board of directors. By determining the content of the company 
constitution, shareholders can choose to whom to allocate the responsibility of running 
the company.70 Whilst shareholders have substantial control over corporate affairs, most 
matters of importance are usually left for management to deal with.71 This passive 
approach by shareholders is commonly due to the belief that managerial issues are best 
left to those more qualified, the corporate executives.72 Shareholders of closely-held 
companies, on the other hand, usually have a long-term interest in the success of the 
company and often have a significant amount of personal wealth invested. In order for 
                                                 
67 Cheffins, above n 61, 54. 
68 Mayson S et alia, Company Law (16th ed, 1999), 189. 
69 Ibid 191. 
70 Cheffins, above n 61, 61.  
71 Pennington, above n 57, 690. 
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such shareholders to protect their own interests, it is often necessary for them to take part 
in corporate decision-making.73 
 
Both closely-held and widely-held companies are open to possible conflicts of interest. 
Such risks are generally associated more with closely-held corporations stemming from 
family conflicts. These family conflicts may seem irrelevant to the company, but the on-
flow of such conflicts can significantly disrupt company affairs.74 Widely-held 
corporations are at risk of conflicts when dominant shareholders treat the company as 
their own with little or no regard for minority shareholders.75 This is especially so if 
dominant shareholders are causing detriment to the company by diverting business 
elsewhere to enterprises either directly or indirectly owned by them.76 There are, 
however, many options available to shareholders of both closely-held and widely-held 
companies for dispute resolution when conflicts arise within the corporate structure.77 
 
(b) Creditors 
 
Many individuals, as well as commercial entities, become creditors of companies. Three 
specific types of creditors, however, are more prevalent and of particular importance.78 
The first is trade creditors, who supply goods and services to companies without 
requiring immediate payment.79 The second type is institutional lenders, the most 
important of which is banks.80 Bank overdrafts are the principal method in this form of 
lending. The third type is composed of creditors whose right to payment is evidenced by 
a certificate a company has issued.81 An important example of such an arrangement is the 
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debenture. The standard way in which a company borrows money by way of debentures 
is to arrange to have them issued to a substantial number of investors through the medium 
of a trustee under a single instrument.82 Debt aggregated in this fashion is ordinarily 
referred to as ‘loan stock’.83 
 
Contracts regarding debt obligations invariably specify some form of repayment date, 
making it possible to determine the legal duration of a debt. These forms of repayments 
and the duration of repayments will vary according to the type of credit obtained. 
Overdraft bank accounts are often considered short-term finance, however, the flexibility 
of this type of credit often encourages a company to utilise this form of loan for long-
term periods.84 The return, or yield, a creditor earns is generally based on the period of 
time taken for the borrower to repay the principal credit and the interest.85 Most often, 
returns for creditors are fixed over a period of time. Unlike shareholders, if a company 
does exceedingly well, it will have no impact on creditors’ yield. On the other hand, if a 
company performs poorly, creditors will still receive their yield providing the company 
does not default or renegotiate.86 
 
The possibility of a company failing to meet its debt obligations is referred to as ‘default 
risk’. If a company encounters financial difficulties that result in liquidation, creditors 
have priority over shareholders in collecting monies owed, as a company must pay any 
outstanding debts before distribution of assets can occur.87 One possible method a 
creditor can employ to reduce the associated risks is to exercise a certain measure of 
control over the business affairs of the debtor company.88 Banks will often monitor 
developments at a company by checking the movements of the balance owing on an 
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overdraft account, or even by requesting sales forecasts or monthly financial statements.89 
However, these courses of action are rare, as lenders generally find that involvement in 
corporate decision-making has little or no effect on their yield.90 
 
(c) Managers 
 
Managers of large corporations act as central organisers.91 They are responsible for 
making the key administrative and strategic decisions pertaining to the present and future 
direction of the business.92 Management teams are generally made up of professionally 
trained executives, many specialising in specific fields such as marketing or finance. 
These specialised managers usually operate under a chief coordinator and policy maker, 
the chief executive officer.93 Managers must always carefully consider their choice of 
business ventures and objectively ascertain whether they are appropriate for the company. 
Accordingly, a thorough understanding of the company’s position and priorities is vital.94  
 
Managers are often locked into a contractual relationship with a specific period of 
employment.95 Management positions are usually salary based and, depending on the 
nature of the business, often highly paid.96 Managers are also often offered incentives to 
ensure they run the company to its peak performance and improve shareholder returns.97 
For instance, executive share options offer an attractive way of providing incentives to 
top executives.98 Such schemes operate on the theory that a manager is motivated to think 
like a shareholder.99 
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Of course, with the high salary and incentives a manager receives, the position carries 
higher levels of risk than other positions within the company. The most notable risk is 
forced departure, which can result from a variety of circumstances. For example, 
situations such as financial difficulties in the company or even possible personality 
clashes within the company can lead to a management executive being forced out. In 
family owned companies, marital or domestic quarrels often lead to the removal of a 
management executive.100  
 
The legal authority to control and direct company affairs is ordinarily vested in the board 
of directors, however, such boards often delegate a large portion of their legal powers to 
those in management. Managers quite often undertake the responsibility of determining 
basic long-term corporate objectives and coordinating key business operations. This 
control maintained by managers needs to be conducted with discretion, without outside or 
external constraints.101 If a manager were to misuse his or her powers in this respect, the 
board of directors has the legal power to pursue disciplinary action.102 
 
Managers must also strive to conduct company matters and business ventures in an 
ethical manner. Although fraudulent use of corporate funds is rare, it still occurs. More 
common is the inappropriate use of corporate funds for personal expenditures. This is 
often seen by behaviour such as excessive use of expense accounts or providing friends 
or family members with highly paid jobs. Such conduct reduces the profitability of a 
company, which has an impact on all persons related to the company.103 
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(d) Directors 
 
The board of directors is generally vested with the power to manage companies. In turn, 
the board will generally delegate most day-to-day tasks and running of the company to 
the executive officers or managers.104 In the case of closely-held companies, key 
investors are often directors of the company as well as full-time managers.105 In contrast, 
the board of directors in a public company will ordinarily operate on a more formal and 
structured basis. In these types of companies, senior full-time executives are often joined 
on the board by various non-executive directors.106 These non-executive directors provide 
support and assistance to the full-time executives, as well as monitoring executive 
decision-making.107 
 
Non-executive directors are often referred to as either ‘independent’ or ‘outside’ 
directors, though each term is slightly, yet significantly, different. An independent 
director has no connection with the company apart from his or her seat on the board, and 
any possible shareholding. An outside director encompasses those directors who are not 
employed on a full-time basis by a company.108 The number of non-executive directors 
present at a board meeting varies depending on the company. Research indicates that the 
ratio is often as high as 50 percent.109 
 
Directors are ordinarily elected by shareholders. The term or duration of a director is 
usually specified once elected. Once that term is served, directors will be eligible for re-
election, providing they are in good standing with the nominating committee.110 An 
elected director can leave their office during their term by resigning their position. They 
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can also be forcibly removed by shareholders.111 Non-executive directors are usually paid 
a fee for attending meetings and carrying out related duties. The amount of the fee paid 
will vary depending on the size of the company and other variables.112  
 
(e) Employees 
 
The relationship between a company and its employees is unique. When employees agree 
to work for a company they do so on the understanding that they will be acting under the 
authority of the employer and that the day-to-day parameters will be determined by the 
company’s administrative system.113 The implication is that there is little or no room for 
employee ‘bargaining’. From an economic perspective, employers ought to be aware of 
market conditions so that they are adequately informed on the terms that must be offered 
to hire and retain appropriately qualified staff.114 
 
Employees occasionally work for a fixed term period, however, the relationship between 
an employee and his or her employer is more commonly based on the ground that the 
relationship will continue to operate until the employee resigns, retires or is dismissed.115 
Often an employee is obligated to give notification of a certain period of time prior to 
resigning, and likewise an employer usually has to notify the worker in advance before 
terminating his or her employment.116 
 
The return an employee receives is more often than not in the form of a wage, with a set 
or prescribed sum paid per hour. Wages often fail to vary in accordance with an 
employee’s contribution to a company. Accordingly, companies are often foregoing an 
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opportunity to use employment remuneration as a motivational instrument.117 Some 
corporations do have employment schemes in which an employee is paid in accordance 
with the profitability of the company; however, these employees are generally at more 
risk than the average salary or wage earner.118 
 
Traditionally, employees have played only a minor role in the control of a corporation. 
There are, however, two circumstances in which an employee can take an active role in 
shaping managerial decisions. The first of these is when the employee is also an owner of 
the company. In these circumstances, the level of control of the company would relate to 
the level of accountability and risk, and would usually mean that the employee would 
receive returns that could vary according to their level of contribution.119 The second 
circumstance in which an employee can take an active role in shaping managerial 
decisions is in companies where employee representatives have been nominated to 
negotiate with corporate executives. By listening to the concerns of the employees, 
executives can ward off possible dangers to the staff that may end up being costly, such 
as physical hazards.120 
 
Conflict situations such as dismissal or wage reductions between employees and other 
corporate participants can often be addressed by bargaining. Bargaining can be used to 
address a vast range of issues and union representatives speaking on behalf of employees 
often assist this process. When agreements are made through such bargaining procedures, 
they are considered to be more intricate and specific than the conventional employment 
contract.121 
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3. CORPORATE CHARACTERISTICS 
 
Whilst company law varies greatly across jurisdictions, the basic structural foundations share common 
characteristics.122 The four main characteristics that are essential to the vitality and appeal of the 
corporate form are: 
(1) limited liability; 
(2) legal personality; 
(3) transferable shares; and 
(4) centralised management.123 
 
3.1  Limited Liability 
 
Limited liability is the term used to express the separation of the liability of the corporation from 
the liability of its owners, employees and other individuals that make up the corporate entity.124 
Most importantly, in the case of bankruptcy, the individuals in a corporation are not held 
individually responsible for corporate debts.125 The formation of a limited liability entity is used 
as a means of sharing the risks of transactions with the parties with whom a company 
contracts.126 Another subtle, yet important, role that limited liability plays is in facilitating 
delegated management. By shifting downside risk from shareholders to creditors, limited liability 
enlists creditors as monitors of the company’s managers, a role they are far more capable of 
tackling than shareholders with widely dispersed share ownership.127 Historically, limited 
liability was not always associated with the corporate form. In recent years, however, it has 
become an almost universal feature of the company.128  
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The concept of limited liability was first formulated and utilised in the 15th century by trade 
merchants, especially the Genoan, Venetian and Florentine traders. Whilst trade merchants of 
this time had the opportunity to reap large profits, they were also at high risk from the likes of 
piracy, ships sinking, and predatory competitors that monopolised certain markets. The idea was 
then formulated to spread investments over many ships instead of investing in just the one. The 
institution that was developed to resolve such problems was called the Commenda.129 Under the 
Commenda, the organisers of a voyage would collect funds from a number of investors whose 
liability would be restricted to the money that they had invested. The promoter, however, would 
have unlimited liability. What this meant was that, in the case of a catastrophe, the investors 
would only be called upon for the share they had invested, whilst the promoter could be 
bankrupted to pay the relevant debts.130 It was from this historical scheme that the modern day 
notion of limited liability developed. 
 
3.2  Legal Personality  
 
A corporation is considered, in legal terms, to be a single entity or ‘person’ that is separate from 
its contributing and participating members.131 As an economic entity, a corporation is a 
collaboration of contracts, suppliers, products, services and activities that are usually unique 
from the next corporation. These features give the impression of having an actual personality.132 
Civil law refers to legal personality as ‘separate patrimony’, which is the firm’s ability to own, 
sell and pledge assets that are distinct from the property of other persons such as investors.133   
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3.3  Transferable Shares 
 
Fully transferable shares are another characteristic that distinguishes the corporation from 
various standard-form legal entities such as partnerships.134 Transferability is a function that 
gives the corporation the freedom to conduct business without interruption whilst owner identity 
constantly changes. Such transferability allows shareholders greater ability to diversify their 
shareholding portfolio due to the liquidity of their investments.135 Shareholders who fear that 
their investments may be losing value are able to sell their stock almost immediately, which 
gives them greater control of personal investments.136 Transferability also gives the corporation 
maximum flexibility in raising capital, and all jurisdictions provide for free transferability as the 
default regime for at least one class of corporations.137 Most jurisdictions also provide for certain 
mechanisms that restrict transferability because completely free transferability can make it 
difficult to maintain negotiated control arrangements.138 
 
3.4  Centralised Management 
 
The power to determine the overall direction of a company is vested in the directors, whilst the 
power to control a company’s day-to-day operations is delegated to the managers.139 Delegation 
permits the centralisation of management that is necessary for maximum productivity. 
Centralised management gives specific decision-making powers to the appropriate personnel. 
This provides clarification to all members of a corporation as to those persons who have the 
authority to make binding agreements.140 It is also another aspect of the limited authority given 
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to investors. That is, in order to maximise operational efficiency, shareholders give up the right 
to make decisions regarding anything other than general issues.141 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPANY LAW IN JORDAN 
 
1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
The land that became Jordan is part of the richly historical ‘Fertile Crescent’ region. Around 2000BC, 
Semitic Amorites settled around the Jordan River in an area called Canaan. Subsequent invaders and 
settlers included Hittites, Egyptians, Israelites, Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Arab 
Muslims, Christian Crusaders, Mameluks, Ottoman Turks, and, finally, the British.142  
 
Jordan was originally part of the Ottoman Empire.143 In the latter course of the Ottoman rule in the early 
19th century, a partially codified system of law was introduced to the urban areas of the Syrian territory 
of the Ottoman Empire which included Jordan. The most significant single code of law promulgated by 
the Ottomans was the famous Ottaman Majellah 1877.144 The Ottaman Majellah was a codification of 
the prevailing Islamic Shari’ah (Islamic Law) representing the views of the Muslim jurists following the 
Hanafi school of the Sunni Islam.145 The Ottaman Majellah dealt with select areas of private law. The 
most important and detailed part of the text concerned the law of obligations in civil transactions 
(especially sale, hire, guarantee, assignment, etc.). The other principal area of law covered by the 
Ottaman Majellah was the law of evidence.146  
 
Jordan remained a part of the Ottoman Empire until the end of World War I, when the United Nations 
awarded the territory now comprising Israel, Jordan, the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem to the United 
Kingdom. In 1922, the British divided the mandate by establishing the semi-autonomous Emirate of 
                                                 
142 Hassan A, Bedouin Customary Law (1974), 5, [Arabic Text]. 
143 Narjeeli W, The Islamic Jurisdiction (1973), 93, [Arabic Text]. 
144 Hassan, above n 142, 7. 
145 One of denominations of Islam. 
146 Mousa T, The Commercial Companies (1973), 14, [Arabic Text]. 
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Transjordan, ruled by the Hashemite Prince Abdullah I, while continuing the administration of Palestine 
under a British High Commissioner. In February 1928, the United Kingdom and Transjordan signed a 
treaty followed by an Organic Law (promulgated on 19 April 1928) which recognised Prince Abdullah I 
as the ‘Head of State’ with hereditary rights and declared Islam as the State religion.147  
 
The Organic Law of Transjordan 1928 provided that – except in so far as it may have been amended 
subsequent proclamations, rules, or laws – the Ottoman legal tradition retained its influence in Jordan. In 
1929, many Ottoman laws (including the Ottoman Law of Family Rights 1917) were re-enacted with 
some alterations. The British mandate over Transjordan ended on May 22, 1946. Days later the country 
became the independent Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.148 The Kingdom promulgated a new 
constitution in February 1947, and legislation pertaining to ‘family rights’ was enacted soon after in 
1951. The Law of Family Rights 1951 was the first in a series of codifications of Islamic family law 
issued in the 1950s by the national legislatures of newly independent Arab states.149 A new constitution 
was adopted in 1952, retaining the religious and communal basis of jurisdiction in personal status 
matters.150 The 1952 Constitution declared Jordan to be a constitutional hereditary monarchy with 
representative government. The king, however, still retained considerable control over the executive, 
legislature and judiciary.  
 
The Civil Code and Civil Procedure Code were enacted in 1952 and 1953 respectively, the former 
replacing the Ottoman Majellah.151 The Civil Code was reenacted in 1976 and was largely drawn from 
Syrian legislation, which in turn was modeled on the Egyptian Civil Code 1948.152 The Civil Code 1976 
remains the principal legislation governing areas of private law in general and the law of obligations in 
particular.153 As the former Ottoman Majellah was by no means comprehensive, and sometimes not 
even comprehensible, there had been a strong push by Jordanian lawyers to have it repealed, which 
                                                 
147 Denoeux B, Legislative Politics in the Arab World (1999), 136.   
148 Eid E, Commercial Companies (1969), 12, [Arabic Text]. 
149 Denoeux, above n 147, 137.  
150 Khiat A, Companies in the Islamic Shariáh and the Law (1970), 12, [Arabic Text]. 
151 Mousa, above n 146, 14. 
152 Shamri T, The Law of Commercial Companies (1999), 15, [Arabic Text]. 
153 Khafif A, Companies in the Islamic Jurisprudence (1998), 97, [Arabic Text]. 
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succeeded in 1976. Also in 1976, the Jordanian Law of Personal Status repealed the Jordanian Law of 
Family Rights 1951 in a number of significant ways, providing for a more comprehensive code, while 
retaining reference to the classical Hanafi154 rules in circumstances that were not specifically covered in 
the regulations.  
 
2. COMMERCIAL LAW 
 
Commercial matters in Transjordan were governed by the Ottoman Commercial Code 1849-1850 until it 
was later replaced by the promulgation of several commercial laws. In 1964, the Company Law was 
enacted and applied to both the East and West Banks of Jordan. In 1966, the Commercial Code was 
enacted, including four separate parts: (i) trade and traders; (ii) commercial contracts; (iii) bills of 
exchange; and (iv) creditors and bankruptcy. To facilitate the implementation of the government’s 
liberal economic policies, the 1964 and 1966 codes were supplemented by the Encouragement of 
Investment Law 1972, the Registration of Foreign Companies Law 1975, and the Control of Foreign 
Business Activities Defense Regulations 1978.    
 
A new legal regime was introduced by the Jordanian Government in June 1997 to encourage much-
needed investment into the business sector. The Companies Law 1997 encompasses routine procedural 
matters, facilitates the process of company registration, and provides several options for those wishing to 
register a corporate entity. The principal registration options include: a general partnership company, a 
limited partnership company (with or without share capital), a limited liability company, a private 
shareholding company, a public shareholding company, a joint investment company, an offshore 
company, and a foreign operating company. A brief outline of each registration option is provided in the 
next section. 
 
The enactment of the Companies Law 1997 was followed by the establishment of the Amman Stock 
Exchange (ASE), a private and independent body, in March 1999. The ASE, Jordan’s only stock 
                                                 
154 One of denominations of Islam. 
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exchange, is governed by a seven-member board of directors. A chief executive officer oversees day-to-
day responsibilities and reports to the board. The ASE is regulated by the Securities Law 2002,155 ASE 
Listing Rules 2003, and other internal regulations. Whilst it has the power to issue fines and warnings, 
and suspend and delist issuers, the ASE has not played a significant role in regulating listed companies 
to date.156 
 
The establishment of the ASE was complemented by the creation of two other institutions – the 
Securities Depository Centre (SDC)157 and the Jordan Securities Commission (JSC).158 The SDC, a non-
profit private body, was established to ensure safe custody of ownership of securities and oversee the 
registration and transferral of ownership of securities traded on the ASE.159 The JSC, a government 
body, is responsible for supervising the issuance of, and dealings in, securities, as well as regulating and 
monitoring the activities and operations of those organs falling under its supervision. The JSC also 
supervises the disclosure of information related to securities, issuers, insider trading and major 
shareholders. The Commission itself is appointed by the Council of Ministers and consists of a 
chairman, deputy chairman, and three commissioners. The JSC has approximately 100 staff and more 
than 10 enforcement officers.160 
 
The JSC’s powers and authority were increased significantly with the enactment of the Securities Law 
2002.161 The Securities Law 2002 regulates the capital market and provides a legislative framework to 
supervise the activities of the ASE, JSC, SDC, and market intermediaries. The JSC has the power to 
draft regulations in support of the legislation. The legislation gives the JSC the power to suspend trading 
or delist issuers and to impose fines of up to JD50,000, pursuant to Article 22 of the Securities Law 
                                                 
155 The relevant provisions are Articles 65-76 of the Securities Law 2002 (JOR). 
156 World Bank, Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC): Corporate Governance Country Assessment 
(Jordan) (June 2004), 2. 
157 For more information see www.sdc.com.jo.   
158 For more information see www.jsc.gov.jo.   
159 The SDC is regulated pursuant to Articles 76-89 of the Securities Law 2002 (JOR). 
160 The JSC is regulated pursuant to Articles 25-46 of the Securities Law 2002 (JOR). 
161 See Articles 8-15 of the Securities Law 2002 (JOR) for a general outline of the main responsibilities and powers of the 
JSC. 
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2002.162  The JSC has also been given quite significant investigative powers, including the power to 
subpoena parties to enforcement hearings and to obtain telephone records.163 The Controller of 
Companies, operating under the Ministry of Industry and Trade, also plays a significant enforcement 
role. The Controller has wide investigative authority and recourse rights, including the right to dissolve 
the board or revoke the company’s registration. The Controller does not, however, have the power to 
impose a fine or penalty. 
 
3. TYPES OF COMPANIES IN JORDAN 
 
3.1 General Partnership164 
 
A general partnership is formed by at least two and not more than twenty partners who are 
jointly and severally liable for the partnership’s debts.165 All of the rights and obligations of the 
partners are determined by a partnership agreement.166 A partner’s interest may be transferred 
with the approval of all partners or in accordance with the partnership agreement. Further, with 
the consent of existing partners, new partners can be admitted throughout the course of the 
partnership.167 The management of the partnership is vested with one or more managers.168 
Managers must act honestly and faithfully, and are personally liable for negligence that causes 
harm to the partnership.169 Partners may withdraw from the partnership of their own will at any 
time.170 If the partnership consists of only two partners, the withdrawal of one of the partners will 
not lead to the dissolution of the partnership. Instead, the remaining partner may seek to replace 
                                                 
162 Approximately AUD100,000. 
163 A board has been established to hear appeals from JSC decisions, whose decisions can be further appealed to the courts. 
For a general discussion see World Bank, above n 156, 2. 
164 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Articles 9-40.  
165 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Articles 9 and 26. 
166 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 16. 
167 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 29. 
168 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 17. 
169 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 18. 
170 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 28. 
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the absent partner.171 Further, a partnership continues to exist in the event of the death of one 
partner.172 
 
3.2  Limited Partnership173 
 
Limited partnerships can be established with or without share capital.174 Both types of 
arrangements are made up of general partners and limited partners.175 General partners are 
responsible for the management of the partnership and are jointly and severally liable for all the 
partnership’s debts and liabilities. Limited partners do not have the right to participate in 
management and liability is limited to their share in the capital of the partnership.176 The 
minimum capital permitted in a limited partnership in shares is JD100,000.177 Partnerships 
limited by shares are permitted to issue shares to the public through the ASE. Ordinary limited 
partnerships and general partners in partnerships limited by shares are subject to the provisions 
governing general partnerships in all matters not expressly covered.178 Limited partnerships in 
shares are also governed by the provisions pertaining to public shareholding companies.179 
 
3.3 Limited Liability Company180 
 
A limited liability company is composed of two or more persons whose liability is limited to the 
value of their shareholding in the company.181  The registration of a limited liability company 
                                                 
171 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 28(3)(c). Failure to do so within three months of the partner’s withdrawal will result 
in the partnership’s dissolution by virtue of law. 
172 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 30. 
173 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Articles 41-48 and 77-89.  
174 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Articles 41 and 77. 
175 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Articles 41 and 77. A limited partnership in shares must have at least two general partners 
and at least three limited partners (Article 77). There are no similar specifications for ordinary limited partnerships. 
176 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Articles 41 and 43. Whilst limited partners do not have the right to participate in 
management, they do have access to books, accounts and registers related to the decisions adopted in the course of 
management (Article 43(a)).  
177 Approximately AUD200,000. See Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 78. 
178 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Articles 48 and 82. 
179 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 89. 
180 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Articles 53-76. 
181 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 53(a). 
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composed of one person only is permitted with the approval of the Controller of Companies in 
the Ministry of Industry and Trade.182 The minimum required capital for limited liability 
companies is JD30,000,183 50 percent of which must be paid prior to official registration of the 
company.184 A limited liability company is to be managed by one individual or by a board of 
directors consisting of no more than seven individuals.185 The general assembly is composed of 
all the company shareholders and is required to hold annual meetings to discuss all relevant 
company matters.186 Limited liability companies are subject to the provisions governing public 
shareholding companies in all matters not expressly covered.187 
 
3.4  Private Shareholding Company188 
 
A private shareholding company is composed of two or more persons whose liability is limited 
to the value of their shareholding in the company.189 The registration of a private shareholding 
company composed of one person only is permitted with the approval of the Controller of 
Companies in the Ministry of Industry and Trade.190 The minimum required capital for limited 
liability companies is JD50,000,191 50 percent of which must be paid prior to official registration 
of the company.192 The company may issue various types and categories of shares which differ in 
their terms of nominal value, priority rights, transfer rights, voting force and method of profit and 
loss distribution.193 A private shareholding company is to be managed by a board of directors.194 
The general assembly is composed of all the company shareholders and is required to hold 
                                                 
182 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 53(b). 
183 Approximately AUD60,000. 
184 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Articles 54 and 59. The remaining amount must be paid within the following two years. 
185 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 60. 
186 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Articles 64-67. 
187 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 76. 
188 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Articles 65-89 bis. 
189 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 65(a) bis. 
190 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 65(a) bis. 
191 Approximately AUD100,000. 
192 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Articles 66 bis and 69 bis. 
193 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 68 bis. 
194 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 72 bis. 
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annual meetings to discuss all relevant company matters.195  Private shareholding companies are 
subject to the provisions governing public shareholding companies in all matters not expressly 
covered in the legislation or the articles or memorandum of association.196 
 
3.5  Public Shareholding Company197 
 
A public shareholding company may be formed by two or more shareholders whose liability is 
limited to their respective share of the company’s equity.198 They are managed by a board of 
directors, whose members are elected by company shareholders.199 The minimum authorised 
capital is set at JD500,000.200 The subscribed capital must exceed JD100,000201 or 20 percent of 
the authorised capital, whichever is greater.202 Banks, financial institutions and insurance 
companies may only be incorporated as public shareholding companies.203 Further, holding 
companies must be incorporated in this form.204 Public shareholding companies are permitted to 
issue shares to the public through the ASE.205  
 
3.6 Joint Investment Company206 
 
A joint investment company (mutual fund company) must be established as a public 
shareholding company. Its objectives are restricted to investing funds on behalf of others by way 
of securities.207 This entity may take the form of a company with variable capital, which issues 
redeemable shares, the value of which is determined by the value of the company’s assets. It may 
                                                 
195 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Articles 76-80 bis. 
196 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 89 bis. 
197 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Articles 90-191.  
198 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Articles 90(a) and 91. 
199 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 132. 
200 Approximately AUD1,000,000. 
201 Approximately AUD200,000. 
202 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 95. 
203 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 93. 
204 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 204. 
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206 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Articles 209-210.   
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also take the form of a company with fixed capital whose shares are not redeemable and are 
traded on the stock exchange.208 Joint investment companies are subject to the provisions 
governing public shareholding companies in all matters not expressly covered.209 
 
3.7  Offshore Company210 
 
An offshore (or exempt) company is a public shareholding company, private shareholding 
company, limited liability company or partnership limited by shares, that is registered in Jordan 
but conducts its business outside of Jordan.211 This company form was introduced in Jordan to 
attract foreign investment. This entity may not offer its shares for public subscription in Jordan, 
and Jordanians are prohibited from subscribing to its capital.212 Where the offshore company is 
engaged in insurance, banking, finance or joint investments, its capital must be at least 
JD1,000,000.213 
 
3.8  Foreign Operating Company214 
 
This business structure is open to foreign companies wishing to engage in business ventures in 
Jordan. A foreign company that has been awarded a contract in Jordan requiring execution of 
work therein must register a branch with the Controller of Companies in the Ministry of Industry 
and Trade. Such a company is registered as a foreign operating company for the purpose of the 
contract and for the relevant duration. If the company obtains other contracts in Jordan, then the 
same registration can be extended to cover such new contacts. If no new contracts are obtained 
                                                 
208 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 210. 
209 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 209(b). 
210 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Articles 211-214. 
211 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 211(a). 
212 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 211(b). 
213 Approximately AUD2,000,000. See Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 212. 
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by the company, then the branch office is closed and liquidated upon the completion of the 
contract in respect of which the registration was affected.215 
   
3.9  Foreign Non-operating Company216 
 
A foreign non-operating company is a foreign company or entity which takes Jordan as a base 
for its operations conducted outside Jordan, for the purpose of using the base as a representative 
office for directing and coordinating its operations with the foreign head office.217 Non-operating 
foreign companies are prohibited from carrying out any commercial activities within Jordan. 
However, it is still permissible for such companies to provide support services, including 
technical and scientific services. 218    
 
3.10  Joint Venture 
 
A joint venture need not be registered in Jordan and, hence, is not governed by the Companies 
Law 1997. A joint venture is typically regulated by a contractual agreement between the joint 
venture parties.  
 
 
                                                 
215 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 240(a). 
216 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Articles 245-251.   
217 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 245(a). 
218 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Articles 245(b)-(c). 
 44
CHAPTER 3 
 
THE OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND  
 
In recent years, countries around the world have come to realise the importance of an official corporate 
governance regime, which underpins market confidence, integrity and efficiency, as well as assisting in 
the strengthening of economic growth.219 After a wave of financial crises and a series of corporate 
scandals and failures that began in East Asia and rapidly spread to Russia,220 investors watched 
helplessly as their investments crashed due to systematic failures of investor protection mechanisms, 
combined with weak capital market regulation.221 These financial crises and corporate scandals raised 
serious concerns about the stability of the international financial market and further focussed the minds 
of governments, regulators, companies, investors and the public on weaknesses in corporate governance 
systems.222 
 
In 1998, policy makers within the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)223 
began a push for the OECD to develop, in conjunction with national and international governmental 
organisations, and the private sector, a universal set of corporate governance principles.224 As a result, 
the OECD developed an ad-hoc taskforce to consider the views of OECD member and non-member 
                                                 
219 Chee L, Corporate Governance: An Asia-Pacific Critique (2002), 55. See also Kirkpatrick G, Improving Corporate 
Governance Standards: The Work of the OECD and the Principles (2005). 
220 Gregary H, The Globalisation of Corporate Governance (2000), 2.   
221 Jesover F and Kirkpatrick G, The Revised OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and their Relevance to Non-OECD 
Countries (2004), 2. 
222 Ibid. 
223 OECD, Survey of Corporate Governance Development in OECD Countries (2004). 
224 Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC) to the OECD, The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance: An Evaluation 
of the 2004 Review by the TUAC Secretariat, (2004), 4.   
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countries and develop non-binding principles to evaluate and improve the legal, institutional, and 
regulatory framework for corporate governance.225   
 
In May 1999, a number of key principles were agreed upon and adopted by the OECD Ministerial 
Council. The principles became known as the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 1999 (OECD 
Principles 1999). They were the first international standard in this area, providing guidance and 
benchmarks for regulators and participants in financial markets across the globe. The OECD Principles 
1999 were non-binding because their implementation was intended to be adapted to different legal, 
economic and cultural circumstances. Furthermore, the OECD Principles 1999 did not adopt any single 
model of corporate governance. Rather, the drafters attempted to strike a balance between various 
international models, and focussed on basic principles which enable private sector corporations in 
different countries to be sufficiently attractive to the global investment community. 226  
 
The OECD Principles 1999 provided the landscape for the establishment of regional corporate 
governance roundtables in cooperation with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.227 In 
fact, the International Monetary Fund adopted the OECD Principles 1999 as a benchmark instrument for 
their member countries and surveillance procedures.228 Moreover, they were endorsed by the Financial 
Stability Forum229 as one of its twelve key standards for financial stability. Although not binding in any 
respect, the OECD Principles 1999 were too valuable to be ignored and far too beneficial not to 
embrace. 
 
                                                 
225  Gregary, above n 220, 3.     
226 TUAC, above n 224. 4.  
227 Chee, above n 219, 18. See also Jesover and Kirkpatrick, above n 204, 3; and TUAC, above n 224.   
228 Ibid. 
229 The Financial Stability Forum was established in 1999 to promote international financial stability through information 
exchange and international cooperation in financial supervision and surveillance. The Forum brings together, on a regular 
basis, national authorities responsible for financial stability in significant international financial centres, international 
financial institutions, sector-specific international groupings of regulators and supervisors, and committees of central bank 
experts. The Forum seeks to coordinate the efforts of these various bodies in order to promote international financial stability, 
improve the functioning of markets, and reduce systematic risk. For more information see www.fsforum.org.  
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2. FRAMEWORK OF THE OECD PRINCIPLES 1999 
 
As will be explained in the next section, the OECD Principles 1999 were revised and replaced in 2004. 
Whilst the 2004 revision process implemented a number of significant amendments which will be 
discussed in the next section of this chapter, the general content and underlying rationale of the 
principles remained the same.  
 
2.1  General Content 
 
The five chapters of the OECD Principles 1999 were each headed by a single statement of 
principle followed by a number of supporting recommendations. A second part to the document 
supplemented the recommendations with annotations that contained commentary on each 
principle. The first two chapters addressed the ‘Rights of Shareholders’ and the ‘Equitable 
Treatment of Shareholders’, respectively. The third chapter addressed the ‘Role of Stakeholders 
in Corporate Governance’. The last two chapters focused on the board of directors and were 
headed ‘Disclosure and Transparency’ and ‘Responsibilities of the Board’. 
 
There is no single model of effective corporate governance. The job of the drafters of the OECD 
Principles was to identify common elements from the systems in both OECD and non-OECD 
countries that underlie good corporate governance. The Principles do not provide detailed 
prescriptions for the implementation of national legislative frameworks. Rather, they seek to 
outline a series of general governance objectives and recommended means of achieving those 
objectives effectively. The role of corporate participants and their interaction with each other 
vary significantly between jurisdictions. The OECD Principles were developed to serve as a 
reference point for the policy makers within these jurisdictions to draft regulatory frameworks 
that reflect their respective economic, legal, social and cultural circumstances.  
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2.2 Core Standards  
 
The OECD Principles 1999 were built on four core standards: fairness, transparency, 
accountability, and responsibility.230  
 
(a) Fairness 
 
Principles 1 and 2 of the OECD Principles 1999 reflected the concept of fairness. 
Principle 1 provided that the corporate governance framework should protect 
shareholders’ rights. It was recognised that equity investors (shareholders) are property 
owners and, as owners of a legally recognised and divisible share of a company, they 
have the right to hold or convey their interest in the company. The Principle also 
recognised the protection of basic rights, such as the right to secure share ownership, to 
obtain a share in the profits, to gain access to relevant information on a timely basis, and 
to participate in general shareholder meetings, the election of directors, and the approval 
of mergers and acquisitions. The underlying rationale of Principle 1 was that effective 
corporate governance depends on the enforcement of common practices that ensure and 
protect the property rights of shareholders, and provide for secure methods of ownership, 
registration and transferability of shares. 
 
Principle 2 recognised that it is necessary to have a legal framework that protects the 
rights of minority shareholders against misappropriation of assets or self-dealing by 
controlling shareholders, managers, and directors. It provided that all shareholders of the 
same class must be treated equally and that the grievances of minority shareholders must 
receive the same attention and degree of urgency as those of majority shareholders. 
Principle 2 prohibited insider trading and abusive self-dealing and provided that all 
                                                 
230 Chee, above n 219, 80. 
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material matters related the company should be disclosed by the board to the 
shareholders.   
 
(b) Transparency  
 
A corporate governance framework should ensure timely disclosure of adequate 
information on financial performance and other important aspects of the corporation. It is 
expected that management give investors a clear and current representation of company 
affairs, including the financial position, performance, ownership and governance of the 
company. Principle 4 recognised that shareholders and investors need information from 
the company regarding financial and operating results to evaluate the performance of the 
company. It provided that, in order to prepare this information, a high quality standard of 
accounting and auditing must be maintained and an annual audit should be performed by 
an independent auditor to inform the shareholders and investors about corporate 
objectives, foreseeable risk factors and other relevant matters.    
 
(c) Accountability  
 
A corporate governance framework should ensure clarity in governance roles and 
responsibilities, effective monitoring of management to ensure alignment with 
shareholders’ interests, and accountability of the board of directors to shareholders. 
Principle 5 reflected the concept of accountability. As elected representatives of the 
shareholders, the board is answerable to them. The board is also responsible for the 
monitoring of management because they are in a fiduciary relationship with the 
shareholders and the company.231 The board should be independent from management to 
enable them to properly evaluate the performance of management. Directors have duties 
                                                 
231 Directors are generally charged with the following responsibilities: hire, compensate, monitor and, when necessary, 
replace senior management; advise management on corporate strategies, plans and major decisions; provide strategic 
oversight; ensure compliance with laws and regulations; ensure the integrity of accounting and financial reporting; consider 
the relationship of the corporation with stakeholders and society at large; and organise board structure and process.  
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of loyalty and care which require that they avoid self-interest in their decisions and act in 
good faith on a fully informed basis.  
 
(d) Responsibility  
 
The corporate governance framework should recognise the rights of stakeholders as 
established by law. Principle 3 reflected the concept of responsibility by recognising that 
a corporate governance framework should acknowledge the important role that 
stakeholders play in a company’s existence. Stakeholders should be given access to 
relevant information necessary for them to fulfil their particular role in the corporate 
governance process. Importantly, they should also have access to effective redress when 
their rights are violated. The underlying rationale of Principle 3 is that corporations 
should be encouraged to cooperate and act responsibly, in a manner that considers the 
interests of stakeholders in creating wealth and employment.  
 
3. REVISION OF THE OECD PRINCIPLES 1999 
 
Immediately following their establishment, the OECD Principles 1999 were utilised by member and 
non-member governments to evaluate and improve institutional and regulatory frameworks for corporate 
governance in their respective jurisdictions.232 Review committees were established and, in some 
countries, significant policy initiatives were set in motion. Further, the OECD implementation process 
continued in developing and transition countries. However, systemic corporate failures and scandals233 
continued to occur and undermine confidence in the integrity of corporations, financial institutions and 
the market generally. Accordingly, the OECD Ministerial Council formally launched a review process in 
2002 which resulted in the call for a reassessment of the OECD Principles 1999 by 2004.234 The 
assessment was carried out under the responsibility of the OECD Steering Group on Corporate 
                                                 
232 Jesover and Kirkpatrick, above n 204, 6. 
233 For example, the collapse of Enron, Tyco and Worldcom in the United Sates, Maxwell and BCCI in the United Kingdom; 
Ansett Airlines, One Tel, and HIH  in Australia; Parmalat, Ahold, and Vivendi in Europe. 
234 TUAC, above n 224, 6.   
 50
Governance which agreed to prepare an extensive report detailing major developments and issues in 
corporate governance.235  
 
The first major step in the OECD’s review process was the circulation of a detailed survey to member 
countries which highlighted the key features of corporate governance arrangements and requested 
comments on some significant issues that had not been addressed in the OECD Principles 1999.236 
Between March 2003 and January 2004, seven successive draft revisions were submitted by the OECD 
Secretariat to the Steering Group. As part of this process there was active participation by key 
international institutions, including the International Monetary Fund,237 World Bank,238 Financial 
Stability Forum,239 International Organisation of Securities Commissions,240 and the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision.241 There was also some participation of leading business and labour 
representatives, including the OECD’s Business Industry Advisory Committee242 and Trade Union 
Advisory Committee.243  
 
In January 2004, a draft of the revised principles was made publicly accessible on the internet seeking 
comments from interested parties. This proved to be a successful endeavour. A large number of public 
responses were received which aided the formulation of new principles that could be adapted to the 
needs of diverse legal, economic and cultural circumstances. The revised principles, which drew on the 
experiences of both OECD member and non-member countries, were agreed upon by the OECD in April 
                                                 
235 Ibid.  
236 Kirkpatrick, above n 202, 2.   
237 For information on the International Monetary Fund see above n 7. 
238 For information on the World Bank see above n 6. 
239 For information on the Financial Stability Forum see above n 229. 
240 The International Organisation of Securities Commissions is the world’s most important international cooperative forum 
for securities regulatory agencies. The Organisation’s wide membership regulates more than 90 percent of the world’s 
securities markets. For more information see www.iosoc.org.  
241 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision operates under the Bank for International Settlements. The Committee 
provides an international forum for regular cooperation on banking supervisory matters. The Committee encourages contacts 
and cooperation between its members and other banking supervisory authorities. It circulates both published and unpublished 
papers to supervisors throughout the world providing guidance on banking supervisory matters. For more information see 
www.bis.org/bcbs /index.htm.   
242 The Business Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD is an independent organisation officially recognised by the 
OECD as being representative of the OECD business community. Its members are the major industrial and employers’ 
organisations in the 30 OECD member countries. The principal objective of the Committee is to ensure that business and 
industry needs are adequately addressed in OECD policy instruments. 
243 The Trade Union Advisory Committee to the OECD is an interface for labour unions with the OECD. It is an international 
trade union organisation which has consultative status with the OECD and its various committees.  
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2004. The revision process had provided the opportunity for industrialised countries to re-establish a 
public leadership role in implementing effective corporate governance systems and continue the building 
of a solid relationship between the internal governance mechanisms of corporations and their 
accountability to all relevant corporate constituents.  
 
4. AN EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE OECD PRINCIPLES 2004  
 
4.1  Foundations of the Revised Principles 
 
Although non-binding, the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 2004 (OECD Principles 
2004) are a serious attempt to strengthen every aspect of corporate governance. They provide 
solutions to governance problems that stem from the separation of ownership and control, and 
suggest methods of dealing with complex issues relating to shareholders, employees, boards, 
management, and decision-making. Responding to experiences in OECD member and non-
member countries, the drafters of the revised principles recognised the need for flexibility, to 
ensure adaptation to different legal systems, as well as diverse economic and cultural 
circumstances. The flexibility of the OECD Principles 2004 allows corporate governance 
participants to evolve and adapt to constant change, and to develop strategies to keep up with the 
pace of the competitive business world. 
 
The OECD Principles 2004 utilised the same basic framework as the OECD Principles 1999.  
Chapter 1, a new chapter, calls on governments to put in place effective institutional and legal 
frameworks to support good corporate governance practice. Chapter 2 sets out the framework for 
a corporate governance system that protects and facilitates the exercise of shareholders’ rights.244 
Chapter 3 sets out measures to ensure the equal treatment of all shareholders, including minority 
and foreign shareholders.245 Chapter 4 details the important role of stakeholders in corporate 
                                                 
244 Equivalent to Chapter 1 of the OECD Principles 1999. 
245 Equivalent to Chapter 2 of the OECD Principles 1999. 
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governance.246 Chapter 5 outlines the importance of timely, accurate and transparent disclosure 
mechanisms.247 Finally, Chapter 6 deals with board structure, responsibilities and procedures.248  
 
4.2  Content of the Revised Principles   
 
In light of the discussion of the content of the OECD Principles 1999 earlier in this chapter, the 
following section concentrates primarily on the amendments that were made in the 2004 revised 
principles, as well as the comments and recommendations made by interested parties in the 
review process.  
 
(a) Chapter 1: Implementation 
 
Chapter 1 is a new chapter that outlines general methods for the implementation, 
supervision, regulation and enforcement of the principles. To ensure an effective 
corporate governance framework, it is important to improve the enforcement of existing 
laws and regulations. Improved law enforcement requires broad reform to improve the 
performance of the judiciary and to properly empower securities regulators, whilst at the 
same time increasing the effective use of self-regulation. Reinforcing the importance of 
proper implementation and effective enforcement was a critical issue for the drafters of 
the 2004 revised principles. 
 
Chapter 1 calls on policy makers to give the regulatory authorities within each country 
the power and resources necessary for effective implementation and enforcement of 
corporate governance initiatives. Moreover, policy makers are encouraged to regularly 
examine the different factors and elements of corporate governance to ensure the 
continuance of good and transparent practice. Governments are advised to outline the 
                                                 
246 Equivalent to Chapter 3 of the OECD Principles 1999. 
247 Equivalent to Chapter 4 of the OECD Principles 1999. 
248 Equivalent to Chapter 5 of the OECD Principles 1999. 
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process used to review their corporate governance framework and ensure that it embraces 
the needs of the unique cultural and social circumstances of their particular country.  
 
(b) Chapter 2: Rights of Shareholders  
 
Chapter 2 is equivalent to Chapter 1 of the OECD Principles 1999 with some significant 
amendments. It is generally aimed at protecting basic shareholder rights such as the right 
to secure methods of ownership, the right to attend and participate in general shareholder 
meetings, and the right to elect the board of directors.249 In addition, rights have been 
introduced that allow shareholders to remove the board of directors, to ask questions of 
the board of directors at the general shareholder meeting relating to the annual external 
audit, and to propose resolutions.250 Moreover, Chapter 2 introduced a new requirement 
that shareholders have the right to have their views heard in relation to the remuneration 
policy for board members and key executives, and that the equity component of 
compensation schemes for board members and employees be subject to shareholder 
approval.251 
 
Important amendments were made pertaining to ownership rights for all shareholders, 
including institutional investors. Under the original OECD Principles 1999, there was no 
mention of the need to facilitate the exercise of ownership rights by institutional 
investors. The revised Chapter 2 encourages authorities to allow institutional investors to 
cooperate and consult with each other on issues of corporate governance.252 It is a 
significant improvement to include a provision calling for an active ownership policy by 
institutional investors. The chapter also recommends that institutional investors maintain 
a good practice of disclosing information to the market.253 This has been said to be 
                                                 
249 OECD Principles 2004, Chapter 2, Principle A. 
250 Ibid. 
251 OECD Principles 2004, Chapter 2, Principle C3. 
252 OECD Principles 2004, Chapter 2, Principle G. 
253 OECD Principles 2004, Chapter 2, Principle F. 
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particularly important for trade unions in pre-funded retirement systems, collective 
investment schemes and some activities of insurance companies.254  
 
Despite these positive aspects of Chapter 2, it has been subject to some criticism. Union 
Network International255 commented that the title of the chapter would be more accurate 
if it referred to the ‘rights and responsibilities of shareholders’.256 It has also been argued 
that, although the chapter calls for shareholders’ effective participation in the nomination 
of directors, it does not explain or introduce the means by which shareholders can 
effectively access the nomination process, specifically, the company proxy material.257 
According to George Loladze,258 Chapter 2 should have been amended with a more 
specific and detailed requirement that shareholders have the opportunity to effectively 
buy or sell shares.259  
 
Another criticism of Chapter 2 is that it does not go far enough to meet the needs of 
institutional investors who are seeking to exercise responsible stewardship over the 
companies in which they invested workers’ retirement income or savings.260 Moreover, 
Chapter 2 does not help pension fund trustees who hold equity in certain companies and 
would like to see a more active and efficient role from their investment manager to 
oversee the activities of these companies.261 Furthermore, the Australian Stock Exchange 
(ASX) asserted that the principle which states that fiduciary institutional investors must 
set aside appropriate human and financial resources to disclose corporate governance 
policy requires strengthening.262 
                                                 
254 TUAC, above n 224, 13. 
255 Union Network International represents 15 million members in over 140 countries in more than 900 unions worldwide. 
For more information see www.union-network.org.    
256 OECD, Comments Received from Web consultations, Union Network International (UNI) (2004). 
257 Ibid. 
258 George Loladze is the Chairman of the Supervisory Board of the Georgian Stock Exchange. 
259 OECD, Comments Received from Web consultations, George Loladze, Chair, Supervisory Board, Georgian Stock 
Exchange  (2003).   
260 OECD, Comments Received from Web consultations, Union Network International (UNI) (2004).  
261 Ibid. 
262 OECD, Comments Received from Web consultations, Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) (2003). 
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The draft Chapter 2 included a provision requiring institutional investors to disclose 
voting records to the market on an annual basis. The provision was deleted from the final 
draft which only requires satisfactory disclosure.263 The Association of British Insurers264 
supported omitting the obligation that the voting record of the institutional investors be 
disclosed to the market on an annual basis.265 The Life Insurance Association of Japan 
(LIAJ) took a similar position to the Association of British Insurers. The reasoning of the 
LIAJ was that institutional investors, who are acting in a fiduciary capacity, often hold a 
wide variety of domestic and foreign stocks and the disclosure of voting records for all 
kinds of stocks would be very costly.266 The LIAJ also asserted that institutional investors 
acting in a fiduciary capacity should act in the interests of the beneficiaries, not for the 
shareholders of the company in which the institutional investors exercise their voting 
rights.267 
 
(c) Chapter 3: Equitable Treatment of Shareholders  
 
Chapter 3 is equivalent to Chapter 2 of the OECD Principles 1999 with some relatively 
minor amendments and clarifications. Conflicts of interest between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders are a major issue in all jurisdictions. Chapter 3 
was amended to place more emphasis on the need to protect minority shareholders from 
abusive actions by controlling shareholders.268 The provision pertaining to disclosure of 
                                                 
263 OECD Principles 2004, Chapter 2, Principle F.  
264 Members of the Association of British Insurers are actively involved in institutional investment, both because of the need 
to invest life and other premiums and because of their role in managing third party funds. Assets under management exceed 
₤1,000bn, including extensive equity investments in the United Kingdom and overseas market.  
265 OECD, Comments Received from Web consultations, The Association of British Insurers (2003). In contrast, the 
Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia supported the inclusion of the annual disclosure requirement. The 
organisation asserted that institutional investors should disclose their voting records on important issues where the value of 
the investment has been affected or where the board of directors’ recommendation has been voted against by the fund. For 
more information see OECD, Comments Received from Web consultations, Association of Superannuation Funds of 
Australia Ltd, (2003). 
266 OECD, Comments Received from Web consultations, The Life Insurance Association of Japan (LIAJ).  
267 Ibid. 
268 OECD Principles 2004, Chapter 3, Principle A2. 
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related party transactions was also strengthened.269 The final noteworthy amendment to 
Chapter 3 was the inclusion of a clause providing that impediments to cross-border 
voting should be eliminated.270  
 
One criticism of Chapter 3 was that the requirement for board members and key 
executives to disclose to the board whether they have a material interest in transactions 
affecting the corporation should be extended to require disclosure to shareholders as 
well.271 The rationale is that shareholders must be aware of potential conflicts when 
voting with regards to board membership or strategic company decisions.272  
 
According to Hermes Investment Management,273 the annotation to Principle A1, which 
pertains to capital structures, should have been amended to include the requirement that 
all companies shall monitor regularly (at least once every two years) the impact that their 
capital structure has on the cost of capital.274 Hermes suggested that independent external 
experts be appointed to assess the advantages and disadvantages of any departure from 
the ‘one share one vote’ rule. The independent external experts’ reports should be made 
publicly available and, subject to the approval of shareholders, the board of directors 
should use the report as a guideline to assist in determining the capital structure of the 
company.275  
 
The annotation to Principle A2, in the context of minority shareholders obtaining 
effective redress for violation of their rights, provides that derivative and class action law 
suits are a means of improving minority shareholders’ rights. The Japanese Business 
                                                 
269 OECD Principles 2004, Chapter 3, Principle C. 
270 OECD Principles 2004, Chapter 3, Principle A4. 
271 OECD, Comments Received from Web consultations, The International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) (2003). 
272 Ibid. 
273 Hermes Investment Management is owned by, and is the principal fund manager for, the British Telecom Pension Fund 
Scheme, the UK’s largest pension fund scheme. Hermes also manages portfolios for Royal Mail Pension Plan and 
approximately 200 clients including many major pension schemes. 
274 OECD, Comments Received from Web consultations, Hermes Investment Management (2003). 
275 Ibid. 
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Federation276 submitted, however, that this perception is flawed and that derivative 
lawsuits are not a means to improve minority shareholders’ rights, but rather, they are 
intended as a system for the recovery of damage a company has sustained. Whilst this 
submission is seemingly pedantic, it stems from a noteworthy concern, that is, the 
potential for shareholder suits to lead to excessive and frivolous litigation. The Federation 
recommended, albeit unsuccessfully, that the annotation should be amended with an 
expression relating to litigation on behalf of shareholders’ common interest, rather than 
referring to class action suits.277  
 
Another noteworthy criticism was directed at the annotation to Principle A3, which 
provides, in the context of custodial or nominee voting, that ‘[i]t is sufficient to disclose 
to the shareholders that, if no instruction to the contrary is received, the custodian will 
vote the shares in the way it deems consistent with shareholder interest’. The ASX 
recommended that the annotation should go further to provide that shareholders should be 
clearly informed on how the custodian intends to vote undirected proxies on each 
resolution.278  
 
(d) Chapter 4: The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance 
 
Chapter 4 is equivalent to Chapter 3 of the OECD Principles 1999 with some significant 
amendments. Chapter 4 recognises the importance of respecting the rights of 
stakeholders, not only those rights established by law, but also those established through 
mutual agreements.279 Moreover, the revised amendment to Principle C strengthens the 
language in relation to performance enhancing mechanisms for employee participation.280 
It seeks to allow such performance mechanisms to develop, especially in countries where 
                                                 
276 The Japanese Business Federation comprises 1,541 major Japanese business firms and industrial associations. 
277 OECD, Comments Received from Web consultations, The Japanese Business Federation (2003).  
278 OECD, Comments Received from Web consultations, Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) (2003). 
279 OECD Principles 2004, Chapter 4, Principle A. 
280 OECD Principles 2004, Chapter 4, Principle C. 
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they have no effective mechanisms to ensure and encourage employees to participate in 
the corporate governance of the company. 
 
Other significant amendments were made to Chapter 4 in relation to protecting the rights 
of whistleblowers and creditors. The new principle pertaining to whistleblowers calls for 
the protection of employees, and employee representative bodies, who wish to express 
their concerns about illegal or unethical practices to the board.281 The principle provides 
that such persons or bodies should be able to do so in full confidence that their 
complaints will be treated confidentially and without fear of punishment. The new 
principle pertaining to creditors addresses the importance of establishing a regulatory 
framework to ensure the existence and proper functioning of an effective and efficient 
insolvency framework that protects and enforces the rights of creditors.282 This is an 
important amendment as poorly defined and ineffective protection of creditors’ rights has 
caused significant corporate governance failures in many jurisdictions across the globe.  
 
Chapter 4 has been criticised for not including a definition of stakeholders. According to 
the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH),283 the term ‘stakeholders’ 
includes stockholders, other owners, workers and their representatives, and any other 
individuals who are either directly or indirectly affected by the activities and transactions 
of the corporation.284 Accordingly, the FIDH recommended the inclusion of a definition 
of stakeholders in Chapter 4 in these terms.285 The FIDH also directed a sweeping 
criticism of Chapter 4 in terms that it falls far short of an effective mechanism to ensure 
stakeholder participation because the wording is vague and lacks precision. This criticism 
was particularly targeted at Principles B1, C, and D. It was contended that these 
                                                 
281 OECD Principles 2004, Chapter 4, Principle E. 
282 OECD Principles 2004, Chapter 4, Principle F. 
283 The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) is an international human rights non-governmental organisation 
representing 115 member organisations in over 100 countries. 
284 OECD, Comments Received from Web consultations, International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) (2003).  
285 Ibid. The recommended definition of stakeholders came from a report adopted by the FIDH in August 2003 titled: ‘Norms 
on the responsibilities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to human rights’, adopted by 
the Sub-Commission on human rights in August 2003 (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2).  
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provisions allow a wide margin of discretion to managers with respect to the information 
they agree to make public and they do not go far enough to ensuring access to judicial 
recourses for affected stakeholders. 286 
 
Chapter 4 was also criticised by Union Network International287 and the Pensions and 
Investment Research Consultants Ltd288 for treating employees as an ordinary group of 
stakeholders.289 It was contended that employees should be more clearly recognised as 
valuable participants in the corporation. This requires the facilitation of internal 
procedures to allow them to play a role in the management and accountability systems of 
the company, as well as having adequate representation on the board. Moreover, in the 
opinion of Union Network International, Chapter 4 reflected a conceptual 
misunderstanding as it does not distinguish between performance enhancing mechanisms, 
such as employee share ownership schemes, and representation of stakeholders, such as 
employee participation at board level.290 None of the principles in Chapter 4 explicitly 
address and encompass the need for employee representation in the corporate governance 
framework.   
 
(e) Chapter 5: Disclosure and Transparency 
 
Chapter 5 is equivalent to Chapter 4 of the OECD Principles 1999 with a number of 
important amendments. The revised content has significantly improved standards for 
disclosure and auditing procedures. Disclosure requirements for board members and key 
executives has been broadened to include their qualifications, their selection process, 
their membership of other boards, whether they are regarded as independent by the board, 
                                                 
286 OECD, Comments Received from Web consultations, International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) (2003). 
287 For information see above n 255. 
288 Pensions and Investment Research Consultants Ltd (PIRC) is an UK-based independent adviser to institutional investors 
on issues of corporate governance and corporate responsibility. PIRC’s clients have combined assets of approximately 
₤400bn and include some of the largest pension funds, investment management companies and insurance companies in the 
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289 OECD, Comments Received from Web consultations, Union Network International (UNI) (2003); Comments Received 
from Web consultations, Pensions and Investment Research Consultant Ltd (PIRC) (2003). 
290 OECD, Comments Received from Web consultations, Union Network International (UNI) (2003). 
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and related party transactions.291 The wording of the principle pertaining to the 
requirement for an annual external audit has also been significantly strengthened and a 
new principle has been introduced providing that external auditors should be accountable 
to shareholders and owe a duty to the company to exercise due professional care.292 
Further, a new principle has been introduced providing that the corporate governance 
framework should include an effective approach to ensure the integrity of those 
professions that serve as conduits of analysis and advice to the market, such as brokers, 
analysts, and rating agencies.293 
 
Despite these amendments, Chapter 5 has still been subject to criticism, particularly for 
the limited scope of the disclosure requirements. For instance, the FIDH294 recommended 
that the disclosure obligations of a company should include the company’s policies 
regarding human rights, social and environmental responsibilities, as well as the actual 
impact of its activities on such issues.295 MVC Associates International suggested that 
companies should disclose their goals and activities in three domains of leadership 
accountability and governance, namely: 
 Operational domain – focussed on financial and other results from current 
business operations. 
 Business development domain – focussed on development of future 
products, services and possible new business models, as a basis for 
assessing the level of innovation and risk in the enterprise on behalf of the 
shareholders. 
                                                 
291 OECD Principles 2004, Chapter 5, Principle A. 
292 OECD Principles 2004, Chapter 5, Principles C and D. 
293 OECD Principles 2004, Chapter 5, Principle F. 
294 For information see above n 283. 
295 OECD, Comments Received from Web consultations, International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) (2003).  
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 Global industry domain – focussed on the role of the enterprise in society 
and goals and objectives related to corporate citizenship, shareholder value 
and sustainable development.296  
 
The Association of British Insurers297 suggested that the disclosure of material risk 
factors should include reference to social and environmental factors that have an impact 
on the company’s performance.298 Moreover, Union Network International299 
recommended that Chapter 5 should be amended to require disclosure by board members 
and key executives of any stock options which must not be traded while they are under 
obligations to the company.300 Accordingly, the organisation submitted, albeit 
unsuccessfully, that Chapter 5 should be further extended to prohibit the abuse of stock 
options by members of the board and key executives.301 
 
(f) Chapter 6: Responsibility of the Board 
 
Chapter 6 is equivalent to Chapter 5 of the OECD Principles 1999 with relatively minor 
amendments. An independent and responsible board of directors is an essential 
foundation for an effective internal corporate governance structure. It is the duty of the 
board to meet often and to set long-term business strategies, rather than be responsible for 
the day-to-day operation of the company. The board is responsible for monitoring the 
company’s management and ensuring the company’s compliance with relevant laws and 
regulations. Moreover, to prevent conflicts of interest and to balance competing demands 
on the company, the board must be independent from managers rather than simply 
operating as a rubber stamp. The board should consider the interests of all stakeholders in 
the company, treat them fairly, and provide them with access to information.  
                                                 
296 OECD, Comments Received from Web consultations, MVC Associates International (2003). 
297 For information see above n 264. 
298 OECD, Comments Received from Web consultations, The Association of British Insurers (2003). 
299 For information see above n 255. 
300 OECD, Comments Received from Web consultations, Union Network International (UNI) (2003). 
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Chapter 6 has been subject to extensive criticism. The FIDH302 contended that the term 
‘ethical standards’ in Principle C does not constitute an internationally consistent norm, 
and that the principle falls short of calling on boards to respect the United Nations’ 
Declaration of Human Rights and other human rights instruments.303 Moreover, the FIDH 
was concerned to see ‘ethical standards’ and the ‘interests of stakeholders’ lumped into 
one provision, a combination which will possibly cause confusion.304  
 
Another commentator305 suggested including a section which more explicitly reinforces 
the responsibilities of management. The rationale is that a clear and specific statement 
pertaining to the duties and responsibilities of managers would assist in better serving 
shareholders’ and stakeholders’ interests.306 Further, the Association of British Insurers307 
criticised Principle E1 by asserting that it is insufficient to call on boards to ‘consider’ 
assigning independent directors to tasks where there is potential for conflicts of interest 
and that, accordingly, the word ‘consider’ should be deleted from the provision.308  
 
Principle B provides that ‘where board decisions may affect different shareholder groups 
differently, the board should treat all shareholders fairly’. Hermes Investment 
Management309 suggested that the annotation to this principle needs to make mention of 
the situation in which controlling shareholders de facto appoint a large proportion of 
members to the board, and the directors have a conflict of interest with one of the 
shareholders in a specific transaction.310 It was recommended that the annotations should 
                                                 
302 For more information see above n 283. 
303 OECD, Comments Received from Web consultations, International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) (2003). 
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305 Wendy Lane, Chairman of Lane Holdings Inc, Needham, Ma, USA. 
306 OECD, Comments Received from Web consultations, Wendy Lane, Chairman of Lane Holdings Inc (2003).  
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308 OECD, Comments Received from Web consultations, The Association of British Insurers (2003). 
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stipulate that when directors are involved in this kind of conflict, they should disclose 
their conflict and abstain from voting.311  
 
Moreover, Hermes submitted that the annotation to Principle E, concerned with 
objectivity of boards, should also deal with the issue of cross-directorship and suggested 
the inclusion of an example in the following terms: ‘A typical case of cross-directorship 
is to have an executive director of company [A] as a member of the board of company 
[B], and conversely an executive director of company [B] to be a member of the board of 
company [A]. This situation can lead to inappropriate “mutual support” between directors 
of different companies and conflicts of interest that could be detrimental to the interests 
of the company as a whole, including shareholders’.312 
 
The PIRC313 suggested that the annotation to Principle D4, which deals with board 
remuneration, should include a statement reinforcing the importance of independent 
remuneration committees as a means of avoiding conflicts of interest.314 Moreover, the 
PIRC contended that the annotation to Principle D5, pertaining to transparency in the 
nomination process, should include a recommendation for the appointment of a fully 
independent nomination committee.315 The PIRC also suggested that Principle E, which 
deals with board independence, should more clearly support the presence of a significant 
number of independent directors, and the enhancement of requirements for extensive 
disclosure to shareholders on the background details of directors to assist shareholders in 
forming their own view on the issue of independence.316 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OECD PRINCIPLES 2004                                        
IN AUSTRALIA AND JORDAN 
 
1. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS  
 
1.1  Framework of Analysis 
 
This chapter serves to provide a comparative analysis of the implementation of the OECD 
Principles 2004 in Australia and Jordan. Each principle is discussed separately, except where two 
or more principles are closely related. In each section, the content of the principle is set out 
together with a summary of the annotation to the principle. This is followed by a detailed 
discussion of the relevant legal framework in Jordan and Australia. Where necessary, 
recommendations are proposed at the end of the section. The focus of the OECD Principles 
2004, and therefore this comparative analysis, is publicly traded companies. However, to the 
extent they are deemed relevant, the Principles may provide a useful tool to improve corporate 
governance in non-listed companies, for example privately owned and government enterprises. 
The comparative analysis begins at Chapter 2 of the OECD Principles 2004. Chapter 1 of the 
OECD Principles 2004 has not been used as the basis for a comparative analysis because of the 
very general nature of its content.317 
 
1.2  Jordan: Background Information 
 
Jordan operates under a civil law scheme. Accordingly, any obligations, responsibilities or rights 
must be supported by legislation in order to be enforceable. Jordanian corporations are regulated 
                                                 
317 A general discussion of the content of Chapter 1 of the OECD Principles 2004 has been included Chapter 3, Section 
4.2(a), of this paper.  
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pursuant to the Jordanian Companies Law 1997 (Companies Law). The provisions referred to in 
this chapter will be those relating to public shareholding companies listed on the Amman Stock 
Exchange (ASE). As explained in Chapter 2, Section 3, of this paper, the provisions regulating 
public companies also apply to the other types of companies in Jordan in areas not specifically 
covered in the chapters of the legislation governing those other types of companies. Other 
relevant rules and regulations include the ASE Listing Rules, banking law,318 privatisation 
law,319 insurance supervision law,320 and securities law.321  
 
In October 2003, just prior to the OECD’s review of its 1999 Principles, the Global Corporate 
Governance Forum322 and the Centre for International Private Enterprise (CIPE)323 sponsored a 
large-scale initiative to assess the state of corporate governance in a number of Middle Eastern 
and North African (MENA) countries, including Jordan.324 Local discussion roundtables were 
held in Jordan and were attended by a number of representatives from both the public and private 
sectors. The recommendations from these meetings were presented in Cairo on September 7, 
2003 at the MENA Corporate Governance Workshop.325 These recommendations, albeit only 
stated in very general terms, were a positive step forward as they identified the key areas of the 
Jordanian corporate governance landscape requiring reform. 
 
                                                 
318 Banking Law 2000 (JOR).  
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In June 2004, a report assessing Jordan’s observance of corporate governance procedures was 
completed as part of the joint program of Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes 
(ROSC) sponsored by the World Bank and the IMF.326 The Jordan Securities Commission (JSC) 
cleared the report for publication in February 2005. Whilst the initiative had the potential to 
provide a solid platform for a detailed reform agenda for the Jordanian Government, the content 
of the report was, like the recommendations formulated for the MENA workshop, relatively 
general and brief. Nevertheless, the reform proposals contained in the report provide a solid 
foundation for policymakers in Jordan. 
 
A significant recent development was the establishment of the Jordanian Corporate Governance 
Association (JCGA) in 2005. The JCGA was set up to operate as an independent, non-profit 
membership organisation responsible for working with investors, companies and regulators in 
the implementation of effective corporate governance practices throughout Jordan.327 The first 
major task for the JCGA was to represent Jordan at two meetings of the OECD-MENA Working 
Group on Corporate Governance in 2005. The Working Group is a regional forum for policy 
dialogue which has built on the 2003 regional corporate governance roundtables sponsored by 
the Global Corporate Governance Forum and the CIPE, discussed above. At the first meeting, 
held in Jordan on 14 February 2005, the Working Group agreed to develop a regional corporate 
governance paper. The meeting was reconvened in Morocco six months later and a draft paper 
was completed. The purpose of the paper was to provide an overview of the main issues and 
developments in the MENA region and establish benchmarks for measuring success.328 As yet, 
the final version of the paper has not been released. 
 
JCGA also represented Jordan at a MENA-sponsored corporate governance technical assistance 
workshop held in Cairo, Egypt on March 14 and 15, 2006. The workshop was attended by 
regional participants from 7 countries, including Jordan, and mainly focused on the rationale and 
                                                 
326 World Bank, above n 156. 
327 For more information see www.cipe.org/programs/global/partners/dispPartner.php?id=231. 
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process of developing corporate governance codes.329 The second workshop is scheduled to be 
held in Amman, Jordan on 12-13 December, 2006. Its focus will be on drafting the code’s 
content and consulting stakeholders.330 The third and final workshop, to be held in Beirut in 
April 2007, will focus on strategies to implement and monitor the code.331 
 
1.3  Australia: Background Information 
 
Australian corporations are regulated pursuant to the Australian Corporations Act 2001 
(Corporations Act). Other relevant rules and regulations include the Australian Stock Exchange 
(ASX) Listing Rules, the ASX Corporate Governance Council, Principles of Good Corporate 
Governance and Best Practice Recommendations (ASX Principles of Corporate Governance 
2003), accounting standards which have the force of law,332 guidelines issued by private sector 
bodies,333 and voluntary self-regulatory codes of practice. 
 
The Australian Government’s Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP) was 
announced in 1997 as an initiative to improve the regulation of companies operating in Australia. 
The CLERP is an ongoing program which seeks to ensure that Australia’s business regulation is 
consistent with international best practice and provides an appropriately secure environment for 
investment in Australia. The program is specifically aimed at enhancing the transparency of 
financial information and the accountability of market participants by modernising the regulation 
of fundraising, takeovers, directors’ duties, corporate governance, financial reporting, financial 
markets and investment products. The policy frameworks that have been developed under the 
                                                 
329 The main issues discussed included (i) why codes are useful; (ii) the objectives of a code; (iii) initiating and leading the 
process; (iv) setting-up an action plan; and (v) managing difficulties. 
330 More specifically, this workshop is to discuss the following issues: (i) assessing the country’s existing corporate 
governance and company law frameworks, and identifying gaps; (ii) identifying specific corporate governance issues to be 
addressed in the MENA context; (iii) consulting with stakeholders; and (iv) drafting the code. 
331 For more information on the MENA workshops see www.gcgf.org/ifcext/cgf.nsf/Content/SupportingDevelopment 
_MENA. 
332 The Australian Auditing Standards issued by the Australian Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (AUASB) are 
legally enforceable, and apply for financial periods commencing 1 July 2006. They apply to audits under the Corporations 
Act 2001 (Cth) and audits of a financial report for any other purpose. 
333 For example, the Guide for Investment Managers and Corporations produced by the Australian Investment Managers’ 
Association and the Best Practice Guidelines for Research Integrity produced by the Australian Institute of Company 
Directors.   
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CLERP since 1997 have prompted the enactment of legislation in all these key areas of company 
regulation.334 
 
The ASX Corporate Governance Council was established in August 2002 as a collaborative, 
industry-based body set up to develop corporate governance recommendations for listed entities 
which reflect international standards. It includes representatives from more than 20 business, 
shareholder and industry groups from disparate business backgrounds, each offering valuable 
guidance and information specific to their constituencies and industry.335 On 1 January 2003, the 
ASX introduced a number of significant amendments to the ASX Listing Rules to enhance 
compliance with corporate governance best practice. Three months later the ASX Principles of 
Corporate Governance were released, which represent the most comprehensive statement of best 
practice in Australia.336 The adoption of this framework represented a major evolution in 
corporate governance practice in Australia. A full version of the Principles including 
commentary and guidance on each principle is provided to all listed companies.  
 
The ASX Principles of Corporate Governance 2003 are guidelines, not prescriptions. ASX 
Listing Rule 4.10.3 provides that a company must include in its annual report a statement 
disclosing the extent to which the entity has complied with the ASX Principles of Corporate 
Governance 2003 during the reporting period. If the company has not followed any one of the 
recommendations then it must identify that recommendation and provide reasons for not 
following it. This process is most commonly referred to as an ‘if not, why not’ policy. It is 
considered to be an effective approach because it allows listed companies a degree of flexibility 
to consider a range of means to address corporate governance issues and avoid particular 
recommendations if they are inappropriate for the company’s particular circumstances. ASX 
                                                 
334 For more information see www.treasury.gov.au/content/business_law.asp?ContentID=321&titl=Business%20Law%20% 
26%20Regulation. 
335 More information on the Council representatives can be located at www.asx.com.au/supervision/governance/corporate_ 
governance_council.htm 
336 For a copy of the ASX Principles of Corporate Governance 2003 see www.asx.com.au/about/pdf/ASXRecommendations. 
pdf. 
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Guidance Notes 9 and 9A were published to assist listed companies in the preparation of the 
compliance statement required under ASX Listing Rule 4.10.3.  
 
On 6 March 2006, the ASX Corporate Governance Council released the results from a user 
survey, issued in November 2005, aimed at understanding the relevance of corporate governance 
disclosure to the investment and analyst community.337 The results revealed that the vast 
majority of respondents, private investors and organisations/professionals,338 do rely on 
corporate governance compliance information in assessing their potential and current 
investments.339 The key areas of interest were financial reporting, board structure and 
responsibilities, and board remuneration. Private investors expressed a need to know where to 
find corporate governance information and to be provided with clearer simpler explanations. 
Private investors cited the media as their principal source of information, whereas 
organisations/professionals rely more heavily on information disclosed in annual reports and 
financial statements. The ASX survey also prompted a formal review340 of the ASX Principles of 
Corporate Governance 2003 and changes to the current recommendations will become effective 
on 1 July 2007. 
 
On 22 May 2006, the ASX released a detailed report documenting its most recent analysis of 
corporate governance practice disclosure. The report revealed listed companies are continuing to 
improve their corporate governance reporting. The aggregate of adoption of recommended 
practices and of ‘if not, why not’ exception reporting were significantly higher in 2005 than in 
the previous year. The overall reporting level (being the aggregate of actual adoption of the 
                                                 
337 For a copy of the survey results see www.asx.com.au/supervision/pdf/MR20060306_corp_gov_council_ user_survey.pdf. 
338 In total, there were 729 respondents. Of the total, 355 (49 percent) answered as private investors (all part of the Australian 
Shareholder’s Association) while 374 (51 percent) answered as organisations/professionals.  
339 In total, 80 percent of private investors and 75 percent of organisations/professionals surveyed use corporate governance 
information in assessing and reviewing their investments. 
340 The Council’s review takes into account recent legislative amendments, reporting trends to date, the need for any 
additional guidance, and recent developments in non-financial risk reporting. The Council will seek the views of the general 
public as part of the review, which it intends to complete by the end of 2006. 
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Recommendations and the ‘if not, why not’ exception reporting) increased to 88 percent from 84 
percent in 2004. There were also strong improvements in most other areas.341 
 
1.4  The Importance of Effective Enforcement Measures 
 
Although Chapter 1 is not being used as the basis for a comparative analysis in this paper for 
reasons stated above, the principles within that chapter which highlight the importance of 
effective enforcement measures are worthy of brief discussion. Chapter 1, Principles C and D 
reinforce that the division of responsibilities between different enforcement authorities within a 
jurisdiction should be clearly articulated, and those authorities should be provided with the 
necessary power and resources to fulfil their duties effectively. A perfectly drafted all-
encompassing corporate governance regulatory framework is of no worth if it is not properly 
enforced. As well as promoting the use of effective self-regulation measures, improved 
enforcement requires broad reform to improve the performance of the judiciary and to provide 
securities regulators with effective means to enforce relevant laws and regulations.  
 
In Jordan, enforcement of corporate governance measures is still very much in the development 
stage. In many instances there is a significant gap between what a Jordanian law states and what 
is actually practiced. The judiciary in Jordan is not sufficiently developed to be able to cope with 
the arduous task of enforcing corporate governance standards.342 Other bodies responsible for 
enforcement include the JSC,343 the Controller of Companies,344 the Central Bank of Jordan 
(CBJ), and the Insurance Commission. Accordingly, there are significant overlaps in 
enforcement jurisdiction. This is particularly so because of the separate disclosure statements 
                                                 
341 For a copy of the report see www.asx.com.au/about/pdf/corporate_governance_2005_disclosure.pdf.  
342 There is ordinarily a great deal of secrecy surrounding corporate investigations and court cases can drag out for many 
years. For a detailed discussion see MENA Regional Corporate Governance Working Group, above n 16, 52. 
343 The JSC’s powers and authority increased significantly with the enactment of the Securities Law 2002 (JOR). It now has 
the power to impose significant fines and even delist issuers. The JSC also has investigative powers, including powers to 
subpoena non-registrants and obtain phone records. 
344 The Controller of Companies in Jordan, operating under the Minister of Industry and Trade, has wide information and 
recourse rights, can attend general shareholder meetings, and can dissolve a company’s board or revoke its registration. The 
department of the Controller of Companies does not have the power to impose fines and must use the courts to enforce its 
findings. 
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that each of these bodies require of listed companies, which is discussed in detail in Chapter 4, 
Section 16, of this paper. The problem is that the regulatory function in Jordan is simply too 
fragmented and not adequately coordinated. The Jordanian authorities need to review the 
enforcement roles of all these bodies and organise them into a more coordinated and consistent 
scheme. 
 
In Australia, the body responsible for overseeing the matrix of corporate governance regulation 
is an independent statutory authority, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
(ASIC). ASIC is granted wide powers of investigation by the ASIC Act 1989 (Cth).345 ASIC also 
has a general power to do ‘whatever is necessary for or in connection with, or reasonably 
incidental to, the performance of its functions’.346 Separately, provisions in the Corporations Act 
confer further investigative powers on ASIC. At the conclusion of an investigation, if ASIC 
believes that an offence may have been committed, it can commence prosecution itself or refer 
the matter to the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP).347 
 
ASIC deals with both civil and criminal matters.348  ASIC’s enforcement actions are best 
classified as either civil (restitutionary in nature) or penal (punitive in nature). The most 
frequently occurring civil actions are: (i) applications to the court to restrain the payment or 
transfer of money or property where there has been a breach of the law;349 (ii) applications to the 
court for injunctions to restrain breaches of the law;350 and (iii) applications to the court to wind 
up companies.351  
 
                                                 
345 Section 13 of the ASIC Act 1989 (Cth) grants ASIC the power to ‘make such investigation as it thinks expedient for the 
due administration of the corporations legislation … where it has reason to suspect that [a contravention] may have been 
committed’.  
346 ASIC Act 1989 (Cth), s 14. 
347 ASIC Act 1989 (Cth), s 49. In practice, the DPP handles indictable criminal offences, while ASIC prosecutes the bulk of 
minor summary matters itself. 
348 For a detailed discussion of ASIC’s enforcement functions see Bird H et alia, ASIC Enforcement Patterns (2003), 
Research Report, Centre for Corporate Law and Securities Regulation (University of Melbourne), 44-52 
349 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 1323. 
350 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 1324. 
351 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 461. 
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ASIC penal sanctions can be separated into two separate categories: (i) wrongdoing for which 
the penalty is specified in the particular section, or s 1311; or (ii) wrongdoing under a civil 
penalty provision. Section 1311 is a general penalty provision which provides that when a 
provision in the Corporations Act provides a penalty for a certain offence, then that penalty will 
apply. Where there is no prescribed penalty, s 1311 prescribes other penalties. Civil penalty 
provisions are either civil or criminal. Civil penalties prescribe an order prohibiting a person 
from managing a corporation for an unspecified period and/or a fine of up to AUD200,000.352 
Criminal penalties apply when a person contravenes a civil penalty provision knowingly, 
intentionally or recklessly with dishonest intent. Criminal penalties include a fine of up to 
AUD200,000 and/or five years imprisonment.353  
 
In addition to enforcing relevant provisions of the Corporations Act 2001, ASIC sets standards, 
issues best practice guidelines, and (together with the ASX) has a key role in disseminating 
information to the market.  It should be noted that disciplinary action may also be taken by the 
ASX against companies in breach of its Listing Rules, including suspension of an entity’s 
securities from quotation or, ultimately, de-listing. Enforcement of the Corporations Act 2001 
may also be undertaken by private action in the courts.354 
 
2. THE GENERAL RIGHTS OF SHAREHOLDERS 
 
2.1  Content of the OECD Principles 
 
Chapter 2: The Rights of Shareholders and Key Ownership Functions 
 
The corporate governance framework should protect and facilitate the exercise of shareholders’ 
rights.   
                                                 
352 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), Part 9.4B (ss 1317DA-1317S).   
353 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 1311(2), and (3), and Schedule 3. 
354 This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 of this paper. 
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A.  Basic shareholders’ rights should include the right to: (1) secure methods of ownership 
registration; (2) convey or transfer shares; (3) obtain relevant information on the 
corporation on a timely and regular basis; (4) participate and vote in general 
shareholder meetings; (5) elect and remove members of the board; and (6) share in the 
profits of the corporation. 
 
2.2 Comparative Analysis 
 
Shareholders have a number of property rights that should be protected by law. The right of 
shareholders in public companies to buy, sell and transfer shares is fundamental. In addition to 
this fundamental right, there are numerous other important rights possessed by equity investors, 
for example, the right to share in the profits of the corporation and the right to vote on important 
issues regarding the company’s affairs. Management of a company, however, is left in the hands 
of a board of directors and management team. Chapter 2, Principle A, is a statement of the most 
basic rights of shareholders that are recognised in legal regimes of almost all developed 
countries. 
 
(a) Secure Methods of Ownership Registration 
 
Both the Jordanian Companies Law and the Australian Corporations Act comply with the 
OECD principle regarding shareholders’ right to secure methods of ownership 
registration. 
 
In Jordan, the Companies Law clearly identifies the right of shareholders to secure 
ownership registration in Article 98, which provides that a public shareholding company 
is required to keep a register which records the names of all shareholders and all other 
relevant information in relation to their shareholding. Registration with the company’s 
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shareholder register provides formal legal proof of ownership for public shareholding 
companies. Further, the Securities Law 2002 specifies the responsibilities of the 
Securities Depository Centre (SDC) to include maintenance of a central registry and 
depository of authenticated shareholders along with a central settlement process. This 
ensures that the registers of all public shareholding companies are held and maintained at 
the SDC in electronic form. All listed companies are required to register with the SDC.355 
 
Similarly, in Australia, ss 168 and 169 of the Corporations Act outline the requirement 
for a detailed register of members. Further, s 231 provides that a person is a member of a 
company if they: (a) are a member of the company upon its registration; or (b) agree to 
become a member of the company after its registration and their name is entered on the 
register of members; or (c) become a member of the company under s 167 (membership 
arising from conversion of a company from one limited by guarantee to one limited by 
shares).356 
 
(b) Convey or Transfer Shares 
 
Both the Jordanian Companies Law and the Australian Corporations Act comply with the 
OECD principle regarding shareholders’ right to convey or transfer shares. 
 
In Jordan, Article 98(c) of the Companies Law provides that a public shareholding 
company shall list its shares and shall follow the rules and procedures provided for in the 
laws, regulations and instructions that regulate the negotiability of securities. 
Accordingly, virtually all shares listed on the ASE are freely transferable pursuant the 
ASE Listing Rules. The only exception is found in Article 100 of the Companies Law, 
which provides that founders’ shares in public shareholding companies are non-
                                                 
355 Securities Law 2002 (JOR), Articles 81 and 82. 
356 For a general discussion see Fisher S et alia, Corporations Law (2nd ed, 2001), 57. 
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transferable for two years.357 Clearing and settlement is handled by the SDC and all 
shares must be ‘authenticated’ before they can be traded.358 
 
In Australia, pursuant to s 1085 of the Corporations Act, shares are transferable in the 
manner provided by the company constitution, or, if the company is a listed company, the 
ASX Listing Rules.359 All ordinary shares listed on the ASX are traded and freely 
transferable, however, directors, senior managers, employees and related parties cannot 
trade in the company’s securities while in possession of unpublished price sensitive 
information.360 Directors and employees should ensure that all transactions in the 
company’s securities comply with relevant laws and regulations. In particular, 
compliance must be ensured with the insider trading provisions in s 1043A and all of the 
relevant provisions in the ASX Listing Rules, especially the continuous disclosure 
requirement in Listing Rule 3.1.361 
 
(c) Obtain Relevant Information on the Corporation on a Timely and Regular Basis 
 
Both the Jordanian Companies Law and the Australian Corporations Act comply with the 
OECD principle regarding shareholders’ right to obtain relevant information on the 
corporation on a regular basis. A timely and balanced disclosure is necessary to allow 
shareholders to exercise their ownership rights based on the information provided. Proper 
disclosure is very important to attract local and foreign investment and to maintain 
confidence in the capital market. On the other hand, poor disclosure can contribute to a 
loss in market integrity. Shareholders should have the right to access regular information 
                                                 
357 There is an exception to this general restriction in Article 100(b). Excluded from the restriction is the transfer of founders’ 
shares to heirs and between spouses, ancestors and descendents, as well as transfers among the founders themselves. Also 
permitted is the transfer of founders’ shares to third parties under a judicial decision. 
358 Authentication is essentially just a process of identification. 
359 For a general discussion see Tomasic R et alia, Corporations Law in Australia (2nd ed, 2002), 293. 
360 Ford H et alia, Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law (10th ed, 2001), 415. 
361 For a general discussion see Tunstall I, Corporations Act Compliance Guide (2nd ed, 2003), 213. 
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so that they can assess management performance and make vital decisions based on this 
information.362 
 
In Jordan, Article 140 of the Companies Law states that the board must prepare and 
present to the general assembly, on an annual basis, the balance sheet of the company, its 
profit and loss statement, and cash flow statements accompanied with their clarifications 
compared with those of the previous fiscal year. The board must also present an annual 
report on the company activities and forecasts for the following year.363 Article 142 
provides that the board of a public shareholding company must also prepare a separate 
financial report every six months that includes the financial position of the company, the 
results of its operations, a profit and loss account, a cash flow list and the clarifications 
related to the financial statements certified by the company auditors. Moreover, Article 
143 provides that the board of a public shareholding company shall provide the general 
assembly with a detailed annual report disclosing all relevant information pertaining to 
the expenses, remunerations and privileges of the chairman and the board of directors.364  
 
Also relevant in the context of shareholders obtaining relevant information is instructions 
issued by the JSC in 2004 which require listed companies to make public any ‘material 
fact’ as soon as possible after its occurrence.365 ‘Material fact’ is defined as ‘any event or 
datum that might affect a person’s decision to buy, hold, sell or dispose of a security’.366 
It is also required that the relevant company submit a report of the event to the JSC 
                                                 
362 For more information see OECD Principles 2004, Annotation to Chapter 2, Principle A3. 
363 Copies of all documents must be sent to the Controller of Companies in accordance with Article 140(b) of the Companies 
Law 1997 (JOR). Further, Article 141 provides that the board must publish the company balance sheet, its profit and loss 
account, a detailed summary of the annual board report, and the auditors’ report, within a period not exceeding 30 days from 
the date of the general assembly meeting. 
364 Article 143 lists the following items requiring disclosure: (1) All amounts received from the company during the fiscal 
year by the chairman and members of the board, in the form of wages, fees, salaries, bonuses, remuneration and others; (2) 
Benefits that the chairman and members of the board enjoy such as free accommodation, cars etc; (3) Amounts that have 
been paid to the chairman and members of the board of directors during the fiscal year such as travel and transport 
allowances; (4) A detailed account of the donations paid by the company during the fiscal year, and the entities that received 
them; (5) A list of the names of the board of directors, the number of shares owned by each of them and the duration of their 
membership. 
365 JSC Instructions for Disclosure, Accounting and Auditing Standards of Issuing Companies 2004, Article 8. 
366 Article 8 of the JSC Instructions for Disclosure, Accounting and Auditing Standards of Issuing Companies 2004 provides 
a list of the types of events that may constitute a material fact. 
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within a week of its occurrence, as well as issuing a public statement to confirm, deny or 
correct any news item about the event which is published in the media.367 See also Article 
43 of the Securities Law 2002, which provides that every issuer must make public, and 
file with the JSC, the detail of any material events. 
 
In Australia, the Corporations Act also has various provisions protecting shareholders’ 
right to obtain relevant information. For example, s 292 requires disclosing entities, 
public companies, large proprietary companies, and registered schemes to prepare and 
disclose a financial report and a directors’ report for each financial year. These reports 
incorporate extensive disclosure requirements as specified in Part 2M.3 (ss 292-323).368  
 
Section 674 details a continuous disclosure requirement, which is intended to ensure that 
material price-sensitive information is made available to the market in a regular and 
timely fashion.369 These measures are necessary to avoid reliance solely on half-year or 
annual disclosure, or other informal methods of dissemination. Section 674(2) of the 
Corporations Act provides that a listed entity must provide information to the market 
operator if the entity has information that is not generally available and a reasonable 
person would expect that, if it were generally available, it would have a material effect on 
the price or value of the securities of the entity.  
 
Also relevant in this context is ASX Listing Rule 3.1 which provides that once an entity 
becomes aware of any information concerning it that a reasonable person would expect to 
have a material effect on the price or value of the entity’s securities, the entity must 
immediately disclose that information to the ASX.370 Such material information is not 
                                                 
367 JSC Instructions for Disclosure, Accounting and Auditing Standards of Issuing Companies 2004, Article 9. 
368 All of the relevant provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) in this respect are explained in detail in Chapter 4, 
Section 16, of this paper. 
369 Section 674 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) provides that listed entities are required to comply with disclosure 
requirements in market listing rules, which effectively gives statutory force to the disclosure obligations in ASX Listing Rule 
3.1. For a general discussion see Cassidy, above n 48, 213. 
370 The Rule sets out a detailed list of the types of information requiring disclosure. 
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confined to information that is relevant because of its monetary value, and can extend to 
strategic and operational matters likely to influence investor decisions.371  
 
Also relevant is Principle 5 of the ASX Principles of Corporate Governance 2003 which 
supports timely disclosure of all material information regarding the company, including 
the financial situation, performance, ownership and governance of the company. 
Recommendation 5.1 requires companies to disclose their policies and establish proper 
governance structures and written corporate policies and procedures to ensure compliance 
with ASX Listing Rule disclosure requirements, and to ensure accountability at senior 
management levels. 
 
(d) Participate and Vote in General Shareholder Meetings 
 
Both the Jordanian Companies Law and the Australian Corporations Act comply with the 
OECD principle regarding shareholders’ right to participate and vote in general 
shareholder meetings. 
 
In Jordan, Article 178 of the Companies Law provides that every shareholder in a public 
shareholding company who was registered in the company register three days prior to the 
date set for any meeting of the general assembly shall have the right to participate in the 
meeting. This participation includes discussing issues presented thereto and voting on the 
decisions adopted by the assembly regarding these issues. Shareholders in Jordanian 
companies have the right to give a proxy to another shareholder or third party372 to attend 
the meeting on their behalf and to participate in discussing issues and voting.373 
 
                                                 
371 For more information see Guidance Note 8 – Continuous Disclosure: Listing Rule 3.1, ASX, January 2003. Section 677 of 
the Corporations Act defines ‘material effect on price or value’ in similar terms to ASX Listing Rule 3.1. That is, the 
information would, or would be likely to, influence persons who commonly invest in securities in deciding whether to 
acquire or dispose of the ED securities. 
372 By virtue of a judicial power of attorney. See Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 179(a). 
373 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 179. 
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In Australia there is a similar provision which clearly identifies the right of shareholders 
to participate and vote in general meetings. According to s 250E(1) of the Corporations 
Act, if a company does not specify the voting rights attaching to shares in the company 
constitution, each shareholder, whether they hold preference or ordinary shares, has equal 
voting rights.374 Shareholders in Australian companies also are entitled to appoint a 
person as their proxy to attend and vote at the meeting.375 Principle 6, Recommendation 
6.1, of the ASX Principles of Corporate Governance 2003 provides that companies 
should design and disclose a communications strategy to promote effective 
communication with shareholders and encourage effective participation at general 
meetings. 
 
(e) Elect and Remove Members of the Board 
 
Both the Jordanian Companies Law and the Australian Corporations Act comply 
generally with the OECD principle regarding shareholders’ right to elect and remove 
members of the board. 
 
In Jordan, shareholders have the right to elect members of the board by secret ballot.376 
There is one instance, however, where board representation arises from appointment 
rather than election. Article 135(a) of the Companies Law provides that the government 
or any official public corporation or any public corporate body is entitled to have board 
representation that is proportional to their shareholding. It is difficult for shareholders to 
remove directors from the board. According to Article 165, removing directors from the 
board requires a signed request of shareholders holding at least 30 percent of the 
company’s share capital. The request must be submitted to the board, who must then call 
                                                 
374 [Replaceable Rule]. For a general discussion see Tomasic R et alia, Corporations Law: Principles, Policy and Process (4th  
ed, 2002), 582.  
375 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 249X [Replaceable Rule for Proprietary Companies and Mandatory Rule for Public 
Companies]. 
376 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 132. 
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an extraordinary meeting of the general assembly within 10 days of the request. The 
general assembly must then vote on the request by secret ballot.377  There is an exception 
in that directors appointed by proportional representation pursuant to Article 135(a), 
discussed above, cannot be removed by the general assembly.  
 
In Australia, the provisions in the Corporations Act dealing with the appointment and 
election of directors are in Part 2D.3 (ss 201A-201M). Many of these provisions are 
replaceable rules, meaning that they can be modified or excluded by the company’s own 
constitution. Section 201G provides that shareholders of the company appoint the 
company’s first director or directors in a general meeting.378 Moreover, s 250R provides 
that the business of an annual general meeting (AGM) may include the election of 
directors. Principle 2, Recommendation 2.4, of the ASX Principles of Corporate 
Governance 2003 provides that the board should establish a nomination committee, 
which should consist of a minimum of 3 members, the majority being independent 
directors. The commentary to Recommendation 2.4 provides that the nomination 
committee should have a charter that clearly sets out its responsibilities, composition, 
structure and membership requirements. 
 
Pursuant to s 203D of the Corporations Act, directors of public companies may be 
removed by an ordinary resolution regardless of what is stated in the constitution.379 
Compared to the relevant provisions in the Jordanian Companies Law, the Australian 
provisions are more flexible and offer better protection for the right of shareholders to 
remove members of the board without interference. Accordingly, the Australian 
Corporations Act complies more closely with the OECD principle regarding the right of 
shareholders to remove members of the board.  
 
                                                 
377 Presumably the dismissal request requires at least a majority share of the votes to be accepted, although this is not 
specified in the Companies Law. 
378 [Replaceable Rule]. 
379 For a general discussion see Ffrench H, Guide to Corporations Law (4th ed, 1994), 137. 
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(f) Share in the Profit of the Corporation 
 
Both the Jordanian Companies Law and the Australian Corporations Act comply with the 
OECD principle regarding shareholders’ right to share in the profit of the corporation. 
 
In Jordan, Article 191 of the Companies Law provides that the annual general meeting is 
to approve dividend distribution. Dividends are paid 45 days after the meeting, or 
thereafter within six months with interest.380 In Australia, s 254T of the Corporations Act 
states that a dividend may only be paid out of profits of the company. General rules 
governing the payment of dividends to the shareholders can be found in Part 2H.5.381  
 
2.3  Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
From the analysis above it can be seen that both the Jordanian Companies Law and the 
Australian Corporations Act generally comply with Chapter 2, Principle A, of the OECD 
Principles 2004. However, in Jordan, a simpler procedure is required for shareholders to remove 
members of the board. The Jordanian authorities should take steps to ensure that the right of 
shareholders to remove directors without any exceptions is protected by legislation.   
 
3. THE SHAREHOLDERS’ RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN GENERAL MEETINGS 
 
3.1     Content of the OECD Principles 
 
Chapter 2: The Rights of Shareholders and Key Ownership Functions 
 
B.  Shareholders have the right to participate in, and be sufficiently informed on, decisions 
concerning fundamental corporate changes such as: (1) amendments to statutes, or 
                                                 
380 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 191(c). 
381 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 254T-254W [Replaceable Rules]. 
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articles of incorporation or similar governing documents of the company; (2) the 
authorisation of additional shares; and (3) extraordinary transactions, including the 
transfer of all or substantially all assets, that in effect result in the sale of the company. 
 
C.  Shareholders should have the opportunity to participate effectively and vote in general 
shareholder meetings and should be informed of the rules, including voting procedures, 
that govern general shareholder meetings. 
 
(1)  Shareholders should be furnished with sufficient and timely information 
concerning the date, location and agenda of general meetings, as well as full and 
timely information regarding the issues to be decided at the meeting.  
(2) Shareholders should have the opportunity to ask questions to the board, including 
questions relating to the annual external audit, to place items on the agenda of 
general meetings, and to propose resolutions, subject to reasonable limitations.  
(3) Effective shareholder participation in key corporate governance decisions, such 
as the nomination and election of board members, should be facilitated. 
Shareholders should be able to make their views known on the remuneration 
policy for board members and key executives. The equity component of 
compensation schemes for board members and employees should be subject to 
shareholder approval. 
(4) Shareholders should be able to vote in person or in absentia, and equal effect 
should be given to votes whether cast in person or absentia. 
 
3.2 Comparative Analysis 
 
In general terms, both the Jordanian Companies Law and the Australian Corporations Act 
comply with the OECD principles regarding shareholders’ rights to participate in general 
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shareholder meetings and to be sufficiently informed on decisions concerning fundamental 
corporate changes. 
 
Chapter 2, Principle B, recognises the importance of having an appropriate check on boards 
when making decisions that alter the fundamental structure of their companies. This is necessary 
because of the high potential for abuse in such circumstances. Principle C sets out the important 
rights of shareholders in relation to general meetings. It is necessary for companies to have clear 
guidelines established which include simple and effective means for shareholders to place items 
on the agenda and to submit questions to management and the board. It is justifiable for 
companies to have rules in place to prevent abuse of these rights, so long as the rights of 
minority shareholders are respected. Principle C also recognises the fundamental right of 
shareholders to nominate and elect board members, and to be properly informed in relation to 
board remuneration. The annotation provides that it is particularly important for shareholders to 
be informed of the specific link between remuneration and company performance. Also noted is 
the right of shareholders to vote in absentia. The annotation also encourages companies to 
facilitate the use of secure information technology methods for voting in absentia.382 
 
In Jordan, Article 144 of the Companies Law provides that the board of a public shareholding 
company shall direct an invitation to each shareholder to attend the general assembly meeting to 
be sent via ordinary mail at least 14 days prior to the date set for the meeting. The agenda of the 
meeting must be enclosed in the invitation and must include the board of directors’ report, its 
annual balance sheet, and the auditors’ report and explanatory statement.383 The date and time 
must also be published in two local papers, and must be advertised on the radio or television at 
least three days prior to the relevant date.384 The quorum of an ordinary general assembly 
meeting requires shareholders representing more than one half of the company’s subscribed 
                                                 
382 For more information see OECD Principles 2004, Annotation to Chapter 2, Principles B and C. 
383 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 144(b).   
384 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 145.   
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shares.385 The shareholders have the right at an ordinary general assembly meeting to elect 
members of the board and to propose matters to be included in the agenda.386 Shareholders also 
have the right to appoint a proxy to attend and vote at the meeting on their behalf.387 
 
In relation to the principle that shareholders should be sufficiently informed on decisions 
concerning fundamental corporate changes, Article 175 provides that an ‘extraordinary general 
meeting’ can be called in which members can discuss, consider and make appropriate decisions 
regarding issues such as amending the articles of association, approving mergers, selling all 
company assets, complying with liquidation procedures, increases or decreases in authorised 
capital, buy-backs and convertible bonds. Decisions on these issues require the approval of 75 
percent of present shareholders at the extraordinary general meeting.388 An extraordinary general 
meeting is initiated upon an invitation of the board or upon a written request submitted to the 
board from shareholders (holding not less than one-quarter of the subscribed shares), the 
company’s auditors, or the Controller of Companies (should shareholders holding not less than 
15 percent of the company’s subscribed shares request such a meeting).389  
 
Remuneration policy for company boards in Jordan is not subject to the approval of 
shareholders. According to Article 162, remuneration paid to the board and chairman shall be 
determined at a rate of 10 percent of the net profit which can be distributed as dividends to 
shareholders, and after deducting all taxes and reserves. Remuneration is distributed amongst the 
directors in proportion to their level of attendance at meetings.390 Further, the remuneration paid 
for each director must not exceed 5,000 Jordanian Dinars (JD5,000)391 annually.392 If the 
                                                 
385 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 170.   
386 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 171.  
387 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 179. 
388 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 175(b). 
389 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 172. As discussed above in the comparative analysis of Principle A3, relating to the 
right of shareholders to obtain relevant and material information, listed companies are also required to make public any 
‘material fact’ as soon as possible after its occurrence pursuant to instructions issued by the JSC in 2004. The definition of 
‘material fact’ may include the events listed in Principle B. For more information see the analysis above in Chapter 4, Section 
2.2(c), of this paper. 
390 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 162(a). A meeting not attended for a justifiable cause approved by the board is 
considered to have been attended by the member. 
391 Approximately AUD10,000. 
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company is still in the founding stages and has not realised any profits then remuneration is 
limited to 1,000 Jordanian Dinars (JD1,000) annually.393 
 
In Australia, ss 249H(1) and 249H(2) of the Corporations Act provide that shareholders must be 
given 21 days notice for a general meeting unless the requisite majority agree to shorter notice. 
However, if the company is listed, then 28 days notice must be given.394 The notice must set out 
the place, date and time for the meeting and state the general nature of the meeting business.395 
The quorum is two members who must be present at all times during the meeting, unless the 
company constitution provides otherwise.396 According to s 249D, directors must arrange a 
general meeting on the request of members with at least five percent of the votes or at least 100 
members. Further, s 249F allows shareholders with at least five percent of the votes to call and 
arrange a general meeting. The shareholders who call for the meeting must pay the expenses of 
calling and holding the meeting. Shareholders in Australian companies are entitled to appoint a 
person as their proxy to attend and vote at meetings.397 
 
Remuneration of directors and key executives in Australian companies is governed by internal 
rules that ordinarily give shareholders to the right to fix remuneration. Section 202A(1), a 
replaceable rule, states that the directors of a company are to be paid the remuneration that the 
company determines by resolution. In respect of the directors of public companies, Chapter 2E 
(ss 208-230) requires shareholder consent for any financial benefits given to directors or their 
related parties, although there are various exceptions.  
 
Other important matters concerning fundamental corporate changes often require a special 
resolution, that is, 75 percent of the votes cast by members entitled to vote on the resolution. If a 
                                                                                                                                                                         
392 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 162. 
393 Approximately AUD2,000. 
394 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 249HA(1). 
395 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 249L. 
396 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 249T [Replaceable Rule]. 
397 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 249X [Replaceable Rule for Proprietary Companies and Mandatory Rule for Public 
Companies]. 
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special resolution is to be proposed at the meeting then the notice should include an intention to 
propose the special resolution.398 Matters that are required to be decided by special resolution 
include adoption or alteration of a company constitution, selective capital reduction, and winding 
up. Moreover, the shareholders may propose either an ordinary or special resolution at any 
general meeting of the company. Section 249N(1) provides that, to enable shareholders to put 
forward resolutions at any general meeting, a minimum  of 100 members must consent or the 
members must control at least five percent of the votes, unless a different number has been 
prescribed by regulation under s 249N(1A).  
 
3.3  Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
From the analysis above it can be seen that both the Jordanian Companies Law and the 
Australian Corporations Act comply generally with Chapter 2, Principles B and C. However, it is 
clear that the Australian provisions comply more closely with the relevant principles. They are 
more flexible, comprehensive and offer better protection to the right of shareholders to 
participate and vote on decisions concerning fundamental corporate changes. Accordingly, it is 
recommended that the Jordanian authorities revise the rights of shareholders to include the right 
to discuss any issue and to vote and approve any large transactions that the company is involved 
in. Moreover, the Jordanian provision regarding the procedure for an ‘extraordinary’ general 
meeting should be clarified and simplified in line with the Australian provisions, and the 
percentage share capital requirement for shareholders to call an extraordinary general meeting 
should be lowered to five percent. Finally, the remuneration limitations on directors are 
extraordinary and should be removed. It is recommended that the Jordanian authorities amend 
the Companies Law so that shareholders are responsible for determining and approving the 
remuneration of the board of directors.  
 
                                                 
398 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 249L(1)(c). 
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4. DISCLOSURE REGARDING CAPITAL STRUCTURE  
 
4.1     Content of the OECD Principles 
 
Chapter 2: The Rights of Shareholders and Key Ownership Functions 
 
D.  Capital structures and arrangements that enable certain shareholders to obtain a degree 
of control disproportionate to their equity ownership should be disclosed.  
 
4.2 Comparative Analysis 
 
The Australian Corporations Act complies with the OECD Principle regarding the disclosure of 
capital structures and arrangements that enable certain shareholders to obtain a degree of control 
disproportionate to their equity ownership. In Jordan, public shareholding companies issue only 
one class of shares, ordinary shares.399   
 
Pyramid structures, cross shareholdings and mechanisms which provide shares with limited or 
expanded voting rights can be utilised to limit the power of non-controlling shareholders to affect 
corporate change. The annotation to Chapter 2, Principle D, also raises the issue of shareholder 
agreements and their ability to significantly affect control within a company. Common features 
of shareholder agreements include preferential share purchase rights for parties to the agreement, 
limitations on the transfer rights of parties to the agreement, and various voting restrictions, 
which often include the stipulation that parties to the agreement must vote as a ‘block’. The 
annotation points out that many jurisdictions have been forced to establish strict guidelines to 
monitor these types of agreements and to limit their duration. Given the significant impact that 
                                                 
399 The provisions pertaining to shareholding are Articles 95-98 of the Companies Law 1997 (JOR). 
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these arrangements and other capital structure mechanisms can have on the landscape of control 
within a corporation, it is important that clear disclosure obligations are put in place.400 
 
In Australia, a company may issue ordinary and preference shares.401 According to s 254B of the 
Corporations Act, a company may determine the terms on which the shares are issued and the 
rights and restrictions attaching to them.402  The most common type of company shares are 
ordinary shares. The Corporations Act does not define ordinary shares, however, s 254A 
provides that preference shares have special rights attaching to them. Accordingly, shares with 
no special rights or restrictions attached to them are called ordinary shares. Section 117(2)(k) 
provides that a company must lodge an application with ASIC at the time of registration, which 
must include information on the initial share capital of the company. The application must state, 
for a public shareholding company, the number and class of shares each member agrees in 
writing to take up and the amount each member agrees in writing to pay for each share.403   
 
A public shareholding company in Australia may raise capital by offering shares or other 
securities for the public to invest in. To carry out these offers, the company must prepare a 
disclosure document, unless exempt.404 According to s 709, if an offer of securities requires 
disclosure to investors, a prospectus must be prepared for the offer, unless an offer information 
statement can be used instead.405 Section 710 provides that a prospectus for a body’s securities 
must contain all information that investors and their professional advisers would reasonably 
require to make an informed assessment of a number of matters listed in the legislation, 
including the rights and liabilities attaching to the securities offered. If a prospectus is required, s 
712 provides that a company may simply refer to material lodged with ASIC rather than setting it 
out in full.  
                                                 
400 For more information see OECD Principles 2004, Annotation to Chapter 2, Principle D. 
401 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 254A.  
402 For a general discussion see Tunstall, above n 361, 55.  
403 For a general discussion see Tomasic, above n 374, 212. 
404 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 706-708. For a general discussion see Adams M, Essential Corporate Law (2002), 52. 
405 Section 709(4) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) provides that an offer information statement can be used instead of a 
prospectus when the money being raised, when added to all amounts previously raised by issuing securities under an offer 
information statement, does not exceed AUD5,000,000. 
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4.3  Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
The Australian Corporations Act complies with Chapter 2, Principles B and C. The Corporations 
Act requires companies to disclose information on the initial share capital to ASIC at the time of 
registration. Companies wishing to raise funds by issuing shares must prepare a disclosure 
document, which may take many forms, and must include information about the rights and 
liabilities attached to the shares offered.   
 
5. MARKETS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 
 
5.1     Content of the OECD Principles 
 
Chapter 2: The Rights of Shareholders and Key Ownership Functions 
 
E.  Markets for corporate control should be allowed to function in an efficient and 
transparent manner.  
 
(1)  The rules and procedures governing the acquisition of corporate control in the 
capital markets and extraordinary transactions such as mergers and sales of 
substantial portions of corporate assets should be clearly articulated and 
disclosed so that investors understand their rights and recourse. Transactions 
should occur at transparent prices and under fair conditions that protect the 
rights of all shareholders according to their class.  
(2) Anti-takeover devices should not be used to shield management and the board 
from accountability.  
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5.2   Comparative Analysis 
 
The Australian Corporations Act complies with the OECD principles regarding acquisition rules 
and procedures governing corporate control in the capital market. The Jordanian Companies 
Law, however, lacks clearly detailed provisions in this area. 
 
The annotation to Chapter 2, Principle E, makes it clear that both investors and stock exchanges 
have expressed significant concern over the increased use of anti-takeover devices and the effect 
that such devices have on the functioning of the market for corporate control. Takeover defences 
are often used as a means of shielding directors or managers from shareholder monitoring. The 
annotation reinforces that, in corporate control transactions such as mergers and takeovers, the 
directors’ fiduciary duty to their company must always remain paramount.406 
 
Part 11 (Articles 222-239) of the Jordanian Companies Law sets out the procedures and rules that 
companies have to follow in order to merge. Article 226 states that the boards of merging 
companies must notify the Controller of Companies, the JSC, the Market, and the SDC within 10 
days of the date of issuing the merge decision. Articles 227, 228, and 229 set out the relevant 
procedures for a merger. According to Article 230, the Minister shall form an executive 
committee from the chairmen, board members, managers and auditors of the merging companies, 
in order to carry out the executive procedures for the merge. An important part of this process is 
inviting the shareholders’ extraordinary general assembly of each of the merging companies to 
approve the merger, providing that decisions are made with a majority of 75 percent of the shares 
represented for each company separately.407  
 
Whilst the provisions pertaining to mergers are quite detailed, the Companies Law falls short of 
establishing a clear set of rules for important acquisition activities such as takeovers. In terms of 
Principle E2, general directors’ duties outlined in the Companies Law would cover a situation in 
                                                 
406 For more information see OECD Principles 2004, Annotation to Chapter 2, Principle E. 
407 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 230(c). 
 91
which anti-takeover devices were used to shield management and the board from accountability. 
Article 157 provides that the chairman and members of the board shall be held responsible to 
shareholders and others for every violation of the law committed by any of them or all of 
them.408 Also relevant is Article 159, which provides that the chairman and members of the 
board shall be held responsible for any default or negligence in the management of the company. 
In terms of remedies, shareholders can seek redress with the Controller of Companies who has 
wide investigative authority and recourse rights, including the right to dissolve the board or 
revoke the company’s registration.  
 
In Australia, takeover bids are regulated by Chapter 6 (ss 602-659C) of the Corporations Act.409 
Section 606 sets out the rule that a person is prohibited from acquiring a ‘relevant interest’410 in 
voting shares above the threshold limit of 20 percent if the company is a listed company or an 
unlisted company with more than 50 members. There are a number of exceptions under s 611. 
The most important exception to the prohibition is an acquisition that results from the acceptance 
of an offer under a takeover bid.411 The bidder in a takeover bid is under an obligation to provide 
a significant amount of information to the shareholders of the target company including the 
identity of the bidder, details of shareholding held by bidder, and any arrangement under which 
cash will be provided by another person.412 Section 661A provides that a bidder in a takeover bid 
may compulsorily acquire any securities in the bid class following the takeover bid if the bidder 
has a relevant interest in 90 percent of the shares, and the bidder has acquired at least 75 percent 
of the shares that the bidder offered to acquire.413 
 
                                                 
408 Such violations include any infringements of the relevant laws and regulations in force or the memorandum of association, 
and also for ‘errors’ in the management of the company. 
409 According to s 602, the purpose of Chapter 6 is to ensure that takeovers take place in an efficient and competitive market, 
and that all shareholders have the right to access relevant information and equal rights to sell their shares according to their 
class. 
410 Section 608 provides that a person has a ‘relevant interest’ in securities if they are the holder of the securities, or they have 
the power to exercise the voting rights attached to the securities or to dispose of the securities. 
411 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), 611. Other significant exceptions include an acquisition of no more than three percent every 
six months [Exception 9], and an acquisition which gains approval from the general meeting [Exception 7]. For a general 
discussion of the exceptions see Ffrench, above n 379, 264. 
412 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 636. 
413 For a discussion of s 661A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) see Ford, above n 360, 1107. 
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Any action taken by any directors of a target company in response to an actual bid to delay or 
outwit a takeover bid is considered to be defensive conduct, and such behaviour may constitute a 
breach of duty.  Sections 180-184 of the Corporations Act provide that directors owe duties of 
loyalty and good faith because they are in a fiduciary relationship with the company. Section 180 
provides that directors and other officers414 of the corporation must exercise their powers with a 
reasonable degree of care and diligence. Section 181 provides that a director or other officer 
must exercise their powers in good faith in the best interests of the corporation and for a proper 
purpose. Sections 182 and 183 stipulate that directors, other officers, and employees must not 
improperly use their position, or information they obtained in their position, to gain advantage 
for themselves or cause detriment to the corporation. Importantly, s 184 imposes criminal 
penalties for breaches of ss 181-183 committed recklessly or with dishonest intent.  Because of 
their fiduciary relationship with the company, directors must avoid actual or significant conflicts 
of interest.  
 
The Corporations Act and the general law provide for the courts to make orders against directors 
who have breached their duties. Directors who breach their duties can be sued by the company, a 
liquidator, a creditor, a shareholder, or ASIC. There are two kinds of sanction: 
(1) Remedies: A director can be sued under the general law and/or the Corporations 
Act for general civil remedies. The precise remedy given will depend on whether 
the duty breached derives from common law or from equitable principles.  
(2) Penalties: There are two kinds of penalties which can be imposed against directors 
for a breach of their duties; civil and criminal penalties. Civil penalties can only 
be brought by ASIC against directors who breach their duties. Criminal penalties 
can be brought by the Director of Public Prosecutions against directors who 
breach s 184. 
 
                                                 
414 ‘Officer’ is defined in s 9 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) to include any person who makes, or participates in making, 
decisions that affect the whole, or a substantial part, of the business or the entity; or a person who has the capacity to 
significantly affect the entity’s financial standing. 
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5.3  Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
From the analysis above it can be seen that the Australian Corporations Act complies with 
Chapter 2, Principle E. The Jordanian Companies Law, however, only partially complies with the 
principle. The Australian provisions are far more comprehensive in terms of acquisition rules and 
procedures governing corporate control in the capital market. The Jordanian Companies Law 
lacks clearly detailed provisions in this area, such as those necessary to regulate takeover bids. It 
is recommended that the Jordanian authorities take steps to address this issue in similar terms to 
the Australian Corporations Act.  
 
6. EXERCISE OF OWNERSHIP RIGHTS BY ALL SHAREHOLDERS 
 
6.1     Content of the OECD Principles 
 
Chapter 2: The Rights of Shareholders and Key Ownership Functions 
 
F.  The exercise of ownership rights by all shareholders, including institutional investors, 
should be facilitated.  
 
(1)  Institutional investors acting in a fiduciary capacity should disclose their overall 
corporate governance and voting policies with respect to their investments, 
including the procedures that they have in place for deciding on the use of their 
voting rights.  
(2)  Institutional investors acting in a fiduciary capacity should disclose how they 
manage material conflicts of interest that may affect the exercise of key ownership 
rights regarding their investments.  
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G. Shareholders, including institutional shareholders, should be allowed to consult with 
each other on issues concerning their basic shareholder rights as defined in the 
Principles, subject to exceptions to prevent abuse. 
 
6.2 Comparative Analysis 
 
Neither the Australian Corporations Act nor the Jordanian Companies Law comply fully with the 
OECD principle regarding facilitating the exercise of ownership rights by all shareholders, 
including institutional investors. 
 
In most jurisdictions it is becoming increasingly common for shares in large public companies to 
be held by institutional investors. The voting rights of such investors are often viewed as an 
important part of the value of the investment to the investor’s client. The annotation to Chapter 2, 
Principle F, stipulates that when institutional investors are in a fiduciary relationship with their 
client, it is important that they disclose their voting policies and practices, including the human 
and financial resources that have been set aside to pursue such policies. Also important is open 
disclosure about any conflicts of interests that may affect the client’s investment.  
 
In terms of shareholders, including institutional investors, consulting with each other on issues 
concerning their rights, the annotation to Principle G provides that such action should be 
permitted and encouraged, without the requirement for mandatory compliance with the 
formalities of proxy solicitation. It is noted, however, that such activity can be used to 
manipulate markets and corporate control, and also to avoid competition law. The annotation 
provides that any mandatory disclosure of such cooperation among investors to prevent abuse 
may also have to be accompanied by regulations that prevent trading for a period.415 
                                                 
415 For more information see OECD Principles 2004, Annotation to Chapter 2, Principles F and G. 
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In general terms, the legislation in both jurisdictions facilitates the exercise of ownership rights 
by general shareholders. In Australia, the rules and regulations governing shareholders’ rights are 
comprehensive and well structured. In Jordan, shareholders’ rights to secure ownership 
registration and to vote and participate in general shareholders’ meetings (as well as the right to 
be involved in decisions that concern fundamental corporate change) are all provided for in the 
Companies Law.416 There is no regulatory or legislative scheme in Australia or Jordan, however, 
that specifically deals with institutional investors and their disclosure obligations in relation to 
policies on corporate governance, conflicts of interest, and voting.   
 
In Australia, the level of institutional shareholdings in listed companies has increased 
dramatically in recent years, currently resting at somewhere close to 50 percent.417 The various 
institutions commonly take different approaches to corporate governance issues. A recent study 
indicated that a relatively large percentage of the institutions do not exercise their voting rights 
on ‘routine’ motions and prefer to vote only on significant or contentious issues.418   Whether an 
institution will intervene when dissatisfied with the performance or corporate governance of an 
investee company most often depends on a range factors related to the share price of the 
company.419  
 
Despite the fact that their significant percentage shareholdings put them in an excellent position 
to drive corporate responsibility, institutional investors in Australia have always been, and 
seemingly remain, hesitant to involve themselves in the corporate governance of investee 
                                                 
416 See Chapter 4, Section 2, of this paper for a discussion on shareholders’ rights in Australia and Jordan. 
417 This is primarily due to compulsory superannuation and the strong performance of equities markets compared to bonds. 
Lessing J, ‘Institutional Investors: Will We See Greater Cooperation Between Them Regarding Corporate Governance’ 
(1998), 10 Bond Law Review 376.  
418 Ramsay I et alia, ‘Institutional Investors Views on Corporate Governance’ (2000), 18 Company and Securities Law 
Journal 2, 1. This article is the result of an interview study conducted in late 1997 and early 1998. Representatives of large 
Australian institutional investors were interviewed about their role in corporate governance. The article reports on their views 
on a range of key corporate governance issues such as board structure and composition, exercise of voting rights, activism, 
and barriers to institutional investor involvement.   
419 Often the size of the institution’s shareholding will make it difficult to dispose of its entire shareholding at a reasonable 
price. Further, the investee company's shares might be trading below the net tangible asset value, which eliminates selling the 
shares as a viable option. For a general discussion see Ramsay, above n 418. 
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companies. It should be noted that the provisions of the Corporations Act are at least partly 
responsible for this reluctance, particularly those relating to shadow directorship, insider trading, 
and takeovers.420 Whilst there has been a recent attempt by ASIC to relax the application of the 
takeover provisions to institutional investors,421 more needs to be done to avoid the unintended 
consequence of provisions of the Corporations Act acting as a barrier to shareholder involvement 
and activism.422 
 
6.3 Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
From the analysis above it can be seen that neither the Australian Corporations Act nor the 
Jordanian Companies Law wholly comply with Chapter 2, Principles F and G. Accordingly, the 
relevant authorities in both jurisdictions should legislate to encourage institutional investors 
acting in a fiduciary capacity to disclose their corporate governance policies (including how they 
manage conflicts of interest) and their voting records on important issues where the value of the 
investment has been affected or where the board’s recommendation has been voted against by 
the fund. Furthermore, institutional investors should be encouraged to consult with each other on 
issues of corporate governance.  
 
7. EQUITABLE TREATMENT OF SHAREHOLDERS 
 
7.1     Content of the OECD Principles 
 
Chapter 3: The Equitable Treatment of Shareholders 
 
                                                 
420 For a detailed discussion see Lessing, above n 417. 
421 For a detailed discussion see Lessing, above n 417, 380-388. In short, the reason why some institutional investors have 
been hesitant to liaise with each other on issues of corporate governance is a fear that such action will activate the relevant 
takeover provisions in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 
422 For a recent and detailed discussion of the role and duties of institutional investors in Australia see Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, Corporate Responsibility: Managing Risk and Creating Value (June, 
2006), at Chapter 5. 
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The corporate governance framework should ensure the equitable treatment of all shareholders, 
including minority and foreign shareholders. All shareholders should have the opportunity to 
obtain effective redress for violation of their rights. 
 
 A. All shareholders of the same series of a class should be treated equally. 
 
(1)  Within any series of a class, all shares should carry the same rights. All investors 
should be able to obtain information about the rights attached to all series and 
classes of shares before they purchase. Any changes in voting rights should be 
subject to approval by those classes of shares which are negatively affected. 
(2)  Minority shareholders should be protected from abusive actions by, or in the 
interest of, controlling shareholders acting either directly or indirectly, and 
should have effective means of redress. 
(3)  Votes should be cast by custodians or nominees in a manner agreed upon with the 
beneficial owner of the shares. 
(4)  Impediments to cross border voting should be eliminated. 
(5)  Processes and procedures for general shareholder meetings should allow for 
equitable treatment of all shareholders. Company procedures should not make it 
unduly difficult or expensive to cast votes. 
 
7.2  Comparative Analysis 
 
The Australian Corporations Act generally complies with the OECD principles regarding the 
equitable treatment of shareholders. The Jordanian Companies Law, however, lacks adequate 
provisions in this area. 
 
A core aspect of effective capital markets is investor confidence in boards and managers 
behaving responsibly and in the best interests of their companies. Directors, managers and 
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controlling shareholders sometimes act in their own best interests at the expense of non-
controlling shareholders. It is clear that the most effective deterrent to such activity is a legal 
regime that provides relatively simple and inexpensive methods of redress for shareholders 
whose rights have been violated. The annotation to Chapter 3, Principle A, notes the concerns of 
excessive litigation and encourages the enactment of measures to protect management and 
boards against frivolous lawsuits. It is necessary for legislators to formulate an appropriate 
balance. The annotation notes that many jurisdictions have established alternative adjudication 
procedures organised by securities regulators or other regulatory bodies.423 
 
In Jordan, public shareholding companies issue only one class of shares (ordinary shares). 
Accordingly, shareholders in these companies have equal rights. According to Article 178, 
shareholders in a public company who were registered in the company register three days prior 
to the date set for any general assembly meeting shall have the right to participate in the 
discussion and voting of issues in the meeting. There are no provisions in the Companies Law 
that deal with the issues surrounding voting by custodians or nominees. There is also no mention 
of any procedures pertaining to cross border voting. 
 
Directors of Jordanian companies owe certain duties to shareholders and are held responsible for 
breaches of those duties. Article 157 provides that the chairman and members of the board shall 
be held responsible to shareholders and others for every violation of the law committed by any of 
them or all of them. Such violations include any infringements of the relevant laws and 
regulations in force or the memorandum of association, and also for ‘errors’ in the management 
of the company. Also relevant is Article 159, which provides that the chairman and members of 
the board shall be held responsible for any default or negligence in the management of the 
company.424 Finally, the fact that the general assembly of Jordanian companies can, by consent, 
                                                 
423 For more information see OECD Principles 2004, Annotation to Chapter 3, Principle A. 
424 Article 159 provides further that a court has the right to hold any such person liable for the debts of the company in the 
event of the company being unable to meet its financial obligations in liquidation. 
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absolve the board from responsibility for violations, does not prevent the option of legal recourse 
against the chairman and the board.425 
 
In terms of remedies, shareholders can seek redress with the Controller of Companies who has 
wide investigative authority and recourse rights, including the right to dissolve the board or 
revoke the company’s registration.426 The Controller does not, however, have the power to 
impose a fine or penalty. Alternatively, shareholders, either together or independently, can bring 
a direct legal action against directors, managers, and other shareholders.427 Jordanian courts are 
still relatively inexperienced in commercial matters and cases ordinarily last between two and 
three years.428 Notwithstanding the right of shareholders to seek the assistance of the Controller 
and the courts in certain circumstances, the Jordanian Companies Law does not directly protect 
the rights of minority shareholders nor introduce effective means of redress. There is no 
definition or concept for derivative or class action suits in the Jordanian Companies Law.429  
 
In Australia, a public company may issue ordinary and preference shares.430 According to s 
254B, a company may determine the terms on which the shares are issued and the rights and 
restrictions attaching to them.431 Section 250E(1) of the Corporations Act provides that if a 
company does not specify the voting rights attaching to preference shares, all shareholders, 
whether preference or ordinary, have equal voting rights. Like its Jordanian counterpart, there are 
no provisions in the Corporations Act that deal specifically with the issues surrounding voting by 
custodians or cross border voting. 
 
                                                 
425 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 157. 
426 Article 275 of the Companies Law 1997 (JOR) provides that shareholders holding 15 percent of capital can request the 
Controller to audit the company.  
427 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 160. See also Articles 234 and 237 which provide that shareholders have a direct 
action against directors, the general manager and the auditors in the case of acquisition claims. 
428 World Bank, above n 156, 8. It should be noted that Article 284 of the Companies Law 1997 (JOR) allows claimants to 
request expeditious status. 
429 The issue of minority shareholder protection is covered in Chapter 5 of this paper. 
430 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 254A.  
431 For a general discussion see Tunstall, above n 361, 55.  
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Minority shareholders’ rights are protected in Australia both by the general law and the 
Corporations Act. Shareholders can bring legal proceedings before a court to challenge a 
company’s action or decision, and to obtain remedies against the company, management and 
members.432 Remedies were introduced to protect minority shareholders from the abusive action 
of boards and controlling shareholders who have control of the general meeting through their 
voting power.433 According to s 236, a member has a statutory right to bring proceedings on 
behalf of a company, or intervene in any proceedings to which the company is a party.434 Such 
action under s 236 is subject to a court granting leave under s 237.435 Pursuant to s 232, 
shareholders also have the right to bring an action for oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct. 
An extensive list of remedies open for the court to order in such circumstances is listed in s 
233.436  
 
7.3 Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
From the analysis above it can be seen that the Australian Corporations Act complies generally 
with Chapter 3, Principle A. The Jordanian Companies Law, however, only partially complies 
with the principle. Minority shareholders are afforded much better and clearer protection under 
the Australian legislation. The Jordanian Companies Law does not address the rights of minority 
shareholders in any real depth. There are currently 161 companies listed on the ASE. The listed 
sector is dominated by banks and insurance companies, which together comprise over 55 percent 
of market capitalisation.437 Research carried out in 2004 indicated that the average control 
position for the top 48 listed companies was approximately 30 percent of shares.438 It is 
estimated that almost 50% of listed companies are ‘supermajority owned’, that is, minority 
shareholder consent is not required for fundamental corporate decisions.439 The Jordanian 
authorities need to be alerted to this important subject so that appropriate legal provisions can be 
                                                 
432 For a detailed discussion see Adams, above n 404, 78. 
433 Ffrench, above n 379, 248. 
434 Cassidy, above n 48, 284.  
435 Statutory derivative actions are discussed in detail in Chapter 5, Section 2, of this paper. 
436 The oppression remedy is discussed in detail in Chapter 5, Section 2, of this paper. 
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drafted and enforced to protect the rights of minority shareholders. Also, both jurisdictions 
should take steps to draft appropriate provisions that deal with the issues surrounding voting by 
custodians or nominees, and that remove any impediments to cross border voting. 
 
8. INSIDER TRADING AND ABUSIVE SELF-DEALING 
 
8.1     Content of the OECD Principles 
 
Chapter 3: The Equitable Treatment of Shareholders 
 
B.   Insider trading and abusive self-dealing should be prohibited. 
 
8.2  Comparative Analysis 
 
Both the Jordanian Companies Law and the Australian Corporations Act comply with the OECD 
principle regarding the prohibition of insider trading and abusive self-dealing. 
 
Insider trading, which entails manipulation of capital markets, is prohibited by company law 
and/or criminal law in most developed countries, but unfortunately not all. The annotation to 
Chapter 3, Principle B, provides that in jurisdictions where such abuses are not specifically 
forbidden by legislation or where enforcement is not effective, it is important for legislators to 
take immediate steps to fill any such gaps.440 
 
In Jordan, insider trading and self-dealing are clearly prohibited. Article 158 of the Companies 
Law provides that the company’s directors, managers, and employees are prohibited from 
disclosing to any shareholder in the company or to another person, any confidential information 
                                                                                                                                                                         
437 World Bank, above n 156, 1 
438 Research conducted by Professor Ghassan Omet, University of Jordan; as cited in World Bank, above n 156, 1. 
439 Estimate calculated by HSBC; as cited in World Bank, above n 156, 1. 
440 For more information see OECD Principles 2004, Annotation to Chapter 3, Principle B. 
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related to the company that was acquired in their official capacity in the company, or as a result 
of undertaking any business related to the company. Furthermore, Article 166 provides that the 
company’s board, chairman, managers and employees are prohibited from dealing directly or 
indirectly in the shares of the company on the basis of information which may have been 
acquired as a result of their position in the company. It is also prohibited to reveal any 
information to any person with the aim of affecting the share price of the company or any other 
affiliated company. Directors, managers or employees who undertake such dealings will be held 
liable for the damage incurred by the company, its shareholders or any other persons, and may 
also be subject to a fine.441  
 
Also relevant is Article 108 of the Securities Law 2002 which provides that it is an offence for 
any person to trade in securities or influence others to trade in securities on the basis of inside 
information.442 It also provides that it is prohibited to use inside or confidential information to 
attain material gains. Article 110(A) provides that the penalty for such action is a fine of not 
more than JD100,000, in addition to a fine not less than twice the amount, but not more than five 
times the amount, of profit made or loss avoided by committing the violation.443 Article 110(B) 
provides further that a person committing the violation can also receive an imprisonment term of 
up to three years, at the discretion of the court. The JSC is responsible for monitoring insider 
trading and in 2003 it publicly identified and imposed fines on 23 violators of the insider trading 
rules.444 
 
In Australia, as previously discussed, directors owe duties of good faith and loyalty because they 
are in a fiduciary relationship with the company. Therefore, if a director who possesses price-
sensitive information uses that information to make a profit when dealing in securities, then such 
                                                 
441 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Articles 166 and 282. Also relevant is Article 203 which provides that auditors are 
prohibited from speculating in the company shares. 
442 Article 2 of the Securities Law 2002 (JOR) defines ‘inside information’ as information relating to one or several issuers or 
to one or several securities which has not been made public and which, if it were made public, would likely affect the price of 
any such security. This does not include inferences drawn on the basis of economic and financial studies, research and 
analysis. 
443 Approximately AUD200,000. 
444 Jordan Securities Commission, 2003 Annual Report (Table 1); as cited in World Bank, above n 156, 8. 
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activity may give rise to a breach of his or her fiduciary duties.445 The relevant insider trading 
provisions are extensive and detailed, and are located in ss 1042A-1045A. The central provision 
prohibiting the conduct is s 1043A which provides that where a person possesses information 
that is not generally available but, if it were generally available, a reasonable person would 
expect it to have a material effect on the value of securities of a company, then such a person 
must not subscribe for, purchase or sell any such securities, or procure any other person to do so.  
 
8.3  Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
From the analysis above it can be seen that both the Jordanian Companies Law and the 
Australian Corporations Act comply with Chapter 3, Principle B. Both jurisdictions prohibit any 
person from disclosing information that is not available to the public and which affects the price 
of the company’s securities. 
 
9. DISCLOSURE OF MATERIAL INTERESTS 
 
9.1     Content of the OECD Principles 
 
Chapter 3: The Equitable Treatment of Shareholders 
 
C.   Members of the board and key executives should be required to disclose to the board 
whether they, directly, indirectly or on behalf of third parties, have a material interest in 
any transaction or matter directly affecting the corporation.  
 
                                                 
445 For a general discussion see Tomasic, above n 374, 472. See also Tomasic, above n 359, 348; and Fisher, above n 356, 
144. 
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9.2 Comparative Analysis 
 
Both the Jordanian Companies Law and the Australian Corporations Act comply with the OECD 
principle regarding the disclosure requirement for board members and key executives who have 
material interests in company transactions.  
 
Related party transactions have always been a central issue of concern in terms of the protection 
of shareholders’ rights. Directors and other key executives must inform the board where they 
have a business, family or other special relationship that could possibly affect their judgment in a 
company transaction. Where there is any doubt as to the whether the outside interest is 
‘material’, the relevant person should always lean in favour of caution and disclose the interest 
so that the board can collectively form a view on the nature of the interest. The annotation to 
Chapter 3, Principle C, provides that where a material interest has been declared, it is usually 
best practice for the director to be disqualified from the decision making process in the relevant 
transaction.446 
 
In Jordan, Article 138 of the Companies Law provides that the chairman, members of the board, 
and managers shall provide to the board at the first board meeting a written statement of the 
shares owned by each one of them, their wives, and their children. In addition, the name of other 
companies in which the director and his or her immediate family own shares must be disclosed, 
but only if the public shareholding company also owns shares in the same company. Any change 
which occurs in this respect must be notified to the board within 15 days from the date of the 
change. Article 148 prohibits related party transactions by directors, managers, employees, and 
the company, including indirect participation.  Article 148(b) provides that the board members 
and general manager of a company are prohibited from joining the board of another company 
that carries out similar business activities, has identical objectives, or is a competitor of the 
company. Article 148(c) provides that the company board, its members, its general manager, and 
                                                 
446 For more information see OECD Principles 2004, Annotation to Chapter 3, Principle C. 
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its employees must not have a direct or indirect interest in the business contracts of the company. 
The penalty for such action is discharge from the company.447 In practice, related party 
transactions between affiliated firms owned by the same family are frequent and simply require 
board approval.448    
 
In Australia, s 191 of the Corporations Act provides that directors of both public and proprietary 
companies are required to disclose any material personal interest in any matter relating to the 
affairs of the company. There are various circumstances in which disclosure is not required 
which are listed in s 191(2)(a)-(d).449 Section 194 provides that if the director of a proprietary 
company discloses the nature and extent of their interest to the other directors then the director 
will be able to vote on matters that relate to the interest. Section 195 provides that if the director 
of a public company discloses the nature and extent of their interest then he or she will be able to 
vote, but only if a resolution is passed to that effect by the other directors. ASIC can also provide 
similar approval for participation under s 195(4). 
 
Related party transactions in public companies are regulated by Chapter 2E (ss 207-230). Section 
207 provides that the rules in Chapter 2E are designed to protect the interests of a public 
company’s members as a whole, by requiring members’ approval for giving financial benefits to 
related parties that could endanger those interests. According to s 208, a public company, or an 
entity controlled by a public company, must not give a financial benefit to a related party unless 
the procedure set out in ss 217-227 is strictly adhered to.450 Section 229 provides that ‘financial 
benefits’ for the purposes of Chapter 2E include giving a financial benefit indirectly, giving a 
financial benefit by making an informal, oral or non-binding agreement, or giving a financial 
benefit that does not involve the payment of money. Section 228 defines ‘related parties’ in 
broad terms to include controlling entities, directors of the company and their spouses, relatives 
                                                 
447 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 148(e). 
448 World Bank, above n 156, 9. 
449 Directors are also able to provide a ‘standing notice’ of their interest in accordance with s 192 of the Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth). 
450 For a general discussion see Ffrench, above n 379, 158. 
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of directors and their spouses, entities controlled by related parties, entities that ceased to be 
related parties less than six months prior to the transaction, entities that will become related 
parties in the future, and entities that are acting in concert with a related party. 
 
9.3  Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
From the analysis above it can be seen that both the Jordanian Companies Law and the 
Australian Corporations Act comply with Chapter 3, Principle C. However, the Jordanian 
authorities should be encouraged to clarify and define related party transactions more broadly.  
Rather than simply prohibiting related party transactions, the relevant policymakers should draft 
provisions that more clearly define the relevant procedures in line with the Australian provisions. 
 
10. THE ROLE OF STAKEHOLDERS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
10.1     Content of the OECD Principles 
 
Chapter 4: The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance 
 
The corporate governance framework should recognise the rights of stakeholders established by 
law or through mutual agreements and encourage active cooperation between corporations and 
stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound enterprises.  
 
A.  The rights of stakeholders that are established by law or through mutual agreements are 
to be respected. 
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10.2 Comparative Analysis 
 
Neither the Jordanian Companies Law nor the Australian Corporations Act complies fully with 
the OECD principle requiring the rights of stakeholders to be respected. The legislation in both 
jurisdictions neglects to define stakeholders and give them the requisite attention and protection 
that they are afforded in many other countries. The ASX Principles of Corporate Governance 
2003 do provide recommendations relating to the duty of companies to recognise their 
obligations to legitimate stakeholders. 
 
A good corporate governance regime will encourage effective cooperation between companies 
and the stakeholders that contribute to the effective maintenance and sustainability of the 
companies. These stakeholders generally include investors, creditors, employees and suppliers. 
The annotation to Chapter 4 reinforces that corporations must acknowledge the interests of these 
stakeholders and properly recognise the contribution that they make to the long-term successful 
operation of its business. The annotation to Principle A notes that there are many other 
legislative arenas that have an impact on this area; for example, labour, business, commercial 
and insolvency laws. Also important in this area is contractual relations.451 It is not within the 
scope of this paper to provide a detailed analysis of how these legal factors affect the rights of 
stakeholders.  
 
In Jordan, employees’ rights have priority over creditors’ rights in a bankruptcy situation. 
According to Article 256 of the Companies Law, a liquidator shall settle the company’s debts 
after deducting liquidation expenses and paying the amounts due to the company’s employees. 
The liquidator must also pay any amount due to the Public Treasury and the owners of any real 
estate leased to the company before reimbursing creditors.  
 
                                                 
451 For more information see OECD Principles 2004, Annotation to Chapter 4, Principle A. 
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Article 115, which requires creditor approval for the reduction of a company’s capital, is the only 
provision in the Companies Law that deals directly with the legal rights of creditors. Article 
115(a) provides that the board of a company wishing to reduce its subscribed capital must submit 
an application to the Controller of Companies, which must include a list of the names of all the 
company’s creditors.452 Pursuant to Article 115(b), the Controller must notify the relevant 
creditors of any decision of the company general assembly regarding the reduction of its 
subscribed capital. Creditors may submit a written objection within 30 days from the date of the 
publication of the reduction notice in two local daily newspapers. If the Controller fails in 
settling the objection, the creditors have the right to bring their case before a court.453  
 
In Australia, legislative protection for stakeholders is also mostly limited to the sphere of 
bankruptcy. Section 459P of the Corporations Act lists the entities that can apply to the court to 
have the company wound up because of insolvency. Included is the company itself, creditors, 
liquidators and provisional liquidators, shareholders, and ASIC. A liquidator must distribute all 
assets (subject to the provisions of s 556) firstly to secured creditors, secondly to preferential 
creditors, and finally to general unsecured creditors in equal shares.454 Employees’ rights have 
priority over unsecured creditors in a bankruptcy situation. Section 556 of the Corporations Act 
gives priority to the employees’ wages and superannuation contributions payable by the 
company over all other unsecured debts and claims.455 Moreover, s 596AB prohibits transactions 
that are entered into with the intention of defeating the recovery of employee entitlements.456 The 
remainder of the assets after all other liabilities are met is distributed to shareholders according 
to the company’s constitution. If the constitution is silent, the assets are distributed equally.457 
Moreover, s 256B(1)(b) requires that capital reduction must not materially prejudice the 
company’s ability to pay its creditors.   
                                                 
452 It should also be noted that, pursuant to Articles 115A of the Companies Law 1997 (JOR), a reduction in subscribed 
capital requires the approval of at least 75 percent of the company shareholders. 
453 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 115(b). 
454 For a more detailed discussion see Tomasic, above n 374, 1125. 
455 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 556(e). For a general discussion see Tomasic, above n 359, 820. 
456 For a general discussion see Cassidy, above n 48, 247. 
457 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 501. 
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Principle 10 of the ASX Principles of Corporate Governance provides that companies should 
recognise their legal and other obligations to all stakeholders. Recommendation 10.1 suggests 
that a company establish and disclose a code of conduct to guide compliance with legal and other 
obligations to legitimate stakeholders. The commentary to Recommendation 10.1 provides 
detailed guidelines for the content of such a code. The commentary also provides that the 
company should have a system for ensuring compliance with the code and for dealing with 
complaints. 
 
10.3 Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
Neither the Jordanian Companies Law nor the Australian Corporations Act provides a definition 
of stakeholders. Furthermore, neither Act properly reinforces the role of the stakeholders, 
particularly with regard to the position of the employee in the corporate governance framework. 
As noted above, it is not within the scope of this paper to discuss the role and effect of other 
specific legislative regimes that affect the rights of stakeholders, such as labour and insolvency 
laws.458 It is recommended that the relevant authorities in both countries develop a functional 
definition of stakeholders and create a legislative framework that gives appropriate recognition to 
the interests of stakeholders and their contribution to the long-term success of the corporation.  
 
                                                 
458 For example, the rights and obligations of Jordanian employees are governed primarily by the Labour Law 1996 (JOR). 
Employees have the right to join unions, but unions are generally not very active in Jordan. 
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11. STAKEHOLDERS’ RIGHT TO REDRESS FOR VIOLATION OF THEIR RIGHTS 
 
11.1     Content of the OECD Principles 
 
Chapter 4: The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance 
 
B.  Where stakeholder interests are protected by law, stakeholders should have the 
opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their rights. 
 
11.2 Comparative Analysis 
 
Both the Jordanian Companies Law and the Australian Corporations Act generally comply with 
the OECD principle regarding effective redress for stakeholders whose rights have been violated.  
 
In Jordan, Article 234 of the Companies Law provides that, in the context of a merger, corporate 
bond holders, creditors of merging companies and any shareholders may object to the relevant 
Minister within 30 days of the merger notice being given. The Minister must refer the objection 
to the Controller of Companies, and if the Controller cannot settle the dispute, then the objector 
has the right to bring the matter before a court. According to Article 157, the chairman and board 
of directors are responsible to ‘the company, shareholders and others’ for every violation of the 
company’s internal rules and any other relevant laws, as well as general errors in management. 
The consent of the general assembly for absolving the board from responsibility does not prevent 
the option of legal recourse against the chairman and the board. In light of that fact, theoretically 
every stakeholder has the right to file a legal action against directors for violation of the law. 
Unfortunately, the Jordanian Companies Law does not specifically provide effective mechanisms 
for employees to obtain redress for violation of their rights.  
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In Australia, a director may be liable to compensate the company and others for any losses the 
company suffers from a breach of any one of the general directors’ duties outlined in ss 180-184 
of the Corporations Act. These sections are civil penalty provisions and a director who breaches 
the provisions can be held personally liable to compensate the company or others for any loss or 
damage they suffer.459 Further, creditors have some limited statutory rights against directors for 
breaches of s 588G, which establishes the duty to prevent insolvent trading. Section 588G(3) 
provides that a defaulting director who is acting dishonestly commits an offence and, if 
convicted, will be liable to criminal penalties. Recovery of compensation for losses resulting 
from insolvent trading is covered under s 588M. Section 588M(3), in conjunction with s 
588R(1), provides that a creditor can sue the directors with the liquidator’s consent. Employees 
also have a legal right under s 596AF to begin proceedings, with the liquidator’s consent, for any 
wrongful act in relation to their employee entitlements.460  
 
11.3  Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
From the analysis above it can be seen that both the Jordanian Companies Law and the 
Australian Corporations Act comply generally with Chapter 4, Principle B. In general terms, 
both the Jordanian and Australian legislation protect the rights of stakeholders and introduce 
reasonably effective redress for violation of their rights. However, the Jordanian Companies Law 
does not introduce effective mechanisms for employees to obtain redress for violation of their 
rights. Accordingly, the Jordanian authorities should develop appropriate statutory provisions to 
protect the rights of employees in a more effective way and introduce new mechanisms for 
employees to seek redress for violations of their rights.  
 
                                                 
459 For a more detailed discussion see Cassidy, above n 48, 240. Section 1317H of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) outlines 
the process for compensation orders and civil penalties. For a general discussion see Tunstall, above n 361, 7. 
460 The relevant offence is established in s 596AB of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). For a general discussion see Tomasic, 
above n 374, 1126.  
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12. PERFORMANCE ENHANCING MECHANISIMS FOR EMPLOYEES 
 
12.1     Content of the OECD Principles 
 
Chapter 4: The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance 
 
C.  Performance-enhancing mechanisms for employee participation should be permitted to 
develop. 
 
12.2 Comparative Analysis 
 
Both the Jordanian Companies Law and the Australian Corporations Act comply with the OECD 
principle regarding performance-enhancing mechanisms for employees.  
 
The implementation of performance-enhancing mechanisms for employee participation can 
provide a significant benefit to companies for obvious reasons. The annotation to Chapter 4, 
Principle C, lists a number of examples of mechanisms for employee participation, including 
employee representation on boards, establishing work councils that consider the viewpoints of 
employees on certain issues, and employee stock ownership plans or other profit sharing 
mechanisms.461 
 
In Jordan, Article 190 of the Companies Law provides that a company may set up a saving fund 
for its employees, which shall enjoy an independent corporate identity. Moreover, Article 95(e) 
states that a general assembly can decide to allocate a part of the un-subscribed capital as an 
incentive to the company employees. In Australia, employee share scheme buy-backs are 
facilitated under the Corporations Act as a performance enhancing mechanism.462 These are 
                                                 
461 For more information see OECD Principles 2004, Annotation to Chapter 4, Principle C. 
462 For a more detailed discussion see Ford, above n 360, 1175. 
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arrangements in which the company buys shares held by, or on behalf of, employees, and it is 
approved at a general meeting.463 
 
12.3 Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
From the analysis above it can be seen that both the Jordanian Companies Law and the 
Australian Corporations Act support performance-enhancing mechanisms for employees in 
compliance with Chapter 4, Principle C. 
 
13. STAKEHOLDERS’ RIGHT TO ACCESS INFORMATION 
 
13.1     Content of the OECD Principles 
 
Chapter 4: The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance 
 
D.  Where stakeholders participate in the corporate governance process, they should have 
access to relevant, sufficient, and reliable information on a timely and regular basis.  
 
13.2 Comparative Analysis 
 
Both the Jordanian Companies Law and the Australian Corporations Act partially comply with 
the OECD principle regarding the right of stakeholders to access relevant and sufficient 
information.  
 
In Jordan, the Companies Law specifies limited rights for stakeholders to access information, 
however, they have no specific right to participate in the corporate decision-making process. 
Bondholders are granted explicit legal rights as they are a traditional example of stakeholders in 
                                                 
463 Definition provided in s 9 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Share buy-backs are regulated by Part 2J.1, Division 2     
(ss 257A-257J). 
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Jordan, but they have no voting power at the company’s general assembly meetings.464 Despite 
not being involved in the voting process, they are permitted to form a bondholders’ assembly 
which holds regular meetings and maintains responsibility for protecting the interests of bond 
holders.465  Article 129 provides that the borrowing company shall invite the issue trustee, who 
represents the corporate bonds owners’ assembly,466 to the company’s general meetings to 
represent the interests of the bondholders, without having the right to vote on the decisions of the 
general assembly. There are no other specific provisions in the legislation that allow stakeholders 
access to information.  
 
In Australia, the only relevant provisions allowing stakeholders access to information are those 
in Chapter 5 of the Corporations Act that set out the guidelines for creditors obtaining access to 
information in the context of external administration.467 Section 412 requires that a company 
under administration provide it creditors with all relevant information in relation to proposed 
compromises or arrangements. In particular, the company must explain the effect of the proposed 
compromise or arrangement to its creditors and state any material interest of the directors and the 
effect of those interests on the compromise or arrangement.468 Part 5.3A, Division 2 (ss 436A-
436G), requires an administrator to convene a meeting of creditors and ascertain whether a 
committee of creditors should be established. If a committee is established, then certain measures 
are outlined in s 436F that require the administrator to keep the committee informed throughout 
the course of the administration process. Section 439C provides that the creditors are to decide 
the company’s future 21 days after the administration begins, with some exceptions. Creditors 
may resolve that the company execute a deed of company arrangement, the administration be 
finished, or the company be wound up. There are numerous other provisions in Chapter 5 that 
outline the role of creditors in all forms of winding up and their right to access information in 
such circumstances.  
                                                 
464 Bondholders are regulated by Chapter 7, Articles 116-131, of the Companies Law 1997 (JOR). 
465 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Articles 126-130. 
466 Pursuant to Article 126(b) of the Companies Law 1997 (JOR) the corporate bond owners’ assembly has the right to 
appoint an ‘issue trustee’ at the expense of the company. 
467 Tomasic, above n 359, 715. 
468 For a more detailed discussion see Ford, above n 360, 1132. 
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13.3 Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
From the analysis above it can be seen that both the Jordanian Companies Law and the 
Australian Corporations Act comply generally with Chapter 4, Principle D. The most significant 
discrepancy is that both jurisdictions provide for only very limited circumstances in which 
stakeholders’ can participate in corporate governance decision-making.  
 
14. COMMUNICATION OF CONCERNS ABOUT ILLEGAL OR UNETHICAL PRACTICE 
 
14.1     Content of the OECD Principles 
 
Chapter 4: The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance 
 
E.  Stakeholders, including individual employees and their representative bodies, should be 
able to freely communicate their concerns about illegal or unethical practice to the board 
and their rights should not be compromised for doing this.  
 
14.2  Comparative Analysis 
 
The Australian Corporations Act complies partially with the OECD principle regarding the right 
of stakeholders to freely communicate their concerns about illegal and unethical practice to the 
board of directors. In Jordan, neither the Companies Law nor the Jordanian Constitution 
recognises the right of whistleblowers to freely communicate their concerns about illegal and 
unethical practice. 
 
Unethical and illegal activity carried out by directors and other key executives that violates the 
rights of stakeholders will almost always also have a detrimental effect on the company and its 
 116
shareholders. Accordingly, effective procedures and safe-harbours for individuals, either 
personally or through a representative body, to make complaints are therefore a very important 
aspect of a corporate governance regime. The annotation to Chapter 4, Principle E, notes that in 
many countries the board is encouraged to protect whistleblowers and to give them confidential 
and direct access to an independent board member. Also quite common is the establishment of an 
internal ethics committee or ombudsman-like figure to receive allegations and deal with 
complaints. The annotation also encourages the establishment of confidential phone and email 
facilities to receive allegations.469  
 
In Australia, whistleblower legislation has historically only been provided for the public sector. 
The insertion of Part 9.4AAA (ss 1317AA-1317AE) of the Corporations Act on 1 July 2004 
introduced a certain degree of protection for whistleblowers in the private sector. These 
protections were designed to encourage persons within companies, or with a special connection 
to companies, to alert and report illegal behaviour to ASIC and other relevant authorities. 
Employees and officers of the company who report a suspected breach of the law must act in 
good faith and upon reasonable grounds. The report must be submitted to ASIC, the company 
auditor or member of the auditor team, a director, or another person authorised by the company 
to receive whistleblower disclosure. Anyone who makes a ‘protected disclosure’ is given 
immunity from civil and criminal liability for making the disclosure. Moreover, the ASX 
Principles of Corporate Governance 2003 recommend that companies establish a code of conduct 
for directors and senior executives. The recommendations include fostering and encouraging 
whistleblower behaviour by staff.  
 
14.3 Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
The Australian Corporations Act complies with Chapter 4, Principle E. Unfortunately, the rights 
of whistleblowers in Jordan are not recognised and protected by the law. The Jordanian 
                                                 
469 For more information see OECD Principles 2004, Annotation to Chapter 4, Principle E. 
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authorities must act to draft appropriate provisions to protect the rights of whistleblowers to 
freely communicate their concerns about illegal and unethical practice within companies. 
 
15. EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT INSOLVENCY FRAMEWORK 
 
15.1     Content of the OECD Principles 
 
Chapter 4: The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance 
 
F.  The corporate governance framework should be complemented by an effective, efficient 
insolvency framework and by effective enforcement of creditor rights. 
 
15.2  Comparative Analysis 
 
Both the Jordanian Companies Law and the Australian Corporations Act comply with the OECD 
principle regarding the establishment of effective and efficient insolvency frameworks and 
effective enforcement measures for creditors’ rights.  
 
A key aspect of a corporation’s initial and continued success is ensuring the flow of external 
capital in the form of credit. The annotation to Chapter 4, Principle F, provides that, especially in 
emerging markets, the amount and type of credit that a company is able to obtain depends on the 
level of protection offered to creditors in the relevant jurisdiction. Corporate insolvency 
frameworks vary significantly between jurisdictions. The annotation discusses a common aspect 
of legislative frameworks that imposes a duty on directors to act in the interests of creditors when 
their company is nearing insolvency. In these circumstances creditors might play a significant 
role in the governance of the company. The annotation also encourages the implementation of 
mechanisms that require directors to reveal timely information regarding the financial difficulties 
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of the company so that appropriate consultation can be carried out between the company and its 
creditors.470 
 
In Jordan, the general rules for liquidation are set out in Part 13 of the Companies Law, Articles 
252-272. These provisions are reasonably detailed and comprehensive. According to Article 256 
of the Companies Law, a liquidator shall settle the company’s debts with creditors after 
deducting liquidation expenses and paying the amounts due to the company’s employees. The 
liquidator must also pay any amount due to the Public Treasury and the owners of any real estate 
leased to the company before reimbursing creditors. Article 257(b) provides that if any of the 
operations of the company and its members during the liquidation were accomplished with the 
intention of defrauding its creditors, then the instigators of such activity will be held personally 
liable for any losses suffered by the relevant creditors. Also relevant in terms of enforcement 
rights for creditors is Article 159, which provides that if a deficiency in the company’s assets is 
found upon liquidation as a result of the mismanagement or negligence of a board member, 
manager, or auditor, a court has the right to hold the relevant person/s responsible for all or part 
of the deficiencies.  
 
In Australia, s 95A of the Corporations Act provides that a company is insolvent if it is unable to 
pay all its debts as and when they fall due. Sections 459A-489 set out the process for the 
compulsory winding up of a company in insolvency.471 Section 459P lists the people who can 
apply to the court to have the company wound up because of insolvency and s 459Q sets out the 
application procedure. Sections 490-512 set out the process for the voluntary winding up of a 
company.472 Sections 588D-588Z set out mechanisms that enable liquidators to improve returns 
for creditors in a winding up. Pursuant to s 588E, liquidators may take action against directors 
who allow the company to trade when it is insolvent.473 Whilst most insolvent trading claims are 
                                                 
470 For more information see OECD Principles 2004, Annotation to Chapter 4, Principle F. 
471 For a general discussion see Tunstall, above n 361, 186 and Fisher, above n 356, 438. 
472 Ffrench, above n 379, 332. 
473 For a more detailed discussion see Ford, above n 360, 1315.  
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brought by liquidators, ss 588R-588U provide creditors the right to bring claims in certain 
circumstances, subject to the consent of the liquidator or leave of the court.474   
 
15.3  Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
From the analysis above it can be seen that both the Jordanian Companies Law and the 
Australian Corporations Act comply with Chapter 4, Principle F.   
 
16. GENERAL DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS  
 
16.1     Content of the OECD Principles 
 
Chapter 5:  Disclosure and Transparency  
 
The corporate governance framework should ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is made 
on all material matters regarding the corporation, including the financial situation, 
performance, ownership, and governance of the company.  
 
A.   Disclosure should include but is not limited to, material information on: 
 
(1)  The financial and operating results of the company. 
(2) Company objectives. 
(3)  Major share ownership and voting rights. 
(4) Remuneration policy for members of the board and key executives, and 
information about board members, including their qualifications, the selection 
process, other company directorships, and whether they are regarded as 
independent by the board. 
                                                 
474 For a more detailed discussion see Tomasic, above n 374, 1125.   
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(5)  Related party transactions. 
(6)  Foreseeable risk factors.  
(7)  Issues regarding employees and other stakeholders. 
(8)  Governance structures and policies, in particular, the content of any corporate 
governance code or policy and the process by which it is implemented. 
 
16.2  Comparative Analysis 
 
Both the Jordanian Companies Law and the Australian Corporations Act comply generally with 
the OECD principle regarding timely and accurate disclosure and transparency on all material 
matters regarding the corporation.  
 
An effective disclosure regime is central to the effectiveness of market-based monitoring of 
companies and the protection of shareholders’ right to exercise their ownership rights on an 
informed basis. The annotation to Chapter 5 provides that a strong disclosure regime assists the 
ability of companies to attract capital and the maintenance of confidence in capital markets. 
Companies often make voluntary disclosure over and above the minimum legal requirements in 
response to market demand. Conversely, a weak disclosure regime contributes to unethical 
behaviour and a loss of market integrity. This not only costs shareholders, but the economy as a 
whole. The annotation points out that disclosure requirements are not expected to place 
unreasonable administrative and financial burdens on companies, or unnecessarily endanger their 
competitive position. The core concept is materiality, which the annotation defines as 
‘information whose omission or misstatement could influence the economic decisions taken by 
users of information’.475 
 
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, an assessment report was completed in Jordan 
in June 2004 as part of the joint program of Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes 
                                                 
475 For more information see OECD Principles 2004, Annotation to Chapter 5, Principle A. 
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(ROSC) sponsored by the World Bank and the IMF.476 The purpose of the report was essentially 
to assess Jordan’s observance of corporate governance procedures from an international 
perspective. At the same time, a report specifically pertaining to accounting and auditing was 
completed as part of the same initiative.477 The report was based on findings from a diagnostic 
review carried out in Jordan between December 2003 and April 2004. Soon after the release of 
the report, the JSC issued Instructions for Disclosure, Accounting and Auditing Standards of 
Issuing Companies 2004.478 
 
Article 140 of the Companies Law states that the board must prepare and present to the general 
assembly, within a maximum period of three months from the end of the fiscal year, the annual 
balance sheet of the company, its profit and loss statement, and cash flow statements 
accompanied by their clarifications compared with those of the previous fiscal year. Article 
43(a)(1) of the Securities Law 2002 requires the annual report to also be filed with the JSC 
within three months of the end of the fiscal year. The company’s auditors must duly certify all 
documents. The board must also present an annual report on the company’s activities and 
forecasts for the following year.479  Article 4 of the JSC Instructions for Disclosure, Accounting 
and Auditing Standards of Issuing Companies 2004 provides a detailed list of the requirements 
for the annual board report.  
 
Article 141 of the Companies Law provides that the board must publish the company balance 
sheet, its profit and loss account, a detailed summary of the annual board report, and the 
auditors’ report, within a period not exceeding 30 days from the date of the general assembly 
meeting. Further, Article 142 provides that the board must also prepare a separate financial 
report every six months that includes the financial position of the company, the results of its 
operations, a profit and loss account, a cash flow list and the clarifications related to the financial 
                                                 
476 World Bank, above n 156. 
477 World Bank, above n 11, 2. 
478 The JSC is given the power to issue binding instructions pursuant to Article 16 of the Securities Law 2002 (JOR). 
479 Copies of all documents must be also be copied and sent to the Controller of Companies in accordance with Article 140(b) 
of the Companies Law 1997 (JOR). 
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statements certified by the company auditors. The Controller of Companies must be provided 
with a copy of the report within 60 days from the expiry of the period. Article 43(a)(2) of the 
Securities Law 2002 also requires the semi-annual report to be filed with the JSC within 30 days 
of the end of the biannual fiscal year.480  
 
Article 3 of the JSC Instructions for Disclosure, Accounting and Auditing Standards of Issuing 
Companies 2004 requires further that listed companies publish their preliminary business 
results481 within 45 days of the end of the fiscal year, and provide the JSC with a copy of the 
results. There is some evidence that this practice might actually have a negative impact on the 
audit process. The difficulty is that if earnings are reported before the completion of the audit, 
auditors may be subject to increased pressure from the company not to make adjustments that 
would result in profit figures that are lower than those previously released in the unaudited 
financial statement. A further issue in this context is that any significant difference between the 
figures released in the preliminary report and those reported in the audited annual report has the 
potential to mislead investors.482 
 
Article 8 of the JSC Instructions for Disclosure, Accounting and Auditing Standards of Issuing 
Companies 2004 provides that all public shareholding companies must make public, and notify 
the JSC of, any ‘material fact’ as soon as is reasonably practicable after its occurrence. ‘Material 
fact’ is defined in Article 2 as ‘any event or datum that might affect a person’s decision to buy, 
hold, sell or dispose of a security’. Article 8 provides a non-exhaustive list of the types of events 
that may constitute a material fact, although, in practice, what amounts to a material fact is 
usually a very narrow set of major events.483 Article 9 requires the relevant company to submit a 
detailed report of the event to the JSC within a week of its occurrence, as well as issuing a public 
                                                 
480 See also Article 6 of the JSC Instructions for Disclosure, Accounting and Auditing Standards of Issuing Companies, 
which outlines the required content for the semi-annual report. 
481 The preliminary results include: (1) the net revenues; (2) the expected net profit before tax; (3) the amount allocated for 
income tax on expected profit; (4) minority interest in the profits; (5) net profit of the company’s shareholders after deduction 
of the allocated tax and of minority interest; (6) comparative figures with the preceding fiscal year for the items from (1-5) 
above; (7) a summary of the company’s activities during the fiscal year.  
482 World Bank, above n 11, 5. 
483 World Bank, above n 156, 11. 
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statement to confirm, deny or correct any news item about the event which is published in the 
media. The JSC must also be provided with a copy of the statement.484  
 
In relation to disclosure of remuneration policies, Article 143 of the Companies Law provides 
that the board of a public shareholding company must, on an annual basis, provide the general 
assembly with a detailed report disclosing all relevant information pertaining to the expenses, 
remunerations and privileges of the chairman and the board of directors.485 The same 
requirement is provided in Article 4(B)(18) of the JSC Instructions for Disclosure, Accounting 
and Auditing Standards of Issuing Companies 2004. Recent research indicates that, in practice, a 
lot of companies only disclose the aggregate compensation of the board.486 The chairman and the 
board of directors are held responsible to shareholders for the accuracy of the submitted 
statements.487  
 
The JSC is the body principally responsible for disclosure enforcement and began taking 
administrative action, such as the imposition of fines, against violators in 2003.488 This shift 
towards enforcement was seemingly driven by political will and increased support for the 
independence of the JSC and the immunity of its members.489 To illustrate the increased 
enforcement activity of the JSC in this period it is worthy to note the following statistics collated 
for the year of 2003, all of which were a significant improvement upon previous years: 
 
                                                 
484 See also Securities Law 2002 (JOR), Article 43, which provides that every issuer must make public, and file with the JSC, 
any material facts upon recognising such.  
485 Article 143 lists the following items requiring disclosure: (1) All amounts received from the company during the fiscal 
year by the chairman and members of the board, in the form of wages, fees, salaries, bonuses, remuneration and others; (2) 
Benefits that the chairman and members of the board enjoy such as free accommodation, cars etc; (3) Amounts that have 
been paid to the chairman and members of the board of directors during the fiscal year such as travel and transport 
allowances; (4) A detailed account of the donations paid by the company during the fiscal year, and the entities that received 
them; (5) A list of the names of the board of directors, the number of shares owned by each of them and the duration of the 
membership of each member. 
486 World Bank, above n 156, 11. 
487 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 143(b). 
488 Section 17 of the Securities Law 2002 (JOR) provides that the JSC can conduct any investigation or auditing to determine 
if any person or company has violated or taken preparatory steps to violate any provision in the legislation. 
489 Saidi N, Corporate Governance in MENA Countries: Improving Transparency and Disclosure, Paper presented at the 
Second Middle East and North Africa Regional Corporate Governance Forum (2004), 79. 
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(a) 17 of the 190 companies registered with the JSC were deemed not to be transparent 
enough, and were requested to disclose further information; 
(b) 16 companies were penalised due to inaccuracies in their published annual financial 
reports; 
(c) 5 companies were fined for failure to disclose material information; 
(d) 18 companies were penalised for not having presented a preliminary report; 
(e) 24 companies were reproached because they did not submit an annual report, and 
26 for not presenting a semi-annual report.490 
 
Most importantly, all of these violations were made public so that market participants were made 
aware of the sanctions that they would face in the event of non-compliance.491 This process and 
the JSC’s increased cooperation with the ASE resulted in higher compliance rates in 2004 and 
2005.492 There is no doubt, however, that the JSC could go much further in its monitoring 
function.493 The major difficulty, however, is that the JSC is not the only body responsible for 
fulfilling this role. In fact, the function is significantly fragmented and not effectively 
coordinated.494 The function is effectively shared between the Controller of Companies,495 the 
CBJ,496 the JSC,497 and the Insurance Commission.498 The relevant Jordanian authorities need to 
review the disclosure requirements from all these sources and organise them into a single scheme 
                                                 
490 Ibid, 80. 
491 Article 20 of the Securities Law 2002 (JOR) provides that violations of the legislation can be publicised to forewarn 
investors to avert any resultant consequences. See also Article 21(a)(1) which gives the JSC Board the power to publish the 
findings of its investigations.  
492 Saidi N, above n 489, 80. 
493 Evidence suggests that the JSC reviewers concentrate primarily on the form rather than the substance of disclosure 
documents. The JSC reviewers use a checklist with basic disclosure requirements to determine non-compliance in financial 
statements.  For a general discussion see World Bank, above n 11, 8. 
494 For a general discussion see World Bank, above n 11. 
495 Pursuant to the Companies Law 1997 (JOR). 
496 Pursuant to the Banking Law 2000 (JOR), Articles 60-71. The legislation requires all banks to keep records, maintain 
books of account, and prepare financial statements in accordance with recognised accounting principles. It is further required 
that a bank’s financial statements be prepared in accordance with the instructions issued by the CBJ. The auditors of banks’ 
financial statements are required to be pre-approved by the CBJ in accordance with Article 63(a). A list of acceptable 
auditors is published by the CBJ each year. 
497 Pursuant to the JSC Instructions for Disclosure, Accounting and Auditing Standards of Issuing Companies 2004. 
498 Pursuant to the Insurance Regulatory Act 1999 (JOR). The Insurance Commission, established under this legislation, has 
issued instructions (pursuant to Article 23 of the Act) pertaining to compliance with reporting standards in the insurance 
sector. In addition to filing annual audited financial statements, the Commission requires insurance companies to submit 
quarterly unaudited financial statements. 
 125
so as to make compliance with the requirements less of an administrative burden for companies. 
Further, there needs to be an increased effort in Jordan to educate the media about the corporate 
governance legislative framework to enable them to whistleblow and publish the names of 
violators. 
 
In Australia, Chapter 2M (ss 285-344) of the Corporations Act regulates the disclosure of 
financial information. Section 292 requires disclosing entities, public companies, large 
proprietary companies, and registered schemes to prepare a financial report each financial year. 
The content of the annual financial report must include the financial statements for the year, 
supporting notes to the financial statement, and the director’s declaration about the statement and 
notes.499 Section 296(1) provides that the financial reports must comply with accounting 
standards set by the Australian Accounting Standards Board.500 Section 301 provides that the 
financial report must be audited in accordance with the procedures set out in ss 307-311 and an 
auditor’s report must be obtained.501  
 
Section 292 also requires the preparation of an annual directors’ report. The report must include 
general components pursuant to s 299 such as a review of the company’s operations during the 
year and the results of those operations. Section 299 provides that the report must also include 
details of any significant changes in the entity’s state of affairs during the year, the entity’s 
principal activities during the year and any significant changes in the nature of those activities, 
and any other matter that has arisen during the year that has significantly affected the entity’s 
operations.502 Section 300 provides a more specific list of items that must be included in the 
directors’ report such as the dividends paid to members, the name and term of every director, the 
                                                 
499 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 295. Further information as to what each one of the three mentioned items requires is 
provided in subsections (2), (3) and (4). 
500 For more information regarding the Australian Accounting Standards Board’s power to set accounting and auditing 
standards see Part 2M.5 (ss 334-339) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 
501 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 301. For a general discussion see Tunstall, above n 361, 107.  
502 See also ASX Listing Rule 4.10.17 which provides that a listed company’s annual report must include a review of its 
operations and activities for the reporting period. 
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name of all company officers and auditors, information pertaining to options granted throughout 
the year, and various other items. 
 
The directors’ report for a listed public company requires additional information. Section 299A 
provides that such reports must also contain information that members of the company would 
reasonably require to make an informed assessment of the operations, financial position, and 
business strategies of the listed entity, as well as its prospects for future years. Section 300(10) 
requires that the directors’ report of public companies also include each director’s experience, 
qualifications and responsibilities, and the number of board meetings held during the year and 
each director’s record of attendance. Section 300(11) requires further that directors of listed 
companies include details of, among other things, their interest in the shares of the company or 
of a related body corporate, other relevant interests (including contractual) in any related body 
corporate, and all directorships of other listed companies held in the past 3 years.503  
 
Principle 4 of the ASX Principles of Corporate Governance 2003 requires companies to have 
appropriate systems in place to verify and safeguard the integrity of the company’s financial 
reporting. Recommendation 4.1 provides that the chief executive officer (or equivalent) and the 
chief financial officer (or equivalent) should state in writing to the board of directors that the 
company’s financial reports present a true and fair view, in all material respects, of the 
company’s financial condition, in accordance with relevant accounting standards. Principle 5 of 
the ASX Principles of Corporate Governance 2003 promotes timely and balanced disclosure of 
material matters concerning the company. Recommendation 5.1 requires companies to establish 
a proper governance structure with written corporate policies and procedures to ensure 
compliance with ASX Listing Rule disclosure requirements, and to ensure accountability at 
senior management levels.  
 
                                                 
503 For more detailed information see Tomasic, above n 359, 142. 
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ASX Listing Rule 3.1 provides that once an entity becomes aware of any information concerning 
it that a reasonable person would expect to have a material effect on the price or value of its 
securities, the entity must immediately disclose that information to the ASX. The Listing Rule 
sets out a detailed list of the types of information requiring disclosure. Such material information 
is not confined to information that is relevant because of its monetary value, and can extend to 
strategic and operational matters likely to influence investor decisions.504 Section 674 of the 
Corporations Act, a civil penalty provision, gives statutory force to Listing Rule 3.1 by 
mandating that companies must comply with disclosure requirements provided in market listing 
rules.505  
 
In relation to disclosure of remuneration policies, s 300A of the Corporations Act sets out 
detailed provisions requiring directors of listed companies to include information regarding all 
aspects506 of their, and other key executives’, remuneration in the annual directors’ report. 
Principle 9 of the ASX Principles of Corporate Governance 2003 provides that companies must 
ensure that the level and composition of remuneration is sufficient and reasonable and that its 
relationship to corporate and individual performance is defined. Recommendation 9.1 suggests 
companies provide disclosure in relation to the company’s remuneration policies to enable 
investors to understand (i) the costs and benefits of those policies and (ii) the link between 
remuneration paid to directors and key executives, and corporate performance. Recommendation 
9.2 suggests the establishment of a remuneration committee consisting of a minimum of three 
members, the majority being independent directors.507  
 
                                                 
504 For more information see Guidance Note 8 – Continuous Disclosure: Listing Rule 3.1, ASX, January 2003. 
505 Section 674(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) provides that a listed entity must provide information to the market 
operator if the entity has information that is not generally available and a reasonable person would expect that, if it were 
generally available, it would have a material effect on the price or value of the securities of the entity. Section 677 defines 
material effect on price or value in similar terms to ASX Listing Rule 3.1. That is, the information would, or would be likely 
to, influence persons who commonly invest in securities in deciding whether to acquire or dispose of the ED securities.  
506 The disclosure would include, for example, salary, fees, non-cash benefits, bonuses, profit share payments, superannuation 
contributions, termination and retirement payments, and sign-on payments. 
507 Recommendation 9.2 also outlines a detailed framework for determining appropriate remuneration packages. 
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16.3  Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
From the analysis above it can be seen that both the Jordanian Companies Law and the 
Australian Corporations Act comply generally with Chapter 5, Principle A. There is, however, as 
is so often the case, scope for the relevant Jordanian provisions to be clarified and expanded in 
this very important aspect of corporate governance. Firstly, the requirement in Article 3 of the 
JSC Instructions for Disclosure, Accounting and Auditing Standards of Issuing Companies 2004 
for listed companies to publish their preliminary business results within 45 days of the end of the 
fiscal year should be removed for the reasons stated above. Secondly, the financial reporting 
compliance monitoring function in Jordan is too fragmented and not effectively coordinated. The 
Jordanian authorities need to review the disclosure requirement frameworks operating under the 
Controller of Companies, the CBJ, the JSC, and the Insurance Commission and organise them 
into a single scheme. This process would require the relevant laws that establish the monitoring 
function of each of these bodies508 to be amended to make them compatible with the new 
monitoring and enforcement legislative platform. Finally, the Jordanian media need to be 
educated about the corporate governance legislative framework to enable them to whistleblow 
and publish the names of violators.  
 
                                                 
508 Companies Law 1997 (JOR); JSC Instructions for Disclosure, Accounting and Auditing Standards of Issuing Companies 
2004 (JOR); Banking Law2000 (JOR); Insurance Regulatory Act 1999 (JOR). 
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17. HIGH QUALITY PREPARATION AND DISCLOSURE METHODS  
 
17.1     Content of the OECD Principles 
 
Chapter 5:  Disclosure and Transparency  
 
B.  Information should be prepared and disclosed in accordance with high quality standards 
of accounting and financial and non-financial disclosure. 
 
17.2  Comparative Analysis 
 
Both the Jordanian Companies Law and the Australian Corporations Act comply with the OECD 
principle requiring information to be prepared and disclosed in accordance with high quality 
standards.  
 
High quality standards of preparation and disclosure provide increased reliability and 
comparability of reporting for investors. The annotation to Chapter 5, Principle B, supports the 
use of high quality international accounting standards as benchmarks. Such standards should be 
formulated through public processes involving members of the private sector and other interested 
parties such as professional associations and independent experts.509 
 
In Jordan, Article 184 of the Companies Law provides that a public shareholding company must 
organise its accounts and keep its registers and books in accordance with recognised 
international accounting standards. Article 14 of the JSC Instructions for Disclosure, Accounting 
and Auditing Standards of Issuing Companies 2004 provides that the international accounting 
standards issued by the International Accounting Standards Board are adopted as the 
                                                 
509 For more information see OECD Principles 2004, Annotation to Chapter 5, Principle B. 
 130
international benchmark.510 Article 195 of the Companies Law provides that the auditor’s report 
of a public shareholding company is subject to the auditing profession law in force, and any 
other laws or regulations related to the profession. It provides further that the auditor’s report 
must verify that the company maintains organised accounts, registers and documents, and also 
that all financial statements are prepared in accordance with internationally recognised 
accounting and auditing procedures. One significant problem in terms of adherence to 
international standards for financial disclosure in Jordan is that translations of the documents are 
not widely available so a lot of firms and auditors have difficulty interpreting the standards.511 
Also, there is no consultative process in place to inform the relevant persons and bodies of any 
changes or developments in the international standards. 
 
In Australia, s 296(1) of the Corporations Act provides that the financial reports of a company 
must comply with relevant accounting standards. Section 334 provides that accounting standards 
are to be set by the Australian Accounting Standards Board.512 
 
17.3 Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
From the analysis above it can be seen that both the Jordanian Companies Law and the 
Australian Corporations Act comply with Chapter 5, Principle B. The problem in Jordan, 
however, is that adherence to internationally recognised accounting and auditing procedures is 
made difficult by the fact that translated versions of the standards are not widely available. This 
situation needs to be remedied immediately by the establishment of a body responsible for 
maintaining and distributing accurately translated versions of the international standards. Further, 
                                                 
510 The International Accounting Standards (IAS) are a set of accounting standards issued by the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB). IASs were issued between 1973 and 2001 by the Board of International Accounting Standards 
Committee (IASC). In April 2001, the IASB adopted all IASs and continued the development, calling the new standards 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs). The International Accounting Standards Board is an independent, 
privately-funded accounting standard-setter based in London, United Kingdom. The IASB is responsible for developing 
global accounting standards that require transparent and comparable information in general purpose financial statements. In 
addition, the IASB co-operates with national accounting standard-setters to achieve convergence in accounting standards 
around the world. For more information see www.iasb.rg.  
511 For a general discussion see World Bank, above n 11, 12. 
512 For a copy of the accounting standards issued by the Australian Accounting Standards Board see www.aasb.com.au. 
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as discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, Section 18, of this paper, a regulatory body should be 
established with the responsibility of issuing instructions to listed companies, accountants and 
auditors on the practical application of international standards. It would also be necessary for the 
body to sponsor regular consultative sessions to inform all relevant parties of any relevant 
developments in the international standards. 
 
18. THE ANNUAL AUDIT 
 
18.1     Content of the OECD Principles 
 
Chapter 5:  Disclosure and Transparency  
 
C.  An annual audit should be conducted by an independent, competent, and qualified 
auditor in order to provide an external and objective assurance to the board and 
shareholders that the financial statements fairly represent the financial position and 
performance of the company in all material respects.  
 
D.  External auditors should be accountable to the shareholders and owe a duty to the 
company to exercise due professional care in the conduct of the audit. 
 
18.2 Comparative Analysis 
 
Both the Jordanian Companies Law and the Australian Corporations Act comply with the OECD 
principle requiring an annual audit to be conducted by an independent, competent, and qualified 
auditor who is accountable to the shareholders. 
 
The annotation to Chapter 5, Principle C, provides that, in addition to assessing the accuracy of 
the relevant financial reports, auditors should also provide comments and advice on the methods 
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that have been employed to prepare and present the reports. Auditors are often appointed by an 
internal board committee that is also responsible for continual monitoring of the relationship 
between the company and its auditors. Auditor independence has become an issue of increasing 
importance in recent years. Accordingly, a number of jurisdictions have established auditor 
oversight bodies that are independent of the audit profession. The annotation provides that it is 
desirable for such bodies to have an appropriate membership who operate in the public interest 
and adequate funding unassociated with the auditing profession. 
 
A significant problem in many jurisdictions is regulating the provision of non-audit services by 
external auditors. The acceptance of financial payments for non-audit services can significantly 
impair the independence of auditors. The annotation provides a number of examples of ways to 
improve auditor independence, including requiring detailed disclosure of, and the imposition of 
limitations on, the provision of non-audit services. Another common method is requiring 
mandatory rotation of auditors. The annotation also points to the need for ensuring the 
competency of the audit profession. A strict registration process needs to be supported by 
ongoing training and monitoring to ensure a requisite degree of competence.513 
 
In Jordan, external auditing is a legal requirement for all financial statements.514 Pursuant to 
Article 192 of the Companies Law, the general assembly of a public shareholding company shall 
elect one or more independent515 licensed auditor/s for one renewable year, and shall determine 
their remuneration or authorise the board to determine such remuneration.516 Article 15 of the 
JSC Instructions for Disclosure, Accounting and Auditing Standards of Issuing Companies 2004 
provides that the board of all listed companies must form an auditing committee consisting of at 
                                                 
513 For more information see OECD Principles 2004, Annotation to Chapter 5, Principles C and D. 
514 The relevant part of the Companies Law 1997 (JOR) relating to auditors is Part 7, Articles 192-203.  
515 Article 197 of the Companies Law 1997 (JOR) lists the general requirements for auditor independence. It provides that an 
auditor is not entitled to participate in the founding of a company whose accounts he or she audits, to be a member of its 
board, to work permanently in any technical, administrative or consultancy work therein, or to be a partner or employee of 
any board member. 
516 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 171(A)(6). Auditor fees must be disclosed in the annual report: JSC Instructions for 
Disclosure, Accounting and Auditing Standards of Issuing Companies 2004, Article 4(B)(16). 
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least three non-executive board members, and notify the JSC of the same.517 The functions, 
authorities, and terms of service of the auditing committee are specified by instructions issued by 
the board.518 The committee is required to meet at least four times a year and report to the 
board.519 In practice, roughly 80 percent of listed firms comply with the requirement of 
establishing and maintaining an audit committee.520 
 
Pursuant to Article 193 of the Companies Law, auditors are required to monitor the company’s 
operations and to audit its accounts in accordance with recognised auditing profession rules and 
principles, and appropriate scientific and technical standards. Their other duties under Article 
193 include revising the financial and administrative by-laws of the company and its internal 
financial control measures, verifying the company’s assets, ascertaining the legality and 
correctness of the company’s obligations, assessing the board of directors’ decisions and 
instructions issued by the company, and fulfilling any other relevant duties in accordance with 
the Companies Law, the auditing profession laws and other relevant regulations.  
 
Article 182 of the Companies Law 1997 (JOR) provides that the board must invite the company 
auditors to the meeting of the general assembly at least 15 days prior to the date set for the 
meeting.  The auditors must attend or nominate another person to attend in their absence. Article 
193(g) requires auditors to prepare a written report and recite the same at the general assembly 
meeting. Article 195 outlines all of the specific content required in an auditor’s report. Article 
199(a) provides that auditors shall be the representatives of the shareholders within the limits of 
the powers vested in them. During or after the recital of the auditor’s report at the general 
meeting, shareholders may request a clarification from the auditor and may discuss the issue with 
                                                 
517 The same requirement is provided in Article 46 of the Securities Law 2002 (JOR). The Banking Law 2000 (JOR) also 
mandates audit committees for banks, with the same size and composition requirements as those for regular listed companies 
(Articles 32 and 33). 
518 Article 15(D) of the JSC Instructions for Disclosure, Accounting and Auditing Standards of Issuing Companies 2004 
provides a detailed outline of the rights and responsibilities of the audit committee but leaves it open to the board of directors 
to stipulate any other rules regarding the operation of the committee. 
519 JSC Instructions for Disclosure, Accounting and Auditing Standards of Issuing Companies 2004, Article 15(C). 
520 JSC data; as cited in World Bank, above n 156, 13. 
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the auditor.521 Article 18(D) of the JSC Instructions for Disclosure, Accounting and Auditing 
Standards of Issuing Companies 2004 provides that the audit report must include an affirmation 
that the audit procedures are consistent with the audit standards issued by the International 
Federation of Accountants (IFAC).522 
 
Article 200 provides that if auditors become aware of a violation by the company of the 
Companies Law or the company’s memorandum of association, or any important financial issues 
which may affect the financial or administrative position of the company, the auditor shall 
immediately notify, in writing, the chairman, the Controller of Companies, and the JSC. 
Moreover, Articles 168(a) and 201 make it clear that an auditor is liable to compensate the 
company and its shareholders for any breaches of his or duties as outlined in the Companies Law 
or other relevant accounting laws, as well as those duties demanded by internationally recognised 
auditing standards. Seemingly, these liability provisions are yet to be tested in the courts. It is 
also worthy of note, in this context, that auditors in Jordan are not covered by a professional 
indemnity insurance scheme.523  
 
The enactment of the Accountancy Profession Law 2003 in Jordan introduced a number of 
developments, the most of important of which were the establishment of a High Council for 
Accounting and Auditing, and the creation of a new and improved Jordan Association of 
Certified Public Accountants (JACPA). While its introduction was a positive step forward, the 
legislation’s primary focus is regulating the JACPA and it fails to properly deal with other 
important issues that are crucial to strengthening the auditing regulatory framework in Jordan. 
For instance, there are no provisions dealing with auditor independence or enforcement 
mechanisms for ensuring compliance with relevant laws.524 Whilst Jordanian auditors are 
                                                 
521 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 199B.  
522 The IFAC is the global organisation for the accountancy profession. It works with its 163 member organisations in 120 
countries to protect the public interest by encouraging high quality practices by the world’s accountants. IFAC members 
represent 2.5 million accountants employed in public practice, industry and commerce, government, and academia. For more 
information see www.ifac.org.  
523 World Bank, above n 156, 12. 
524 For a general discussion see World Bank, above n 11, 3. 
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licensed by the Higher Auditing Commission,525 neither the licensing body nor the JACPA has 
any real enforcement powers.  
 
The Accountancy Profession Law 2003 needs to be amended to include the establishment of a 
peer monitoring system of some kind.526 The most logical step would be to empower the High 
Council to monitor and enforce auditing standards. Membership of the Council should not be 
dominated by professional accountants and auditors, and should include representatives from the 
office of the Controller of Companies, the JSC, the CBJ and the Insurance Commission.527 
Additionally, it is important than any such regulatory body also takes preemptive action to 
ensure compliance by issuing instructions on the practical application of international 
standards.528 
 
Current research indicates that the quality of professional education in Jordan in the fields of 
accounting and auditing is a serious problem.529 Public universities in Jordan suffer from a lack 
of qualified academics and modern accounting curriculum. The educational background of 
teachers varies significantly and most undergraduate accounting degrees concentrate almost 
solely on elementary topics without any substantive attention being given to international 
accounting standards and practices.530 An appropriate body needs to be established to review and 
update the accounting curriculum to bring it into line with the International Education Standards 
for Professional Accountants531 issued by the IFAC. There also needs to be a stronger focus on 
the ethical dimensions of accounting and auditing in the undergraduate programs, utilising the 
IFAC-issued Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants 532 as a benchmark.533  
                                                 
525 Article 17 of the JSC Instructions for Disclosure, Accounting and Auditing Standards of Issuing Companies 2004 provides 
that auditors must hold a valid licence and must be members of the Jordanian Chartered Accountants Association. 
526 World Bank, above n 156, 12. 
527 As discussed above in Chapter 4, Section 16, of this paper, each of these bodies has a monitoring function of some kind 
established under different legislation. Legislators would need to avoid any overlap. 
528 For a general discussion see World Bank, above n 11, 14-16. 
529 For a detailed discussion see World Bank, above n 11, 7-8. 
530 World Bank, above n 11, 16-17. 
531 The full text of this document is located at www.ifac.org.  
532 The full text of this document is located at www.ifac.org.  
533 World Bank, above n 11, 16-17. 
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Another problem in terms of education is that, contrary to best practice internationally, practicing 
auditors in Jordan are not required to participate in any form of continuing professional 
education.534 Requirements for continuing education should be established in line with the 
Continuing Professional Education and Development535 standard developed by the IFAC. An 
appropriate mechanism for monitoring and enforcing the requirements would also need to be 
developed. Further, it is essential that professional accountants have sufficient practical training 
under the direct supervision of an experienced audit practitioner before receiving an audit 
practice certificate. Again contrary to best practice internationally, there are no such 
requirements in Jordan.536 
 
In Australia, there are extensive provisions in Chapter 2M of the Corporations Act pertaining to 
auditors.537 Sections 301 and 302 provide that a company must have its annual and half-yearly 
financial reports audited and an auditor’s report must be obtained. Section 307 outlines the 
information that must be included in the auditor’s report and s 307A provides that the audit must 
be conducted in accordance with the relevant auditing standards, which are set by the Australian 
Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (AUASB).538 Sections 325-327A provide that, both in 
proprietary and public companies, an auditor must be appointed in a general meeting, or 
alternatively by the board of directors. Sections 324BA-324BC provide that all auditors must be 
registered with ASIC.539 Sections 324CA-324CC set out the general requirements for auditor 
independence and ss 324CD-324CK outline, in extensive detail, the relevant tests for 
independence.540  
                                                 
534 World Bank, above n 11, 7-8. 
535 The full text of this document is located at www.ifac.org. 
536 World Bank, above n 11, 17. 
537 The relevant part of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) relating to auditors is Chapter 2M, ss 301-313 (Audit and Auditor’s 
Report), ss 324-331AE (Appointment and Removal of Auditors), ss 334-399 (Accounting and Auditing Standards), ss 340-
344 (Exemptions and Modifications). 
538 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 336. For a general discussion see Fisher, above n 356, 119. 
539 There is an exception to the auditor registration requirement for proprietary companies operating in remote areas in s 
324BD of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 
540 For a detailed discussion of auditor independence in Australia see Ramsay I, Independence of Australian Company 
Auditors: Review of Current Australian Requirements and Proposals for Reform (October, 2001), Report to the Minister for 
Financial Services and Regulation. 
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Auditors are accountable to shareholders under the Corporations Act. Section 249K(1)(a) 
provides that a company must invite its auditor to the annual general meeting. Section 250T 
requires that if the company’s auditor (or their representative) attends the annual general 
meeting, then the chairperson must allow a reasonable opportunity for members to ask questions 
of the auditor concerning the conduct of the audit and the preparation and content of the auditor’s 
report.541 Section 308(1) provides that an auditor who audits the financial reports of a company 
must report to the members on whether the financial report is in accordance with the 
Corporations Act. If an auditor is of the opinion that the financial report does not comply with an 
accounting standard, the auditor’s report must, to the extent it is practicable to do so, quantify the 
effect that non-compliance has on the financial report. If it is not practicable to quantify the 
effect fully, the report must explain why.542 Auditors have relatively broad powers to obtain 
information543 and are under a strict requirement to report any contraventions of the 
Corporations Act to ASIC.544 In essence, auditors are regarded as a watchdog for both 
shareholders and ASIC.545 
 
Australia significantly enhanced its regulatory requirements for auditors with the Corporate Law 
Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 (Cth) 
(CLERP9). The legislation is based on the reform proposals contained in the CLERP 9 
discussion paper, Corporation Disclosure - Strengthening the Financial Reporting Framework, 
which was released by the Australian government in September 2002. CLERP9 established the 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC) to oversee standard setting for audit and accounting.546 The 
                                                 
541 Principle 6, Recommendation 6.2, of the ASX Principles of Corporate Governance 2003 similarly provides that a 
company should request the external auditor to attend the annual general meeting and to be available to answer shareholder 
questions about the conduct of the audit and the preparation and content of the auditor’s report. 
542 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 308(2). For a more detailed discussion see Tomasic, above n 374, 645. 
543 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 310. 
544 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 311. Furthermore, auditors must report any contraventions to the trustee for debenture 
holders where the company is a borrower or a guarantor in accordance with s 313(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 
545 For more detailed information on the relationship between auditors and shareholders see AUASB Guidance Note, 
Improving Communication between Auditors and Shareholders, which can be located at www.auasb.gov.au/docs/ Guidance 
_Note _Audit_Reports_07-03.pdf. 
546 For more information see www.frc.gov.au.  
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FRC is also responsible for monitoring and assessing the auditor independence requirements in 
the Corporations Act in cooperation with the ASX.547 The legislation also established the 
Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council to provide a forum for the consideration of retail 
investors’ concerns.548 
 
A significant enhancement provided by CLERP9 was to give auditing standards the force of law. 
A new set of Australian Auditing Standards was recently issued by the AUASB. The standards 
apply for financial periods commencing 1 July 2006. They apply to audits under the 
Corporations Act and audits of a financial report for any other purpose. The new standards are 
aimed at improving the quality and credibility of audited financial reports in Australia and 
investor confidence in them. The standards were completed after extensive public consultation 
and provide Australia with a set of standards consistent with the international standards on 
auditing. 
 
ASX Listing Rule 12.7 provides that an entity included in the S & P All Ordinaries Index549 at 
the beginning of its financial year must have an audit committee. If the entity was in the top 300 
of that Index at the beginning of its financial year then it must also comply with the best practice 
recommendations in the ASX Principles of Corporate Governance in relation to composition, 
operation and responsibility of the committee.550 Principle 4, Recommendation 4.3, provides that 
the audit committee should consist only of non-executive directors, a majority of independent 
directors, an independent chairperson, and at least three members. Recommendation 4.4 provides 
that the audit committee should have a formal charter that sets out the audit committee’s 
responsibilities, composition, structure and membership requirements.  
 
                                                 
547 For more information see Memorandum of Understanding between the ASX and the FRC, located at www.asx.com. 
au/about/pdf/MOU_FRC_and_ASX_280504.pdf.  
548 For more information see www.treasurer.gov.au/rac/content/pressreleases/2004/021.asp.  
549 The top 500 listed entities. 
550 Principle 4, Recommendation 4.2, of the ASX Principles of Corporate Governance 2003 suggests that the board establish 
an audit committee. 
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18.3 Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
From the analysis above it can be seen that both the Jordanian Companies Law and the 
Australian Corporations Act comply with Chapter 5, Principles C and D. It is recommended, 
however, that Accountancy Profession Law 2003 be amended to make the High Council for 
Accounting and Auditing a peer monitoring body with real enforcement powers. Representatives 
from the office of the Controller of Companies, the JSC, the CBJ and the Insurance Commission 
should be included on the board of the High Commission. Secondly, the High Council should be 
made responsible for issuing formal instructions on the practical application of international 
standards and holding regular consultative sessions to brief all relevant parties on international 
developments related to improving the standard and transparency of financial reporting. Thirdly, 
the general requirements for auditor independence listed in Article 197 of the Companies Law 
must be considerably expanded and effectively enforced. Fourthly, the quality of public 
university education in Jordan in accounting and auditing courses requires improvement, and 
legislative measures need to be introduced that require practicing auditors to take regular training 
under a continuing professional education scheme. Finally, an appropriate supervision scheme 
needs to be established so professional accountants have sufficient practical training under the 
supervision of an experienced audit practitioner before receiving an audit practice certificate. 
 
19. EFFECTIVE CHANNELS FOR DISEMINATING INFORMATION 
 
19.1     Content of the OECD Principles 
 
Chapter 5:  Disclosure and Transparency  
 
E.  Channels for disseminating information should provide for equal, timely and cost-
efficient access to relevant information by users. 
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19.2 Comparative Analysis 
  
The methods utilised for disseminating company information are almost as important as the 
information itself. Accessing information through ineffective channels can be a costly and 
burdensome process. Over the past decade there has been a significant increase in the use of 
electronic filing and data retrieval systems. The annotation to Chapter 5, Principle E, encourages 
the use of such methods and also notes the widespread use of the Internet as an effective means 
of filing and retrieving information.551   
 
In Australia, all company information is stored and disseminated via electronic means. Securities 
may be exchanged or traded online using the Internet, which helps drive down transaction costs, 
facilitate cross-border transactions and avoid the need to conduct trades using intermediaries. 
ASIC permits the issue of electronic prospectuses and Electronic Company Registration (ECR) 
enables the registration of Australian companies to be made electronically, linked to an 
electronic payment facility. Company details can be viewed and updated online. ASIC’s online 
lodgement service is provided pursuant to the ASIC Electronic Lodgement Protocol. ASIC 
monitor and make improvements to their electronic lodgement services on an ongoing basis and 
maintain a up-to-date register of all relevant changes which can be viewed on their user-friendly 
website. Further, all application forms can be completed and submitted online.  
 
Unfortunately, Internet use and electronic filing is not yet widespread in Jordan. Article 274 of 
the Companies Law provides that each shareholder has the right to examine any published 
information and documents related to the company which are kept with the Controller of 
Companies, and to obtain a certified copy of the same (with the Controller’s approval).552 The 
difficulty is that the viewing of such information must be done manually because it is not 
available electronically. Article 98(D) provides that any shareholder may have access to the 
                                                 
551 For more information see OECD Principles 2004, Annotation to Chapter 5, Principle E. 
552 Moreover, each shareholder has the right to examine any unpublished statement by way of a court order: Companies Law 
1997 (JOR), Article 274A. 
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shareholders’ register in connection with his or her shareholding for any reason, and to the entire 
register for any reasonable cause. Further, Article 38 of the Securities Law 2002 provides that all 
periodic and material disclosure made to the JSC is available to be viewed by any member of the 
public. But again, the viewing of these documents must be carried out manually. Summaries of 
all listed companies’ annual report information are available on CD-ROM, issued by the ASE.553  
 
19.3  Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
From the analysis above it can be seen that ASIC’s system of electronic filing and information 
dissemination comply with Chapter 5, Principle E. The development of similar internet-based 
electronic filing and data retrieval systems would significantly improve company information 
dissemination in Jordan. Further, the websites of relevant bodies such as the JSC, SDC and ASE 
contain only very limited information. 
 
20. PROVISION OF ANALYSIS AND ADVICE BY EXTERNAL EXPERTS 
 
20.1     Content of the OECD Principles 
 
Chapter 5:  Disclosure and Transparency  
 
F.  The corporate governance framework should be complemented by an effective approach 
that addresses and promotes the provision of analysis or advice by analysts, brokers, 
rating agencies and others, that is relevant to decisions by investors, free from material 
conflicts of interest that might compromise the integrity of their analysis or advice. 
 
                                                 
553 For more information see www.ase.com.jo.  
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20.2  Comparative Analysis 
 
There is a regulatory framework in existence in both Australia and Jordan that complies with the 
OECD principle requiring an effective approach that addresses and promotes the provision of 
analysis or advice by analysts, brokers, rating agencies and others.  
 
There has recently been an increased awareness in many jurisdictions of the high level of 
conflicts of interests amongst market analysts and advisors, and the effect that such conflicts can 
have on their judgment. Conflicts usually arise when the relevant body or person is providing 
more than one service to the company, or when they actually have a material interest in the 
company. The annotation to Chapter 5, Principle F, states that the preferred approach is to 
require full disclosure of conflicts and how the relevant body manages such conflicts. Also 
highly relevant is disclosure of information regarding how the body structures any employee 
incentive programs. This type of disclosure allows an investor to make an informed decision as 
to whether the analysis or advice provided by the body is tainted by any form of bias.554 The 
underlying rationale of this principle is that, if such persons and bodies are seen to be honest and 
free from conflicts, they can play an important role in ensuring boards comply with good 
corporate governance procedures.  
 
In 2003, the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)555 developed 
detailed statements relating to market analysts and rating agencies: IOSCO Statement of 
Principles for Addressing Sell-side Securities Analyst Conflicts of Interest;556 and IOSCO 
Statement of Principles Regarding the Activities of Credit Rating Agencies.557 These documents 
provide clear and detailed principles pertaining to the activities of market analysts and rating 
                                                 
554 For more information see OECD Principles 2004, Annotation to Chapter 5, Principle F. 
555 The IOSCO is the international standard setter for securities markets. The Organisation’s wide membership regulates more 
than 90 percent of the world’s securities markets and IOSCO is the world’s most important international cooperative forum 
for securities regulatory agencies. IOSCO members regulate more than one hundred jurisdictions. 
556 International Organisation of Securities Commissions, IOSCO Statement of Principles for Addressing Sell-side Securities 
Analyst Conflicts of Interest (25 September 2003). 
557International Organisation of Securities Commissions, IOSCO Statement of Principles Regarding the Activities of Credit 
Rating Agencies (25 September 2003). 
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agencies and are a useful tool for securities regulators and others seeking to improve how such 
bodies operate and how their opinions are used by market participants. Mechanisms for 
implementing the principles may take the form of any combination of legislation, regulations 
imposed by non-government statutory regulators, industry codes, and internal rating agency 
policies and procedures. 
 
In Jordan, financial brokers and advisors must be licensed pursuant to Article 47 of the Securities 
Law 2002.558 Article 56 provides that a licensee violates the Securities Law 2002 if it carries out 
any of the following: (i) misappropriates client funds; (ii) practices deception559 or 
misrepresentation;560 (iii) adversely affects competition by manipulating the service fees charged 
to clients or the types of services provided; and (iv) affects or attempts to affect the capital 
market adversely. Article 57 provides that licensees must act with loyalty and dedication so as to 
maximise their clients’ interests and investment objectives. It provides further that licensees must 
refrain from discriminating between clients, charging them excessive service fees, or 
guaranteeing them definite profits, or otherwise engaging in fraudulent and deceptive practices. 
Section 60 provides that a breach of the Securities Law 2002 entitles the JSC to deny, suspend or 
revoke the license of the licensee. 
 
In Australia, the regulation of conflicts of interest amongst market analysts occurs under three 
main heads: (i) s 912A(1)(a),(aa) of the Corporations Act,561 (ii) ASIC’s Policy Statement 181, 
Licensing: Managing Conflicts of Interest, and (iii) ASIC’s supplement to that policy statement, 
Managing Conflicts of Interest: An ASIC Guide for Research Report Providers. The Securities 
                                                 
558 Article 2 of the Securities Law 2002 (JOR) defines ‘financial broker’ as any person engaged in the business of buying and 
selling securities for the account of others; and ‘financial advisor’ as any person engaged in the business of providing advice 
with respect to securities investment to others for a fee, charge or commission. 
559 Article 2 of the Securities Law 2002 (JOR) defines ‘deception’ as any act, scheme, device, practice or course of conduct 
likely to have the effect of misleading others. 
560 Article 2 of the Securities Law 2002 (JOR) defines ‘misrepresentation’ as any untrue statement of a material fact, or any 
omission or concealment of a material fact or any other datum required to ensure that a statement made is true and accurate. 
561 Section 912A(1)(a) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) provides that a financial services licensee must do all things 
necessary to ensure that the financial services covered by the licence are provided efficiently, honestly and fairly. Subsection 
(aa) provides further that a licensee must  have in place adequate arrangements for the management of conflicts of interest 
that may arise wholly, or partially, in relation to activities undertaken by the licensee. 
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and Derivatives Industry Association also released the Best Practice Guidelines for Research 
Integrity in 2001, which have received the support of ASIC. The role of the ASX in regulating 
market analysts is only limited.562 There are two primary obligations on market analysts in 
Australia. Firstly, it is required that they have in place adequate systems to prevent conflicts of 
interest. This is a disclosure requirement only, that is, there are no specific types of conflict that 
are absolutely prohibited. Secondly, they are required to do everything necessary to carry out 
their services efficiently, fairly and honestly.  
 
Tony D’Aloisio, former Chief Executive Officer and Managing Director of the ASX, recently 
presented a paper pertaining to conflicts of interest amongst market analysts.563 In his opinion, 
significant market reputation pressures on market analysts serve to ensure the credibility and 
independence of the research they undertake and the recommendations they provide. Australia is 
a relatively small market for analysts compared to other international markets. In this highly 
competitive environment, D’Aloisio asserts that analysts are unlikely to take risks that could 
affect their reputation. He admits, however, that the issue of conflicts among market analysts 
should remain an area of public policy for surveillance and intervention and not just be left to 
market forces.564 The current regulatory scheme operated under ASIC is, in D’Aloisio’s opinion, 
a very good model for other jurisdictions. 
 
In relation to brokers, the Investigations and Enforcement Department of the ASX investigates 
any potential breaches of the ASX Market Rules and ASTC565 Settlement Rules by brokers. The 
Investigations and Enforcement Department works closely with the ASX Surveillance and 
Participant Services Department, and with ASIC, to examine matters warranting investigation. In 
the course of an investigation, ASX officers may interview brokers, inspect their records and 
                                                 
562 An important point is that ASIC’s regulatory wingspan covers all market analysts, whereas the ASX can effectively only 
regulate those analysts who are employed by ASX market participants. ASX Market Rule 4.14 provides that all market 
participants must comply with the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and the conditions of their financial services licence. 
563 D’Aloisio T, Conflicts of Interests for Analysts, Paper presented at the Corporate Law Teachers Association Conference, 
Sydney, February 2005.  
564 Ibid.  
565 ASX Settlement and Transfer Association. 
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examine the behaviour of brokers and their compliance with the rules. In instances where it 
appears that a broker or broking firm may have breached the rules, the matter may be referred to 
the Disciplinary Tribunal566 for adjudication. If a breach is found to have occurred by the 
Disciplinary Tribunal, penalties can be imposed.567 If it appears that a broker or broking firm 
may have breached the Corporations Act, ASIC is notified and may conduct further 
investigations. 
 
20.3 Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
From the analysis above it can be seen that the Australian and Jordanian regulatory frameworks 
discussed is consistent with Chapter 5, Principle F. 
 
21. THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE BOARD 
 
21.1     Content of the OECD Principles 
 
Chapter 6: The Responsibilities of the Board 
 
The corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic guidance of the company, the 
effective monitoring of management by the board, and the board’s accountability to the company 
and the shareholders. 
 
                                                 
566 The Disciplinary Tribunal adjudicates on suspected breaches of ASX’s Market Rules and allegations of unprofessional 
conduct by brokers or broking firms, and applies penalties when contraventions are proven. It similarly determines 
disciplinary matters under the Australian Clearing House (ACH) Clearing Rules and ASTC Settlement Rules. There is also 
an Appeal Tribunal to hear appeals – by either ASX or the broker - against Disciplinary Tribunal decisions. Both the 
Disciplinary and Appeal Tribunals comprise a panel of industry professionals nominated by ASX.  They operate 
independently of ASX executive management and are supported by an ASX legal counsel. For more information see 
www.asx.com.au/about/disciplinary_ tribunal/index.htm. 
567 If a suspected breach is proved, the Tribunal can impose a range of penalties including censure, suspension, an 
undertaking to complete education and compliance programs, and fines of up to AUD250,000. 
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A.  Board members should act on a fully informed basis, in good faith, with due diligence 
and care, and in the best interests of the company and the shareholders. 
 
21.2 Comparative Analysis 
 
Both the Jordanian Companies Law and the Australian Corporations Act comply with the OECD 
principle requiring board members to act in good faith and in the best interests of the company. 
 
The structure of boards varies significantly. A lot of companies these days employ a split board 
structure allocating the supervisory function to non-executive directors and the managerial 
function entirely to executives. Most companies, however, maintain a unitary structure that 
brings together executive and non-executive directors. The annotation to Chapter 6 provides that 
the principles within the chapter are sufficiently broad to encompass all variations in board 
structure. The annotation to Principle A outlines the two key elements of the fiduciary duty of 
board members - the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. The ‘reasonable person’ test is the 
standard measure for the duty of care. In most jurisdictions the duty does not extend to errors of 
‘business judgment’ so long as there is no evidence of gross negligence and the relevant decision 
was made in good faith. The duty of loyalty underpins the other principles in Chapter 6 relating 
to, for example, fair treatment of shareholders, monitoring related party transactions, and 
aligning key executive and board remuneration with the long-term interests of the company and 
its shareholders.568 
 
In Jordan, Article 132 of the Companies Law provides that the management of a public 
shareholding company is entrusted to the board of directors, whose members are elected by the 
general assembly. The term for a director is four years. Article 133 stipulates that directors must 
own a certain number of shares in the company for the period of their directorship in accordance 
with the company’s memorandum of association. Article 134 provides that a person cannot be 
                                                 
568 For more information see OECD Principles 2004, Annotation to Chapter 6, Principle A. 
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nominated as a director if they have been convicted of a crime or misdemeanor involving 
honor.569 Further to these general rules, there are a number of provisions dealing directly with the 
duties of directors. For instance, Article 138 provides that directors and managers must disclose 
at the first board meeting their, and their immediate family’s, shareholding in the company, and 
also in other related companies. Article 143 requires directors to disclose all relevant information 
pertaining to their remuneration. Article 148 prohibits related party transactions by directors, 
managers, employees, and the company, including indirect participation.  
 
Despite the numerous provisions outlining the duties of directors, the Companies Law does not 
explicitly impose an obligation on directors to act in good faith, with due diligence and care, and 
in the best interests of the company. Some would argue, however, that such an obligation is 
implicit, especially in the context of provisions such as Article 157, which provides that the 
board shall be held responsible towards the company, shareholders and others for every violation 
committed by any of them of the laws and regulations in force and the memorandum of 
association. Moreover, Article 159 provides that the board shall be jointly and severally 
responsible towards shareholders for any default or negligence in the management of the 
company. Evidence suggests, however, that lawsuits against directors are rare at best.570 
 
In Australia, ss 180-184 of the Corporations Act provide that directors owe duties of loyalty and 
good faith because they are in a fiduciary relationship with the company. Section 180 provides 
that directors and other officers571 of the corporation must exercise their powers with a 
reasonable degree of care and diligence. Section 181 provides that a director or other officer 
must exercise their powers in good faith in the best interests of the corporation and for a proper 
purpose. Sections 182 and 183 stipulate that directors, other officers, and employees must not 
improperly use their position, or information they obtained in their position, to gain advantage 
                                                 
569 The examples given are bribery, embezzlement, theft, forgery, abuse of confidence, false testimony, any crime against 
public manners and morals, and bankruptcy (unless rehabilitated). 
570 World Bank, above n 156, 14. 
571 ‘Officer’ is defined in s 9 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) to include any person who makes, or participates in making, 
decisions that affect the whole, or a substantial part, of the business or the entity; or a person who has the capacity to affect 
significantly  the entity’s financial standing. 
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for themselves or cause detriment to the corporation. Importantly, s 184 imposes criminal 
penalties for breaches of ss 181-183 involving recklessness or dishonest intent. Also relevant in 
this context is s 191 which requires disclosure of material personal interests in company matters, 
and s 588G which imposes an obligation on directors to prevent insolvent trading. Further, a 
director may be liable to compensate the company for any losses the company suffers as the 
result of a breach of certain duties owed to the company.572 
 
Principle 1 of the ASX Principles of Corporate Governance 2003 provides a general framework 
which companies should consider when they review their corporate governance policies and 
practices. Recommendation 1.1 provides that a company should formalise and disclose the 
functions reserved to the board and those delegated to management. Company directors have a 
wide range of duties that they are required to fulfill in accordance with the Corporations Act, 
general law, and other relevant legislation. The board is responsible for determining and 
monitoring the objectives and strategic direction of the company. Management, on the other 
hand, is responsible for the efficient and effective operation of the company in accordance with 
the objectives and strategies determined by the board.   
 
21.3  Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
From the analysis above it can be seen that both the Jordanian Companies Law and the 
Australian Corporations Act comply with Chapter 6, Principle A. However, the Jordanian 
authorities should consider drafting the duties of directors in more explicit terms, similar to the 
Australian provisions. Further, it is recommended that the Jordanian restriction requiring 
directors to possess a certain number of shares to be eligible for board membership should be 
removed. This move would encourage independent professional and technical expertise on 
boards rather than the current situation of boards being dominated by the controlling family. 
 
                                                 
572 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 1317H. For a detailed discussion see Tomasic, above n 359, 326. 
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22. FAIR TREATMENT OF ALL SHAREHOLDERS 
 
22.1     Content of the OECD Principles 
 
Chapter 6: The Responsibilities of the Board 
 
B.  Where board decisions may affect different shareholder groups differently, the board 
should treat all shareholders fairly. 
 
22.2  Comparative Analysis 
 
Whilst directors are often individually nominated and elected by certain shareholders, it is 
important that boards do not develop into a body of individual representatives for various 
shareholder groups. The annotation to Chapter 6, Principle B, reinforces that this principle of fair 
and even-handed treatment is particularly important in circumstances where there are controlling 
shareholders that de facto may be able to select all board members.573 
 
In Jordan, shareholders have equal rights because there is only one class of shares issued 
(ordinary shares). In Australia, a company may issue ordinary and preference shares.574 
According to s 254B of the Corporations Act, a company may determine the terms on which the 
shares are issued and the rights and restrictions attaching to them.575 Section 250E(1), a 
replaceable rule, provides that if a company does not specify the voting rights attaching to 
preference shares, all shareholders, whether preference or ordinary, have equal voting rights. In 
all circumstances, directors must, pursuant to s 181, exercise their powers and discharge their 
duties in good faith in the best interests of the corporation and for a proper purpose. Therefore, 
                                                 
573 For more information see OECD Principles 2004, Annotation to Chapter 6, Principle B. 
574 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 254A.  
575 For general discussion see Tunstall, above n 361, 55.  
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directors must act fairly and in good faith whenever their decisions affect different shareholder 
groups differently.576    
  
If a certain class of shareholders is treated unfairly as a result of a board decision, there is scope 
to bring legal proceedings before a court to challenge a company’s action or decision, and to 
obtain remedies against the company, management and members. According to s 236, a member 
has a statutory right to bring proceedings on behalf of a company, or intervene in any 
proceedings to which the company is a party. Such action under s 236 is subject to a court 
granting leave under s 237.577 Pursuant to s 232, shareholders also have the right to bring an 
action for oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct. An extensive list of remedies open for the 
court to order in such circumstances is listed in s 233.578 
 
23. APPLICATION OF HIGH ETHICAL STANDARDS 
 
23.1     Content of the OECD Principles 
 
Chapter 6: The Responsibilities of the Board 
 
C.  The board should apply high ethical standards. It should take into account the interests 
of stakeholders. 
 
23.2  Comparative Analysis 
 
Refer to Sections 10-14 of this Chapter for an extensive discussion of the role of stakeholders in 
corporate governance and the relevant provisions in the Jordanian and Australian legislation that 
serve to protect the rights of stakeholders. In terms of the application of high ethical standards, 
                                                 
576 See the decision of the High Court in Mills v Mills (1938) 60 CLR 150 for discussion on this point. 
577 Statutory derivative actions are discussed in detail in Chapter 5, Section 2, of this paper. 
578 The oppression remedy is discussed in detail in Chapter 5, Section 2, of this paper. 
 151
the ASX Principles of Corporate Governance 2003 comply with this principle. Unfortunately, the 
Jordanian Companies Law does not consider this important matter.  
 
A key role of the board is setting and constantly reinforcing the ethical tone of the company. In 
Australia, Principle 3 of the ASX Principles of Corporate Governance 2003 provides that 
companies should promote ethical and responsible decision-making. Recommendation 3.1 
encourages companies to adopt a code of ethics to help maintain high standards of behaviour, 
enhance the company’s reputation, and give employees a clear idea of the company’s values. 
Such a code of conduct should set the framework for the objectives of the board and detail 
measures taken to achieve certain key functions to maintain confidence in the company’s 
integrity. 
 
23.3 Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
From the analysis above it can be seen that Principle 3 of the ASX Principles of Corporate 
Governance 2003 complies with Chapter 6, Principle C. However, the relevant Jordanian laws do 
not cover this area and the Jordanian authorities should consider filling the gap by drafting 
appropriate provisions to address the issue of board’s applying high ethical standards.  
 
24. REVIEW, GUIDE AND MONITOR EFFECTIVENESS OF CORPORATE STRATEGY 
 
24.1 Content of the OECD Principles 
 
Chapter 6: The Responsibilities of the Board 
 
D.  The board should fulfil certain key functions, including: 
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(1)  Reviewing and guiding corporate strategy, major plans of action, risk policy, 
annual budgets and business plans; setting performance objectives; monitoring 
implementation and corporate performance; and overseeing major capital 
expenditures, acquisitions and divestitures.  
 
(2)  Monitoring the effectiveness of the company’s governance practices and making 
changes as needed. 
 
24.2  Comparative Analysis 
 
The Australian Corporations Act, in conjunction with the ASX Listing Rules and the ASX 
Principles of Corporate Governance 2003, complies with the OECD principle requiring the board 
to take certain measures to review and guide corporate strategy, and to monitor the effectiveness 
of corporate governance practices. Whilst the Jordanian Companies Law sets outs various 
guidelines regarding the powers and responsibilities of directors, it does not explicitly require the 
board to review and guide corporate strategy or monitor the effectiveness of corporate 
governance practices. 
 
The annotation to Chapter 6, Principles D1 and D2, gives particular attention to two key board 
functions – formulating risk policy and monitoring governance policy. Formulating risk policy is 
an area of increasing importance, which involves specifying the types and degree of risk that a 
company is willing to accept in pursuit of its corporate goals. This is a delicate process that 
requires continual reassessment. Monitoring governance policy requires boards to periodically 
review the internal structure of the company to ascertain that all systems of accountability are 
functioning effectively. The annotation points out that a number of jurisdictions have introduced 
measures to require, or at least encourage, self-assessment by boards of their performance, both 
individually and collectively.579  
                                                 
579 For more information see OECD Principles 2004, Annotation to Chapter 6, Principles D1 and 2. 
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In Jordan, Article 132 of the Companies Law provides that the management of a public 
shareholding company is entrusted to the board of directors, whose members are elected by the 
general assembly. Article 156(a) provides that the board of directors or general manager shall 
enjoy complete powers in managing the company within the limits set out in the company’s 
memorandum of association. Articles 140-142 set out the principal obligations of the board in 
terms of preparing the company’s half-yearly and annual budgets and financial reports.580 Article 
151 requires the board to prepare special by-laws to govern the company’s financial, accounting, 
and administrative systems, as well as clarify the board’s rights and obligations regarding such 
issues. Article 151 provides further that the by-laws must not contradict the Companies Law or 
any other relevant law, and a copy must be provided to the Controller of Companies. Moreover, 
the Minister is entitled to make amendments to the by-laws. 
 
Other than the reporting obligations in Articles 140-142 and the requirement to prepare by-laws 
pursuant to Article 151, there are no provisions in the Companies Law that specifically require 
boards to fulfill any of the key functions listed in Chapter 6, Principle D1. Further, there is no 
specific requirement for boards to monitor the effectiveness of corporate governance practices. 
 
In Australia, the Corporations Act and the company’s constitution (if any) determine the 
authority and power of the board of directors.581 Section 198(1), a replaceable rule, provides that 
the directors may exercise all the powers of the company except any powers that the Act or the 
company’s constitution require the company to exercise in a general meeting. Sections 292 and 
295 require public companies to prepare a financial report and a directors’ report for each 
                                                 
580 Article 140 of the Companies Law 1997 (JOR) states that the board must prepare and present to the general assembly, 
within a maximum period of three months from the end of the fiscal year, the annual balance sheet of the company, its profit 
and loss statement, and cash flow statements accompanied with their clarifications compared with those of the previous fiscal 
year, and all documents must be duly certified by the company auditors. The board must also present an annual report on the 
company activities and forecasts for the following year. Article 142 provides that the board of a public shareholding company 
must also prepare a separate financial report every six months that includes the financial position of the company, the results 
of its operations, a profit and loss account, a cash flow list and the clarifications related to the financial statements certified by 
the company auditors.  
581 Ffrench, above n 379, 136. 
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financial year. Section 299 provides that the directors’ report must review the operations of the 
company during the year, explain any significant changes in the company’s state of affairs 
during the year, and provide details of any circumstances that have arisen during the year that 
have significantly affected the entity’s operations or will do so in the future. The report must also 
refer to developments in the entity’s operations in future financial years and the expected result 
of those operations, and also the company’s performance in relation to any relevant 
environmental regulations.582 
 
In relation to monitoring the effectiveness of corporate governance practices, ASX Listing Rule 
4.10.3 provides that a company must include in its annual report a statement disclosing the extent 
to which the entity has complied with the ASX Principles of Corporate Governance 2003 during 
the reporting period.583 If the company has not followed any of the recommendations then it must 
identify that recommendation and provide reasons for not following it.584 ASX Guidance Notes 9 
and 9A were published to assist listed companies in the preparation of the compliance statement 
required under Listing Rule 4.10.3.  
 
In relation to reviewing and guiding risk policy, Principle 7 of the ASX Principles of Corporate 
Governance 2003 requires companies to establish a sound system of risk oversight and 
management, and internal control. Recommendation 7.2 requires a company’s chief executive 
officer and chief financial officer to provide written assurance that the company’s financial 
report presents a true and fair view based on a system of risk management and internal 
compliance and control that has been operating effectively during the previous year. In addition 
to the commentary surrounding Principle 7, the ASX Corporate Governance Council has 
provided supplementary guidance on its implementation.585 
                                                 
582 For more information see Chapter 4, Section 16, of this paper. 
583 ASX Listing Rule 4.10.3 is also discussed in Chapter 4, Section 1.3, of this paper. 
584 This process is often referred to as an ‘if not, why not’ policy. It is considered to be an effective approach because it 
allows listed companies a degree of flexibility to consider a range of means to address corporate governance issues and avoid 
particular recommendations if they are inappropriate for the company’s particular circumstances. 
585 The ASX Supplementary Guidance to Principle 7 is located at www.asx.com.au/supervision/governance/principles 
_good_corporate_governance.htm.  
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24.3  Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
From the analysis above it can be seen that the Australian Corporations Act, in conjunction with 
the ASX Listing Rules and the ASX Principles of Corporate Governance 2003, complies with 
Chapter 6, Principles D1 and D2. The Jordanian Companies Law, however, lacks detailed 
provisions in this area. It is recommended that the Jordanian authorities consider drafting more 
explicit and extensive provisions requiring the board to take measures to review and guide 
corporate strategy, risk policy, and the effectiveness of corporate governance practices. 
 
25. MONITOR KEY EXECUTIVES AND OVERSEE SUCCESSION PLANNING  
 
25.1     Content of the OECD Principles 
 
Chapter 6: The Responsibilities of the Board 
 
D.  The board should fulfil certain key functions, including: 
 
(3)  Selecting, compensating, monitoring, and, where necessary, replacing key 
executives and overseeing succession planning. 
 
25.2 Comparative Analysis 
 
Both the Jordanian Companies Law and the Australian Corporations Act comply with the OECD 
principle requiring the board to undertake certain responsibilities in relation to key executives 
and succession planning. 
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In Jordan, Article 153 of the Companies Law provides that the board is authorised to appoint a 
general manager who either is a member of the board or an external candidate. The board is 
responsible for setting the manager’s powers and responsibilities, as well as his or her salary.586 
The board also has the right to extend or terminate the manager’s contract, and must inform the 
Controller of Companies about any such appointment or termination as soon as the decision is 
made.  Pursuant to Article 154, the board is also responsible for appointing (from amongst the 
company’s employees), and determining the salary of, a secretary of the board who is 
responsible for arranging board meetings and preparing the agendas thereof. 
 
In Australia, a company’s constitution determines the rules and conditions pertaining to the 
appointment of a general manager or managing director. The Corporations Act sets out a 
replaceable rule in s 201J which provides that the directors of a company may appoint any one or 
more of themselves to the office of managing director of the company for a period, and on terms 
(including as to remuneration) as the board sees fit. Section 198C, also a replaceable rule, 
provides that the directors may confer on a managing director any of the powers that the 
directors themselves can exercise. Pursuant to s 204A(2), every public company is required to 
have at least one secretary, and one of those appointed must ordinarily reside in Australia. The 
board is responsible for appointing the secretary587 and for establishing the terms and conditions 
of their office, including their salary.588 The position of company secretary in public companies 
comes with important responsibilities and powers. However, the nature of a secretary’s 
responsibilities will vary from one company to another depending on the size and nature of the 
business.589  
 
                                                 
586 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 153. 
587 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 204D [Replaceable Rule]. 
588 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 204F [Replaceable Rule]. 
589 Adams, above n 404, 34. 
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25.3 Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
From the analysis above it can be seen that both the Jordanian Companies Law and the 
Australian Corporations Act comply with Chapter 6, Principle D3. 
 
26. KEY EXECUTIVE AND BOARD REMUNERATION 
 
26.1     Content of the OECD Principles 
 
Chapter 6: The Responsibilities of the Board 
 
D.  The board should fulfil certain key functions, including: 
 
(4)  Aligning key executive and board remuneration with the longer term interests of 
the company and its shareholders. 
 
26.2  Comparative Analysis 
 
The Australian Corporations Act and the ASX Principles of Corporate Governance 2003 comply 
with the OECD principle requiring the board to align key executive and board remuneration with 
the long-term interests of the company and its shareholders. The Jordanian Companies Law, 
however, sets the remuneration of directors as a specific percentage of the company’s annual net 
profit. 
 
In most jurisdictions it is regarded as good practice for boards to develop and disclose a 
remuneration policy statement that outlines all of the relevant information pertaining to the 
remuneration of directors and other key executives. The annotation to Chapter 6, Principle D4, 
outlines the standard content of such policy statements, which includes specifying the 
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relationship between remuneration and performance, with a general view to long rather than 
short-term interests of the company. The statements also usually include any necessary 
information about payments for extra activities carried out by directors, such as consulting. The 
annotation notes that it is becoming increasingly common for these types of remuneration policy 
statements to be developed by a special board committee consisting mostly of independent 
directors to avoid conflicts of interest.590 
 
Remuneration policy for company boards in Jordan is not subject to the approval of 
shareholders. According to Article 162 of the Companies Law, remuneration paid to the board 
and chairman shall be determined at a rate of 10 percent of the net profit that can be distributed 
as dividends to shareholders, and after deducting all taxes and reserves. Remuneration is 
distributed amongst the directors in proportion to their level of attendance at meetings.591 
Further, the remuneration paid to each director should not exceed 5,000 Jordanian Dinars 
(JD5,000)592 annually.593 If the company is still in the founding stages and has not realised any 
profits then remuneration is limited to 1,000 Jordanian Dinars (JD1,000).594 
 
In Australia, the internal rules of a company ordinarily provide shareholders with the power to 
fix the remuneration of directors. Section 202A, a replaceable rule, provides that the directors of 
a company are to be paid the remuneration that the company determines by resolution.595 
Moreover, Principle 9 of the ASX Principles of Corporate Governance 2003 aims to ensure 
proper alignment between remuneration policy and performance. In accordance with this 
principle, the board has to provide clearly detailed information about remuneration schemes in 
order to avoid surprises for shareholders. Recommendation 9.1 requires companies to disclose 
information on the remuneration of board members and key executives to enable shareholders to 
                                                 
590 For more information see OECD Principles 2004, Annotation to Chapter 6, Principle D(4). 
591 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 162(a). A meeting not attended for a justifiable cause approved by the board is 
considered to have been attended by the director. 
592 Approximately AUD10,000. 
593 Companies Law 1997 (JOR), Article 162. 
594 Approximately AUD2,000. 
595 For further discussion see Tomasic, above n 359, 264. 
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understand the link between remuneration and company performance. Moreover, 
Recommendation 9.2 requires the board to establish a remuneration committee to handle 
remuneration policy and employment contracts for board members and key executives. 
 
26.3 Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
From the analysis above it can be seen that the Australian Corporations Act complies with 
Chapter 6, Principle D4. Allowing shareholders to determine the remuneration of directors is an 
appropriate method of ensuring that key executive and board remuneration is aligned with the 
long-term interests of the company and its shareholders. Whilst simple in administrative terms, 
the Jordanian method of setting the remuneration of directors as a percentage of the company’s 
annual net profit will not always be effective in ensuring that appropriate salaries are paid to 
directors in line with the best interests of company. Accordingly, the Companies Law should be 
amended to allow shareholders to determine the remuneration of directors.  
 
27. TRANSPARENT BOARD NOMINATION 
 
27.1     Content of the OECD Principles 
 
Chapter 6: The Responsibilities of the Board 
 
D.  The board should fulfil certain key functions, including: 
 
(5)  Ensuring a formal and transparent board nomination and selection process. 
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27.2 Comparative Analysis 
 
Both the Jordanian Companies Law and the Australian Corporations Act comply with the OECD 
principle requiring the board to ensure a formal and transparent board nomination and selection 
process. 
 
Whilst board nomination procedures vary significantly among different jurisdictions, directors 
always have a special responsibility to ascertain that the process is transparent and effective. The 
annotation to Chapter 6, Principle D5, provides that directors also have a key role in identifying 
potential board members because of their ‘insider knowledge’ regarding the competencies and 
expertise that are needed to complement the existing skills of the board.596  
 
In Jordan, Article 132 of the Companies Law discusses board selection procedures and stipulates 
that the number of board members in public shareholding companies must not be less than three 
and must not exceed thirteen. Directors are elected through a confidential voting process in the 
general assembly and are assigned for a four year term from the date of election. Article 133 
stipulates that directors must own a certain number of shares in the company for the period of 
their directorship in accordance with the company’s memorandum of association. Article 134 
provides that a person cannot be nominated as a director if they have been convicted of a crime 
or misdemeanor involving honor.597  
 
In Australia, s 201G of the Corporations Act, a replaceable rule, states that a company may 
appoint a person as a director by resolution passed in a general meeting. Section 201H, also a 
replaceable rule, provides that the directors may also appoint a person as a director in certain 
circumstances. Section 201A prescribes the minimum number of directors that a proprietary 
                                                 
596 For more information see OECD Principles 2004, Annotation to Chapter 6, Principle D(5). 
597 The examples given are bribery, embezzlement, theft, forgery, abuse of confidence, false testimony, any crime against 
public manners and morals, and bankruptcy (unless rehabilitated). 
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company must have is one, whilst the minimum for a public company is three.598 Unlike the 
Jordanian equivalent, the Australian legislation does not provide a certain number of shares that 
the member of the board must own to qualify him or for membership. Section 201E, a 
replaceable rule, provides a special rule for the appointment of public company directors and 
states that a resolution passed at a general meeting appointing or confirming the appointment of 
two or more directors is void unless the meeting has resolved that the appointment or 
confirmation can be voted on together and no votes were cast against the resolution.599   
 
Principle 2, Recommendation 2.4, of the ASX Principles of Corporate Governance 2003 
provides that the board should establish a nomination committee, which should consist of a 
minimum of three members, the majority being independent directors. The commentary to 
Recommendation 2.4 provides that the nomination committee should have a charter that clearly 
sets out its responsibilities, composition, structure and membership requirements. 
 
27.3  Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
From the analysis above it can be seen that both the Jordanian Companies Law and the 
Australian Corporations Act comply with Chapter 6, Principle D5.  
 
                                                 
598 Section 201A also stipulates that a proprietary company must have at least one director, and a public company must have 
at least two directors, who ordinarily reside in Australia. 
599 For further discussion see Tomasic, above n 359, 364. 
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28. MONITORING CONFLICTS, ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS AND DISCLOSURE 
PROCESSES  
 
28.1     Content of the OECD Principles 
 
Chapter 6: The Responsibilities of the Board 
 
D.  The board should fulfil certain key functions, including: 
 
(6)  Monitoring and managing potential conflicts of interest of management, board 
members and shareholders, including misuse of corporate assets and abuse in 
related party transactions. 
 
(7)  Ensuring the integrity of the corporation’s accounting and financial reporting 
systems, including the independent audit, and that appropriate systems of control 
are in place, in particular, systems for risk management, financial and 
operational control, and compliance with the law and relevant standards.  
 
(8)  Overseeing the process of disclosure and communications. 
 
28.2  Comparative Analysis 
 
Both the Jordanian Companies Law and the Australian Corporations Act comply generally with 
the OECD principles requiring the board of directors to monitor and manage conflicts of interest, 
ensure the integrity of the corporation’s accounting and financial reporting systems, ensure that 
appropriate systems of control are in place, and oversee the process of disclosure and 
communications. 
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The function of overseeing internal control systems covering areas such as financial reporting, 
the use of corporate assets, related party transactions, compliance with relevant laws, and the 
process of disclosure and communications are most often carried out by an internal auditor or 
audit committee. The annotation to Chapter 5, Principles D6, 7 and 8, provides that it is 
important for such persons to maintain regular and direct access to the board, as well as having 
strict reporting requirements. The responsibilities of an internal oversight committee should be 
closely aligned with a published company code of ethics. The annotation maintains that, in order 
to be effective, the incentive structure of a business needs to be linked with a clear set of ethical 
and professional standards so that breaches of such standards are met with dissuasive 
consequences or penalties.600  
 
In Jordan, there are various provisions pertaining to conflicts of interest. For instance, Article 
138 of the Companies Law sets out an ongoing shareholding disclosure requirement for all 
directors.601 Further, Article 148 prohibits related party transactions by directors, managers, 
employees, and the company, including indirect participation.602 However, there are no 
provisions in the Companies Law that explicitly state that the board is responsible for monitoring 
and managing conflicts. Moreover, there are numerous provisions, which have already been 
discussed in detail in this paper, pertaining to the financial and accounting systems of a 
company, as well as the requirements for disclosure and communications. Similarly, however, 
there are no provisions that explicitly require directors to oversee and ensure the integrity of such 
procedures. 
                                                 
600 For more information see OECD Principles 2004, Annotation to Chapter 6, Principle D(6), (7) and (8). 
601 Article 138 of the Companies Law 1997 (JOR) provides that the chairman, members of the board, and managers shall 
provide to the board at the first board meeting a written statement of the shares owned by each one of them, and their 
immediate family. In addition, the name of other companies in which the director and his or her immediate family own shares 
must be disclosed, but only if the public shareholding company also owns shares in the same company. Any change which 
occurs in this respect must be notified to the board within 15 days from the date of the change. 
602 Article 148(b) of the Companies Law 1997 (JOR) provides that the directors and general manager of a company are 
prohibited from joining the board of another company that carries out similar business activities, has identical objectives, or 
is a competitor of the company. Article 148(c) provides that the company board, its members, its general manager, and its 
employees must not have a direct or indirect interest in the business contracts of the company. Article 148(e) provides that 
the penalty for such action is discharge from the company. Moreover, Article 157 confirms that the chairman and members of 
the board shall be held responsible to shareholders and others for every violation of these provisions by any of them or all of 
them. 
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Article 151 does provide a general platform for requiring directors to provide a certain measure 
of oversight and guidance over important internal company procedures. The provision requires 
the board of directors to prepare special by-laws to govern the company’s financial, accounting, 
and administrative systems, as well as clarify the board’s rights and obligations regarding such 
issues. Accordingly, directors should use such by-laws to establish effective internal control 
measures to manage and monitor conflicts, the company’s accounting and financial systems, 
internal systems of control, and the company’s process of disclosure. Ordinarily, the best method 
of fulfilling these control oversight responsibilities is to establish a number of internal 
committees, such as an internal audit committee, within the company who are responsible for 
reporting to the board any noteworthy information related to their specified area.  
 
Auditors in Jordan also have some responsibility for monitoring conflicts, financial systems, 
internal control measures, and disclosure requirements. Article 193 sets out the general duties of 
auditors. These duties include such things as monitoring the company’s operations, revising the 
financial and administrative by-laws of the company and its internal financial controls, and 
ascertaining the legality and correctness of company obligations. Article 195(a) provides that the 
auditor’s report must include, amongst other things, any violations of the Companies Law or the 
memorandum of association which have had a material effect on the results of the company’s 
operations and its financial position. Unfortunately, it is difficult for other stakeholders to 
disclose information about conflicts as neither the Companies Law nor the Jordanian 
Constitution recognises the right of whistleblowers to freely communicate their concerns about 
illegal and unethical practice to the board of directors. 
 
In Australia, there are also a number of provisions in the Corporations Act that have already 
been discussed in previous sections of this chapter related to conflicts of interest, the company’s 
accounting and financial systems, internal systems of control, and disclosure obligations. 
However, like its Jordanian counterpart, the Corporations Act does not explicitly provide that 
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directors are responsible for the monitoring and management of conflicts of interest. 
Accordingly, it is necessary for the board to establish effective internal control measures, in the 
company constitution or otherwise, to fulfil its control oversight responsibilities. Auditors of 
Australian companies, like those in Jordan, also have an important role to play in identifying and 
reporting any conflicts of interest.603 Moreover, there is a certain degree of protection afforded to 
other stakeholders who wish to report suspected conflicts pursuant to Part 9.4AAA of the 
Corporations Act.604 
 
Also relevant in this context is Principle 4 of the ASX Principles of Corporate Governance 2003, 
which provides that the chief executive officer (or equivalent) and chief financial officer (or 
equivalent) must state in writing to the board that the company’s financial reports present a true 
and fair view, in all material respects, of the company’s financial condition, and are in 
accordance with relevant accounting standards. Principle 5 requires companies to disclose their 
policies and establish proper governance structure and written corporate policies and procedure 
to ensure compliance with ASX Listing Rule disclosure requirements, and to ensure 
accountability at senior management levels. It should be noted that companies are required to 
disclose in the annual report the extent of compliance with Recommendation 5.1. Moreover, 
Principle 7 requires companies to establish a sound system of risk oversight and management 
and internal control.  
 
28.3  Comparative Analysis 
 
From the analysis above it can be seen that neither the Jordanian Companies Law nor the 
Australian Corporations Act explicitly comply with Chapter 6, Principles D6, 7 and 8. It is 
                                                 
603 For more information on the requirement for auditors to report contraventions to ASIC see s 311 of the Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth). 
604 Part 9.4AAA of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) was introduced on 1 July 2004. The provisions were designed to 
encourage persons within companies, or with a special connection to companies, to alert and report illegal behaviour to ASIC 
and other relevant authorities. Employees and officers of the company who report a suspected breach of the law must act in a 
good faith and upon reasonable grounds. The report must be submitted to ASIC, the company auditor or member of the 
auditor team, a director, or another person authorised by the company to receive whistleblower disclosure. Anyone who 
makes a ‘protected disclosure’ is given immunity from civil and criminal liability for making the disclosure. 
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recommended that the relevant authorities in both jurisdictions should enact legislative 
provisions that clearly and explicitly provide for the role of the board of directors in monitoring 
and managing conflicts of interest, ensuring the integrity of the corporation’s accounting and 
financial reporting systems, and overseeing the process of disclosure and communications. 
 
29. EXERCISING OBJECTIVE AND INDEPENDENT JUDGEMENT 
 
29.1     Content of the OECD Principles 
 
Chapter 6: The Responsibilities of the Board 
 
E.  The board should be able to exercise objective, independent judgement on corporate 
affairs.  
 
(1)  Boards should consider assigning a sufficient number of non-executive board 
members capable of exercising independent judgment to tasks where there is a 
potential for conflicts of interest. Examples of such key responsibilities are 
ensuring the integrity of financial and non-financial reporting, the review of 
related party transactions, nomination of board members and key executives, and 
board remuneration.  
 
(2)  When committees of the board are established, their mandate, composition and 
working procedures should be well defined and disclosed by the board. 
 
(3)  Board members should be able to commit themselves effectively to their 
responsibilities.  
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29.2  Comparative Analysis 
 
The Jordanian Companies Law and the Australian Corporations Act comply only partially with 
the OECD principle requiring the board to exercise objective, independent judgement on 
corporate affairs.  
 
The annotation to Chapter 6, Principle E, provides that the wide variation in board structures and 
ownership patterns across jurisdictions will require different approaches to the issue of board 
objectivity. Board independence in areas where there is a potential for conflicting interests 
usually requires that there is a sufficient number of directors that are independent of 
management. Utilising committees of independent non-executive directors to oversee delicate 
areas such as financial reporting, remuneration and nomination provides additional assurance to 
market participants. The annotation provides that, in order to avoid any questions being raised 
about the collective responsibility of the board in such circumstances, it is important that the 
composition and duties of such committees are properly disclosed and clearly explained.605 
 
In Jordan, the Companies Law does not specifically require the assignment of any specific 
number of non-executive members to the board. However, Article 15 of the JSC Instructions for 
Disclosure, Accounting and Auditing Standards of Issuing Companies 2004 provides that the 
board of all listed companies must form an auditing committee consisting of at least three ‘non-
executive’ board members, and notify the JSC of the same.606 There is no other explanation of, 
or discussion about, the role of non-executive directors. There is also no mention of a 
requirement for, or the monitoring of, board committees in the legislation other than the audit 
committee. Recent research suggests that, except among a handful of companies, board 
committees other than the audit committee are rare.607  
                                                 
605 For more information see OECD Principles 2004, Annotation to Chapter 6, Principle E. 
606 The same requirement is provided in Article 46 of the Securities Law 2002 (JOR). The Banking Law 2000 (JOR) also 
mandates audit committees for banks, with the same size and composition requirements as those for regular listed companies 
(Articles 32 and 33). 
607 World Bank, above n 156, 15. 
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As discussed in the previous section of this chapter, Article 151 requires the board of directors to 
prepare special by-laws to govern the company’s financial, accounting, and administrative 
systems, as well as clarify the board’s rights and obligations regarding such issues. Accordingly, 
directors should use such by-laws to establish effective internal control measures that require the 
appointment of independent directors to tasks where there is a potential for conflicts of interest. 
It is also necessary for the internal control measures to sufficiently define the role and 
responsibilities of any board committees that are established within the company. 
 
In Australian listed companies, senior full-time executives are often joined on the board by 
various non-executive directors. These non-executive directors provide support and assistance to 
the full-time executives, as well as monitoring executive decision-making.608 Non-executive 
directors are ordinarily referred to as ‘independent’ directors. The number of non-executive 
directors present at a board meeting varies depending on the company, and the ratio is sometimes 
as high as 50 percent.609 Non-executive directors are usually paid a fee for attending meetings 
and carrying out related duties.  
 
Principle 2 of the ASX Principles of Corporate Governance 2003 is relevant in this context. 
Recommendation 2.1 provides that the majority of the board should be ‘independent’ and sets 
out a list of factors that disqualify a director from being independent. According to the 
commentary to Recommendation 2.1, a director will not be independent if he or she: 
 is a substantial shareholder of the company or is directly associated with a 
substantial shareholder; 
 has been employed by the company in an executive capacity in the last three 
years, or has been a director after ceasing to hold such employment; 
 has been a principal of a material advisor or consultant to the company in the last 
three years, or an employer materially associated with the service provided; 
                                                 
608 Proctor and Miles, above n 80, 26. See also Tricker, above n 107, 177. 
609 Bostock R, above n 109, 96. 
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 has been a material supplier or customer of the company, or has been directly or 
indirectly associated with a material supplier or customer; 
 has a material contractual relationship with the company other than as a director 
of the company; 
 has served on the board for a period which could be reasonably perceived as 
materially affecting the director’s ability to act in the best interests of the 
company; or 
 has an interest or relationship which could be reasonably perceived as materially 
interfering with the directors’ ability to act in the best interests of the company. 
 
Recommendation 2.2 provides that the chairperson should be an independent director, and 
Recommendation 2.3 provides that the role of chairperson and chief executive officer should not 
be exercised by the same individual. The Corporations Act itself does not include any provisions 
dealing with non-executive directors. There is also no mention of a requirement for the 
monitoring of board committees in the legislation. Like its Jordanian counterpart, the Australian 
legislation leaves such matters to the internal control measures set by the board of directors. 
 
In relation to board members being able to commit themselves effectively to their 
responsibilities, Principle 8 of the ASX Principles of Corporate Governance 2003 provides that 
boards should fairly review and actively encourage enhanced board and management 
effectiveness. Recommendation 8.1 suggests that the board disclose the process for performance 
evaluation of the board, its committees and individual directors, and key executives. It is further 
provided that the board nomination committee should take responsibility for evaluating the 
board’s performance. 
 
 170
29.3 Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
From the analysis above it can be seen that both the Jordanian Companies Law and the 
Australian Corporations Act comply only partially with Chapter 6, Principle D7. The legislation 
in both jurisdictions should require, in explicit terms, the appointment of independent directors to 
tasks where there is a potential for conflicts of interest. The relevant Jordanian authorities must 
introduce the concept of independent non-executive directors to the Companies Law or through a 
code of corporate governance similar to the ASX Principles of Corporate Governance 2003.  
 
30. ACCESS TO INFORMATION 
 
30.1     Content of the OECD Principles 
 
Chapter 6: The Responsibilities of the Board 
 
F. In order to fulfil their responsibilities, board members should have access to accurate, 
relevant and timely information.  
 
30.2  Comparative Analysis 
 
The Australian Corporations Act complies with the OECD principle requiring the board to 
access to accurate, relevant and timely information. The Jordanian Companies Law, however, 
does not comply with the relevant principle.  
 
In Australia, s 290(1) of the Corporations Act provides that directors are entitled access to the 
company’s financial records at all reasonable times. The commentary to Principle 8 of the ASX 
Principles of Corporate Governance 2003 provides that management should supply the board 
with information in a form, timeframe and quality that enables to board to effectively discharge 
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its duties. It provides further that directors should be entitled to request additional information 
where they consider that the information supplied by management is insufficient for any reason. 
The Jordanian Companies Law does not specifically recognise this important issue. The relevant 
Jordanian authorities must enact provisions that emphasise and clearly provide for the statutory 
right of directors to have full access to relevant information on a timely and regular basis.    
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CHAPTER 5 
 
MEMBERS’ REMEDIES 
 
1. AN ANALYSIS OF SHAREHOLDER REMEDIES 
 
Chapter 3, Principle A2, of the OECD Principles provides that ‘minority shareholders should be 
protected from abusive actions by, or in the interest of, controlling shareholders acting either directly or 
indirectly, and should have effective means of redress’. As stated in the analysis of this principle in 
Chapter 4, Section 7, of this paper, the Jordanian Companies Law does not directly protect the rights of 
minority shareholders nor introduce effective means of redress.  
 
In general terms, shareholder participation in Jordan is weak.610 This could be attributed to various 
factors, including ingrained culture, poor awareness among small investors, and the speculative nature of 
stock trading. The consequence of this lack of involvement is that power is dominated by controlling 
shareholders. Controlling shareholders have strong incentives to monitor their company’s performance 
and its management, and consequently can have a very positive impact on the governance of a company. 
The interests of controlling shareholders, however, often conflict with those of minority shareholders. 
Recent research indicated that the average control position for the top 48 listed companies in Jordan was 
approximately 30 percent of shares.611 Further, approximately half of the listed companies in Jordan are 
‘supermajority owned’, which essentially means that minority shareholder involvement or consent is not 
required for fundamental corporate decisions.612  
 
In Australia, there are legislative measures to protect minority shareholders from the abusive action of 
boards and controlling shareholders. Pursuant to s 232, shareholders have the right to bring an action for 
                                                 
610 MENA Regional Corporate Governance Working Group, above n 16, 28. 
611 Research conducted by Professor Ghassan Omet, University of Jordan; as cited in World Bank, above n 156, 1. 
612 Estimate calculated by HSBC; as cited in World Bank, above n 156, 1. 
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oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct. An extensive list of remedies open for the court to order in 
such circumstances is listed in s 233. According to s 236, a member also has a statutory right to bring 
proceedings on behalf of a company, or intervene in any proceedings to which the company is a party. A 
detailed analysis of these two important minority shareholder remedies is provided below. The Jordanian 
authorities need to be alerted to this important subject so that appropriate legal provisions, in similar 
terms to those in the Corporations Act, can be drafted and enforced. 
 
2. THE OPPRESSION REMEDY 
 
2.1  Historical Background 
 
The origins of the oppression remedy stem back to 1947 in the United Kingdom when a British 
Board of Trade Committee known as the Cohen Committee made recommendations to the 
British Government to give the courts broad discretionary powers to make orders against 
companies in which minority shareholders were being oppressed.613 Following is an extract from 
the 1947 Committee Report:614  
 
A step in the right direction would be to enlarge the powers of the courts to make a 
winding-up order by providing that the power shall be exercisable notwithstanding the 
existence of an alternative remedy. In many cases, however, the winding-up of the 
company will not benefit the minority shareholders, since the break-up value of the assets 
may be small, or the only available purchaser may be that very majority whose 
oppression has driven the minority to seek redress. … The Court should have, in 
addition, the power to impose upon the parties to a dispute whatever settlement the Court 
considers just and equitable.615  
 
                                                 
613 Tomasic, above note 314, 410. 
614 Cohen Committee, Report of the Committee on Company Law Amendment (Cmd 6659), 1945.  
615 Ibid, paragraph 60.    
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These recommendations resulted in the enactment of s 210 of the Companies Act 1948 (UK), 
which is now embodied in ss 459-461 of the Companies Act 1985 (UK).  
 
In Australia, similar provisions were adopted by the state governments in the mid 1950’s, and 
were soon after translated into s 186 of the Uniform Companies Act 1961 (Cth). The section was 
amended substantially in s 320 of the Companies Act 1981, which later became s 260 of the 
Corporations Law 1989 (Cth). After further revision pursuant to the Company Law Review Act 
1998 (Cth), s 260 was replaced by s 246AA of the Corporations Law 1989 on 1 July 1998. 
According to the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act 1999 (Cth), the most recent 
amendment to the oppression remedy replaced s 246AA with Part 2F.1 of the Corporations Law 
1989 on 13 March 2000, which is now Part 2F.1 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 232-
234.616  
 
The key provision pertaining to the oppression remedy is s 232 of the Corporations Act. The full 
text of the section is as follows: 
 
  The Courts may make an order under section 233 if: 
 
(a)  the conduct of a company’s affairs; or  
(b)  an actual or proposed act or omission by or on behalf of a company; or  
(c)  a resolution, or proposed resolution, of members or class of members of a 
company;  
 
is either: 
 
(d)  contrary to the interest of the members as a whole; or 
                                                 
616 Tomasic, above note 314, 410. 
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(e)  oppressive to, unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly discriminatory against, a 
member or members whether in that capacity or in any other capacity. 
 
2.2    Oppression Defined 
 
The term ‘oppressive’ is not defined in the Corporations Act. According to Professor John 
Farrar, no clear definition of oppression, unfairly prejudicial, or unfairly discriminatory conduct 
has been provided because of the fear that such a definition might lead to narrow restrictions 
being placed on the courts’ power to intervene.617 Initially, the courts’ approach to the relevant 
provision was to require a high level of oppression to be proven before a minority shareholder 
could be entitled to a remedy. For instance, the House of Lords in Scottish Cooperative 
Wholesale Society v Meyer618 held that the idea of oppression denoted behaviour which was 
‘burdensome, harsh and wrongful’ to one or more members of the corporation, and also lacked 
probity and fair dealing. In Australia, a similar position was adopted in Re Tivoli Freeholds 
Ltd.619 However, in 1983 amendments were made to the legislation in Australia which included 
the addition of the term ‘unfairly prejudicial or unfairly discriminatory’ to the oppression 
provision. The intention of the legislature was to expand the restrictive interpretation that had 
been given to term ‘oppressive’, and provide the courts with greater flexibility to provide the 
appropriate relief. 
 
The judicial consensus in Australia has been that the amended provision prescribes a single test 
rather than three alternative tests. This notion was first formulated in Thomas v HW Thomas 
Ltd.620 In that case, the New Zealand Court of Appeal considered s 209 of the Companies Act 
1955 (NZ) which, like its Australian counterpart, referred to conduct that is ‘oppressive, unfairly 
discriminatory, or unfairly prejudicial’. The court decided that these words were not distinct 
alternatives and the three words overlap each other in a sense that each term helps explain the 
                                                 
617 Farrar J, Corporate Governance in Australia and New Zealand (2nd ed, 2002), 182.  
618 Scottish Co-operation Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer [1959] AC 324 at 342. 
619 Re Tivoli Freeholds Ltd [1972] VR 445 at 468. 
620 Thomas v H W Thomas Ltd [1984] 1 NZLR 686. 
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others. The decision in Thomas was adopted by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in New 
South Wales Rugby League Ltd v Wade.621  In that decision, the Court of Appeal settled that the 
minimum content of the term ‘oppression’ in s 232 was the concept of fairness. Moreover, in Re 
Norvabron Pty Ltd,622 the court held that it is not necessary for a member to demonstrate both 
oppression and unfair prejudice, but rather it is sufficient for only one of those grounds to be 
made out.  
 
The following matters can be characterised as typical oppression scenarios: 
 An issue of shares by directors to dilute the voting power of minority shareholders: 
Wallington v Kokotovich Constructions Pty Ltd.623  
 Diversion of the corporation’s business by a director to another corporation in which the 
director has an interest: Re Spargos Mining NL.624  
 Low dividend payments resulting from excessive remuneration to directors in the form of 
directors’ fees or bonuses: Sanford v Sanford Courier Service Pty Ltd.625  
 Failure to give notice of meetings: Foody v Horewood.626 
 A breach of fiduciary duty by a director such as failure to disclose, failure to review the 
company’s dividend policy to improve the company’s cash position, or failure to 
prosecute an action on behalf of the company: Overton Holdings Pty Ltd.627    
 Unfair removal of a director for an improper purpose or reasons that are not in the best 
interests of the company: John Starr (Real Estate) Pty Ltd v Robert Andrew (Australasia) 
Pty Ltd.628  
 The use of improper tactics at either the board or general meeting to deprive minority 
shareholders from the right to participate in these meetings: John Starr (Real Estate) Pty 
Ltd v Robert Andrew (Australasia) Pty Ltd.629  
                                                 
621 Wayde v New South Wales Rugby League Ltd (1985) 3 ACLC 799. 
622 Re Norvabron Pty Ltd (1987) 11 ACLR 279. 
623 Wallington v Kokotovich Constructions Pty Ltd (1993) 11 ACSR 759. 
624 Re Spargos Mining NL (1991) 3 ACSR 1.  
625 Sanford v Sanford Courier Service Pty Ltd (1986) 10 ACLR 549. 
626 Foody v Horewood .(2003) VSC 347. 
627 Overton Holdings Pty Ltd (1984) 9 ACLR 225. 
628 John J Starr (Real Estate) Pty Ltd v Robert R Andrew (Australasia) Pty Ltd (1991) 9 ACLC 1372.   
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2.3 The Concept of Company’s Affairs 
 
Another important element in the application of s 232 is the interpretation of the term ‘affairs’ in 
subparagraph (a). Section 53 of the Corporations Act defines the ‘affairs’ of a company in 
extremely broad terms to include, amongst other things:  
 conduct in relation to promotion, formation, membership, control, business, trading, 
transactions, liquidation and dealings of the company; 
 internal management and proceedings of the company;  
 conduct in relation to share ownership, voting rights and disposal rights in the company; 
and 
 the audit of the company.  
 
Accordingly, this statutory definition of ‘affairs’ is broad enough to cover both the external 
business and internal management of the company. In the Federal Court decision of ASC v 
Lucas630 Drummond J observed that ‘the concept of affairs of a corporation is a very wide one 
indeed’. 
 
There are a number of other features of s 232 that should be noted.631 Firstly, the section is not 
confined to positive acts. Under s 232(b), an omission that has the prescribed impact may trigger 
an application. For example, in Scottish Cooperative Wholesale Society v Meyer,632 the House of 
Lords held that adopting a passive policy in order to starve the company of materials it needed to 
conduct its business was oppressive. Secondly, the section applies even if the conduct was 
isolated or even if it occurred in the past before the affected person became a member.633 
Thirdly, it is not necessary that the conduct be ultra vires or illegal, or that it involve a want of 
                                                                                                                                                                         
629 Ibid. 
630 ASC v Lucas (1992) 36 FCR 165 at 184. 
631 For a general discussion of all these features see Tomasic, above n 374, 413; Ford, above n 307, 603.  
632 Scottish Co-operation Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer [1959] AC 324 at 342. 
633 Re Spargos Mining NL (1991) 3 ACSR 1 at 6. 
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probity.634 Fourthly, the section does not require that the conduct be carried out by any certain 
category of persons.635 Finally, the inclusion of the phrase ‘contrary to the interest of the 
members as a whole’ in s 232(d) allows the courts to order relief where all members are equally 
prejudiced by the conduct.636   
 
2.4  Who Can Apply for Orders 
 
Section 234 specifies who may apply for an order under s 233. The list includes: 
 
 a member of the company; 
 a person who has been removed from the register of members because of a selective 
reduction under s 256B(2); 
 a former member of the company (in limited cases); and 
 any other person who is considered to be appropriate by ASIC.  
 
The member must generally be registered at the time of the relevant conduct.637 However, the 
provision lacks clear guidelines in this respect. In Re Independent Quarries Pty Ltd638 a share 
certificate had been duly sealed by the company but the holder’s name had not been entered in 
the members’ register of the company because the register was in the control of a rival 
shareholder. The court held the applicant was a member even though his membership was not 
noted on the register.   
 
                                                 
634 Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360. 
635 Re Harmer Ltd [1958] 3 A11 ER 689. 
636 Re Spargos Mining NL (1991) 3 ACSR 1 at 6.  
637 Ibid.  
638 Re Independent Quarries Pty Ltd (1994) 12 ACSR 188. 
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2.5  The Court’s Power to Make Orders 
 
There are a wide range of orders that the court can make enabling it to intervene in corporate 
affairs if the grounds under s 232 are established. Section 233 sets out a non-exhaustive list of 
orders that the court may make individually or in combination, which include:  
 
 That the company be wound up; 
 That the company’s constitution be modified or repealed; 
 That the affairs of the company be regulated;639  
 That the shares of a member or a person to whom the shares are transmitted by will or 
under operation of law be purchased by another member;640  
 That the shares to be purchased by the company and its share capital be correspondingly 
reduced; 
 That proceedings be instituted, prosecuted, defended or discontinued by the company; 
 That proceedings be instituted, defended or discontinued in the name of the company and 
on its behalf by a member or a person to whom the shares are transmitted by will or under 
operation of the law; 
 That a receiver or manager of property be appointed; 
 Restraining a person from engaging in specified conduct or doing a specified thing; or 
 Requiring a person or the company to do a specific act. 
 
2.6 Analysis 
 
Whilst the oppression remedy is a very powerful remedial tool for minority shareholders, there 
are several difficulties which are inherent in its application. The principal difficulties include: 
                                                 
639 An example of this type of order can be found in the English decision of Re Harmer Ltd [1958] 3 A11 ER 689. The court 
order in this case involved a sweeping reorganisation of the company’s management structure. 
640 An example of this type of order can be found in English decision of Scottish Cooperative Wholesale Society v Myer 
[1959] AC 324. The House of Lords in this case ordered the majority shareholder to purchase the minority shareholders’ 
interests at the price at which they stood before the oppressive conduct which rendered the shares valueless. 
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 The phrase ‘affairs of the company’ may not encompass the acts of a nominee director 
towards a subsidiary.641 
 The phrase ‘contrary to the interest of the members as a whole” is ambiguous. It is 
questionable whether, in the context of this phrase, the relevant action must be contrary to 
the interests of each and every member.  
 Part 2F.1 does not deal explicitly with costs. 
 The standard of proof for shareholders is onerous. 
 
Despite these shortcomings, the oppression remedy is the most widely-used corporate law 
remedy available to shareholders of Australian companies.642 According to an empirical study 
carried out by Professor Ian Ramsay in 1999 regarding the use of the remedy in Australia, there 
has been a significant rise in the use of the remedy since its introduction.643 In the decade of the 
1960s, there were only four oppression judgments in Australia. In the 1980s, the number of 
judgments increased to 25, and from 1990 to 1997, there were more than 50.644 
 
Professor Ramsay’s research indicates that the oppression remedy is more often used by small 
closely-held companies, in circumstances where a domestic or family dispute arises, rather than 
by large public companies.645 Shareholders in closely held companies often have more at risk 
than simply the share capital they have invested. According to the results of Professor Ramsay’s 
research, almost 75 percent of the oppression judgments in Australia have involved a private 
company. Moreover, in almost 55 percent of those judgments, the number of shareholders in the 
company concerned was ten or fewer.646 It is well recognised that shareholders in these small 
private companies ordinarily do not have the same protection available to them as shareholders 
in larger public companies. Minority shareholders in a listed public company can readily sell 
                                                 
641 See for example Re Norvabron Pty Ltd (1987) 11 ACLR 279; Morgan v 45 Flers Avenue Pty Ltd (1986) 10 ACLT 692. 
642 Ramsay I, ‘An Empirical Study of the use of the Oppression Remedy’ (1999), 27 Australian Business Law Review, 23.  
643 Ibid. 
644 Ibid, 26. 
645 Ibid, 27. 
646 Ibid, 28.  
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their shares, however, minority shareholders in a private company often have restrictions on their 
right of disposal. It was noted by one commentator that within the intimate relationship that is a 
small private company, ‘the corporate norms of centralised control and majority rule can easily 
become an instrument of oppression’.647  
 
According to Professor Ramsay, in the majority of the oppression cases to date, the plaintiff has 
been a minority shareholder. In a further 10 percent of the cases, the plaintiff has been a 50 
percent shareholder.648 The most commonly pleaded allegation in oppression actions has been 
the exclusion of shareholders from management. In fact, almost 50 percent of oppression actions 
in Australia have been pleaded in these terms. The other most common allegations include lack 
of information provided to shareholders (29.5 percent), breach of fiduciary duties (26.1 percent), 
misappropriation of company assets (20.5 percent), and insufficient remuneration or dividends 
being received by shareholders (12.5 percent).649 Another interesting finding was that the courts 
are reluctant to wind up companies. In fact, in the 33 cases to date in which plaintiffs have 
sought the remedy of winding up, the courts have only granted the remedy five times.650  
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
The oppression remedy in Part 2F.1 of the Corporations Act is a modified and improved version 
of its progenitor, s 210 of Companies Act 1948 (UK). Since its inception into Australia in the 
1950s, the scope of the remedy has been significantly broadened and it has become a valuable 
weapon for members, particularly minority shareholders, in their dealings with companies. The 
legislative regime provides shareholders with a wide range of possible reliefs, including many 
alternatives to the commonly sought remedy of winding up. It is recommended that the Jordanian 
                                                 
647 Thompson R, ‘Corporate Dissolution and Shareholders’ Reasonable Expectations’ (1988), 66 Washington University Law 
Quarterly, 193. 
648 Ramsay, above n 469. Professor Ramsay asserts further that it is reasonable to assume that the percentage of cases brought 
by minority shareholders is actually higher than his research indicates due to the fact that in a significant number of the 
judgments it was not possible to clearly identify whether the shareholder was a minority shareholder. 
649 Ramsay, above n 469, 28. 
650 Ibid, 28.  
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Companies Law be amended to include an equivalent to the Australian oppression remedy in Part 
2F.1 of the Corporations Act. 
 
3. THE STATUTORY DERIVATIVE ACTION 
 
3.1 Historical Background 
 
At common law, the person who has the cause of action at law is normally the individual who 
should institute legal proceedings to obtain a remedy. In Hurley v BGH Nominees Pty Ltd,651 
King CJ noted that it is a fundamental principle of the law that, except in specified circumstances 
prescribed by law, C has no standing to bring an action against A for a breach of A’s duty to B.  
The ability of a shareholder to initiate proceedings against offending directors or majority 
shareholders is limited by the ‘proper plaintiff rule’, which confines the ability to commence 
proceedings for a breach of duty owed to the company to the company itself. However, 
circumstances often arise where an individual has his or her rights infringed but is unable to 
commence legal proceedings to vindicate those rights because the necessary machinery to do so 
cannot be activated. This is particularly so in the field of company law because of the fact that 
companies are artificial legal persons. The traditional common law position has gradually been 
eroded away by judicial exceptions to the ‘proper plaintiff’ rule and, in particular, the exception 
found in the statutory derivative action contained in Part 2F.1A of the Corporations Act.  
 
The statutory derivative action is an action brought by a shareholder or director of a company in 
the name, and on behalf of, the company against whom the relevant wrongs have been 
committed, in circumstances where the company itself is unwilling to prosecute those wrongs via 
legal proceedings. Such an action is ‘derivative’ in the sense that the right to sue belongs not to 
the party actually bringing the action, but is derived from the company’s right of action. 
Ordinarily, the decision to take action on the company’s behalf lies with the directors, as they 
                                                 
651 Hurley v BGH Nominees Pty Ltd (1982) 6 ACLR 793. 
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generally have the responsibility of managing the company. However, in some cases it is 
necessary that the shareholders be given the right to commence action on the company’s behalf, 
usually because some or all of the board members are themselves responsible for the wrong that 
has been committed.  
 
The foundations for the statutory derivative action were laid in a report prepared by the 
Corporations and Securities Law Review Committee (CSLRC) in 1990.652 This report 
highlighted the need for amendments to the Companies Act 1981 (Cth) that relaxed the rules 
pertaining to derivative actions so that members and creditors were empowered to obtain the 
leave of the courts to institute proceedings. The statutory derivative action proposed in the report 
was subsequently reviewed by the Legal Committee of the Companies and Securities Advisory 
Committee which confirmed the need for such provisions.653 In its report of July 1993, the 
Companies and Securities Advisory Committee stated that for many years there has been 
widespread discontent with the obstacles that confront shareholders in instituting proceedings. 
The three relevant obstacles referred to in the 1993 report were the rule in Foss v Harbottle,654 
the expense of litigation, and the difficulties that shareholders frequently face in obtaining 
information from the company.  
 
After six more years of consultation and revision, the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program 
Act 1999 (Cth) introduced Part 2F.1A (ss 236-242) into the Corporations Law 1989 (Cth) which 
provided for a statutory derivative action. The Parliament prevented overlap with the common 
law derivative action (known as the fraud on the minority) by abolishing the general law to bring 
proceedings on behalf of the company in s 236(3). The provisions in Part 2F.1A give a person 
the right, with the leave of the court, to institute legal proceedings on behalf of the relevant 
company, in the company’s name, and against anyone who may have caused loss to the 
company, in circumstances where the company is prevented from doing, or is unable to do, so 
                                                 
652 Corporations and Securities Law Review Committee (CSLRC), Enforcement of the Duties of Directors and Officers of a 
Company by Means of a Statutory Derivative Action, November 1990.  
653 Fisher, above n 356, 386. 
654 Foss v Harbottle (1843) 67 ER 189. 
 184
for itself. Accordingly, unless leave to bring a derivative action is granted under s 237, the 
company continues to be the proper plaintiff in proceedings for wrongs committed against it.  
 
3.2 The Rule in Foss v Harbottle and its Exceptions 
 
In the case of Foss v Harbottle,655 two shareholders brought an action against the five directors 
of the relevant company on behalf of all shareholders excluding the directors. The plaintiffs 
claimed that the company’s assets had been fraudulently misappropriated by the directors. 
Wigram VC held however, that the action could not be brought by the two shareholders. The 
grounds upon which this decision was made have become known as ‘the rule in Foss v 
Harbottle’, which has since become one of the most notorious principles in company law. The 
rule has two aspects to it. The first aspect, or ‘proper plaintiff’ rule, was described in the 
following terms by Wigram VC in Foss v Harbottle: 
 
The action did not lie at the suit of the shareholders. The injury was to the company as a 
whole, not to the plaintiffs exclusively. There is no general right for any individual 
members of a corporation…to assume to themselves the right of suing in the name of the 
corporation. In law, the corporation, and the aggregate members of the corporation, are 
not the same thing for purposes like this….656 
 
The second aspect, or ‘internal management’ rule, was described in the following terms by Lord 
Davey in Burland v Earle:657 
 
There is the principle that the courts will not interfere in the internal disputes of 
partnerships, joint stock companies or the modern corporation, the precept that the 
courts seek to avoid a multiplicity of actions, the principle that equity will not act in vain 
                                                 
655 Ibid. 
656 Foss v Harbottle (1843) 67 ER 189. 
657 Burland v Earle [1902] AC 83. 
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and that it would do so if the court were to rule on a matter that was within the 
competence of a majority of the shareholders, and, finally, the principle that for a wrong 
done to a company, the company is the proper plaintiff in an action to seek redress.658 
 
3.3 Exceptions to the Proper Plaintiff Rule 
 
The courts recognised that in certain cases justice required that minority shareholders be able to 
avoid the application of the rule in Foss v Harbottle to allow them to initiate proceedings. As 
such, five broad common law exceptions to the rule in Foss v Harbottle developed which 
became known as minority protections. Importantly, it must be noted that the commencement of 
the statutory derivative action under s 236 of the Corporations Act has removed the right to 
apply the general law. Accordingly, the following discussion is provided for historical purposes 
only. 
 
(a) Fraud on the Minority 
 
In Foss v Harbottle, the court recognised the potential for majority shareholders to be 
manifestly unfair to the minority shareholders. This exception applied in circumstances 
where the following elements were satisfied:659 
 
 Fraud;660 
 Effected on the company or minority shareholders;661 and 
 The wrongdoers had such control of the company that they were able to ensure 
that an action could not be brought by the company.662 
 
                                                 
658 Ibid, 93. 
659 For a detailed discussion see Atwool v Merryweather (1867) LR 5 Eq 464 where it was recognised that, without this 
exception, the majority would be able to ‘to defraud the minority with impunity’. 
660 See Daniels v Daniels [1978] Ch 406. 
661 See Ruralcorp Consulting Pty Ltd v Pynery Pty Ltd (1996) 21 ACSR 161 at 166. 
662 Eromanga Hydrocarbons NL v Australia Mining NL (1988) 6 ACLC 906 at 911. 
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(b) Special Resolution 
  
This exception applied in circumstances where the company passed an ordinary 
resolution when the subject matter of the resolution actually required a higher majority.663 
 
(c) Illegal Acts or Ultra Vires  
 
This exception applied in circumstances where the actions for which a remedy was 
sought were illegal or ultra vires.664  
 
(d) Personal Rights  
 
This exception applied in circumstances where a personal right of a member had been 
infringed and the irregularity was not one that could be condoned by the company in a 
general meeting.665 Personal rights are particular ‘membership’ rights that may accrue in 
individuals by reason of rights attached to their shares, provisions in a separate contract 
or pursuant to the company’s constitution. 
 
(e) Interests of Justice 
 
This exception, the most general of all the exceptions, applied in circumstances where the 
interests of justice required that minority shareholders be given standing to sue on behalf 
of the company.666 This exception was a matter of much controversy.667 
  
                                                 
663 See Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All ER 1064. 
664 See Atherton v Plane Creek Central Mill Co Ltd [1914] St R Qd 73 at 93. 
665 See Residues Treatment and Trading Co Ltd v Southern Resources Ltd (No 4) (1988) 14 ACLR 569 at 571 per King CJ 
(Matheson and Bollen JJ concurring): ‘Where the actions for which a remedy is sought amount to an infringement of 
personal rights, a shareholder has locus standi to enforce those personal rights’. 
666 See Scarel v Pty Ltd v City Loan and Credit Corporation Pty Ltd (1988) 12 ACLR 730 at 635; Dempster v Biala Pty Ltd 
(1989) 15 ACLR 191 at 194; Biala Pty Ltd v Mallina Holings Ltd (No 4) (1993) 13 WAR 11. 
667 For a detailed discussion see Cassidy, above note 48, 282-283. 
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3.4  Who May Bring a Statutory Derivative Action? 
 
Pursuant to ss 236(1)(a), 237(1) and 238(1), an application for leave to bring, or intervene in, 
proceedings on behalf of a company or to be substituted for a person to whom leave has been 
granted, may be brought by: 
 
 a member of the company or a related body corporate; 
 a former member of the company or a related body corporate; 
 a person entitled to be registered as a member of the company or a related body 
corporate;  
 an officer of the company; or 
 a former officer of the company.  
 
The inclusion of company officers as eligible applicants gives the statutory derivative action 
much wider scope than the common law action, which restricted the bringing of an action to 
members. Moreover, the inclusion of ‘former members’ as eligible applicants gives the statutory 
derivative action a broader scope than the oppression provisions in Part 2F.1 which, as 
previously discussed, can only be utilised by a former member in limited circumstances.668 It 
should also be noted that s 236(1) does not give ASIC standing to bring an application for a 
derivative action. According to the Explanatory Memorandum to the Corporate Law Economic 
Reform Program Act 1999 (Cth), the statutory action is 'not intended to be regulatory in nature, 
but to facilitate private parties to enforce existing rights attaching to the company’ – effectively, 
the action is designed to be a self-help measure.    
 
                                                 
668 See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 234. 
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3.5 Criteria for Granting Leave 
 
Pursuant to s 236(1)(b), a person seeking to commence a derivative action must obtain leave of 
the court in accordance with s 237. The court must grant leave if it is satisfied that the following 
conditions are satisfied: 
 
1. It is probable that the company will not bring the proceedings or take proper 
responsibility for such proceedings.669 As a practical matter, the board of directors’ 
response to any notice of intention to apply for a grant of leave which the applicant may 
have served on the company would provide evidence relevant to this criterion.670   
 
2. The applicant is acting in good faith.671 The court is required to review the motives of the 
applicant. The Corporations Law Simplification Task Force has set the measures to 
assess whether an applicant is acting in good faith. First, the court is expected to examine 
whether there is any complicity by the applicant in the matters complained of. Second, 
the court is expected to examine whether the applicant’s real goal is pursuit of a personal, 
rather than a corporate remedy. In Chapman v E-sports Club Worldwide Ltd,672 the court 
refused to grant an application because, amongst other things, it appeared that the 
plaintiff was attempting to use the proceedings to put pressure on other parties in the 
company to buy him out.   
 
3. It is in the best interests of the company that the applicant be granted leave.673 This 
criterion recognises that the purpose of the derivative action is in line with the company’s 
interests rather than those of the applicant or any group of directors or shareholders. 
However, it is not left to the company alone (through either the board of directors or the 
                                                 
669 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 237(2)(a). 
670 Tomasic, above n 374, 423.  
671 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 237(2)(b). 
672 Chapman v E-Sports Club Worldwide Ltd (2001) 19 ACLC 213. 
673 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 237(2)(c). 
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general meeting of shareholders) to decide what is in the company’s best interests. 
Ascertaining the company’s best interests is a matter for judicial determination. For 
example, even if the company has suffered a wrong which could be the subject of a 
derivative suit, if the costs of bringing proceedings significantly outweigh any benefit to 
the company, then the court may refuse to grant leave.674   
 
4. There is a serious question to be tried.675 The serious question test is a familiar and 
accepted test used regularly by Australian courts in determining interim injunction 
applications. The applicant is simply required to show that the claim is not frivolous or 
vexatious and it has real prospects of succeeding. It must also be proved that the balance 
of convenience favours granting leave.676  
 
5. Whether the applicant has notified the company of the application.677 At least 14 days 
before the application, the applicant must give the company written notice of his or her 
intention to apply for leave and the reasons for doing so (unless the court believes that an 
order granting leave is appropriate despite no such notice being given).678 This notice 
provides the board of directors an opportunity to consider the matter and perhaps decide 
to litigate without the need for a derivative action.  
 
If these criteria are met, then the court must grant the applicant leave to bring, or to intervene in, 
the proceedings by way of a statutory derivative action. Accordingly, the court does not have an 
open-ended discretion in such matters. Importantly, s 237(3) provides that a rebuttable 
presumption that granting leave is not in the best interest of the company arises if it is established 
that: 
 
                                                 
674 Tomasic, above n 374, 423. 
675 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 237(2)(d). 
676 Tomasic, above n 374, 423. 
677 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 237(2)(e). 
678 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 237(2)(e)(ii). 
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(a) the proceedings are: 
 (1) by the company against a third party; or 
 (2) by a third party against the company; and 
(b) the company has decided: 
 (1) not to bring the proceedings; or 
 (2) not to defend the proceedings; or 
 (3) to discontinue, settle or compromise the proceedings; and 
(c) all of the directors who participated in that decision: 
 (1) acted in good faith for a proper purpose; and 
 (2) did not have a material personal interest in the decision; and  
 (3) informed themselves about the subject matter of the decision to the extent they 
     reasonably believed to be appropriate; and 
 (4) rationally believed that the decision was in the best interests of the company. 
 
3.6  Court Orders and Powers 
 
Section 240 provides that if a court grants leave to commence or intervene in proceedings then 
those proceedings cannot be later be discontinued, compromised or settled without the leave of 
the court. This case management requirement is designed to ensure that a successful applicant 
does not settle proceedings so as to benefit himself/herself, rather than acting in the company’s 
best interests.679 Pursuant to s 241, the court may make any orders or directions it considers 
appropriate in relation to an application for leave or the proceedings brought pursuant to a 
successful application. Directions may be given by the court regarding the conduct of the 
proceedings, including an order requiring mediation680 or directing the company, or an officer of 
the company, to do or not do any act.681 Moreover, the court is empowered to appoint an 
independent person to investigate and report to the court on the company’s financial position, the 
                                                 
679 Cassidy, above n 48, 287. 
680 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 241(b). 
681 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 241(c). 
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acts and circumstances giving rise to the cause of action, and the costs involved in the 
proceedings.682 Section 242 deals with costs orders in derivative proceedings, essentially 
providing the court discretion to make an order at any time about the costs of any party to the 
proceedings.683 
 
3.7 Analysis 
 
There are a number of shortcomings that have been identified in the application of the statutory 
derivative action. As previously mentioned, s 236(1) provides that the persons who are eligible to 
apply for a statutory derivative action include a member, a former member, a person entitled to 
be registered as a member of the company or a related body corporate, and an officer of the 
company. According to one commentator, the term ‘entitled to be registered’ is ambiguous and 
needs to be explained in clearer terms.684 For example, it is questionable whether the term would 
include a transfer upon which stamp duty had not been paid or a transfer the registration of 
which had been refused by the directors under the rights or pre-emption provisions in the 
company constitution. There is also uncertainty as to whether it would be necessary for such a 
party to firstly prove to the court that he or she is ‘entitled to be registered’.685 
 
Questions have also been raised as to why a shareholder of a related body corporate should have 
the right to make an application in respect of a company in which the shareholder has no 
interest.686 It is also worth noting that the definition of ‘officer’ in s 9 provides a very wide 
category of persons including persons who, in some cases, act with total control of the company 
and therefore could sue in the name of the company. Such a person would be a liquidator. 
                                                 
682 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 241(d). 
683 These broad powers in relation to costs enable the court to protect a bona fide applicant from the costs involved in a 
derivative action. 
684 McDonough D, ‘Proposed New Statutory Derivative Action – Does It Go Far Enough?’ (1996) 8 Bond Law Review 47, 
57. 
685 Ibid, 57-58. 
686 Ibid. 
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Seemingly, the legislation will give such persons a right to apply after they have relinquished 
their positions.687  
 
In the view of Ramsay, ‘the main impediment to shareholders contemplating litigation is not 
deficiencies in the common law concerning standing but a lack of incentives to commence 
litigation deriving from a number of factors including the cost of litigation and the fact that if the 
action is successful any recovery accrues to the company and not the plaintiff shareholder’.688 
According to another commentator, litigation costs are the primary deterrent for potential 
applicants.689 The suggestion was made that s 242 should be amended to make the company pay 
the litigation fees rather than the applicant.690   
 
3.8 Conclusion  
 
The rule in Foss v Harbottle was initially a significant hurdle for a minority shareholder wishing 
to remedy a corporate wrong. Early emphasis on the rights of managers to conduct the affairs of 
companies without external interference, and assumptions as to the appropriateness of the 
majority rule principle in all cases resulted in the courts building up complex procedural rules, 
often only tenuously linked to the central issues of the company’s interests in having an action 
brought, and its ability to do so for itself. The introduction of Part 2F.1A (ss 236-242) into the 
Corporations Act has, for the most part, smoothed out these complex procedural rules. In 
Farrar’s view, the new statutory derivative action procedures are welcomed as they clarify and 
reform the law and increase locus standi.691 It is recommended that the Jordanian Companies 
Law be amended to include an equivalent to the Australian oppression remedy in Part 2F.1A of 
the Corporations Act. 
                                                 
687 Ibid, 59-60. 
688 Ramsay I, ‘Corporate Governance, Shareholder Litigation and the Prospects for a Statutory Derivative Action’ (1992), 15 
University of New South Wales Law Journal 149, 150.  
689 McConvill, ‘Part 2F.1A of the Corporations Act: Insert a New Section 242(2) or Give it the Boot?’ (2002), 30 Australian 
Business Law Review 309. 
690 Ibid, 310. 
691 Farrar, above n 617, 201  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS  
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS 
 
1.1 The Role of Corporate Governance 
 
Corporations are constantly evolving to meet the needs of a changing society. They have 
developed to become such a pervasive part of our society that they even determine the quality of 
our food and the air that we breathe. Human beings developed the corporation as part of a social 
structure amongst other things, which nowadays almost everyone can participate in to some 
degree. Corporations enable people to get things done, and enable a small idea or concept to 
develop into a vast and successful business. A corporation is timeless in the sense that it can, and 
often does, live beyond the years of its founders. Also, it can be operated internationally from 
one corner of the world.  
 
As corporations are constantly evolving, so are the corporate laws which govern them. The 
evolution of the corporate form ensures that corporate governance laws must continue to be re-
examined. Corporate governance is primarily concerned with the relationships between a 
corporation’s managers and shareholders, based on the foundation that the board of directors is 
the shareholders’ agent to ensure that the corporation in managed in the shareholders’ best 
interests. This paradigm has been simplified into the phrase, ‘managers accountable to boards 
and boards accountable to shareholders’.692 
 
                                                 
692 Millstein I, above n 38. 
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1.2 The OECD Principles  
 
Soon after their original drafting in 1999, the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance were 
tested and implemented in OECD member and non-member countries to improve their legal 
systems and regulatory frameworks, and review their company law regimes. However, continued 
corporate governance failures in the years that followed prompted a review of the original 
principles. In 2002, the OECD called for an assessment of the OECD Principles by 2004. The 
assessment process was carried out by the OECD Steering Group which prepared a synthesis 
paper covering major issues in corporate governance. In support of the work of the Steering 
Group, the OECD circulated a detailed questionnaire to member counties. Between March 2003 
and January 2004, seven successive draft revisions of the principles were submitted by the 
Steering Group, until a final draft was agreed upon in April 2004.  
 
Chapter 4 of this paper provided a detailed examination of the systems of corporate governance 
in Australia and Jordan, in the form comparative analysis of the implementation of the OECD 
Principles 2004 in each jurisdiction. The importance of establishing effective and enforceable 
legislative frameworks for corporate governance cannot be overstated. From the corporation’s 
perspective, the emerging consensus is that the purpose of high standards of governance is to 
increase the firm’s value, subject to meeting the corporation’s financial and legal obligations. 
From a public policy perspective, the purpose of corporate governance is to nurture the spirit of 
enterprise whilst ensuring accountability. This was the aim of the OECD Principles 2004. 
Hopefully, in time, all governments across the globe will fully embrace and implement the 
Principles. 
 
2. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
In general terms, the provisions of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 are, for the most part, 
consistent with the OECD Principles 2004. The ASX Listing Rules and Principles of Corporate 
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Governance 2003 are also compliant in almost all important respects. The Jordanian Companies Law 
1997, however, complies only partially with the OECD Principles 2004 and is in drastic need of reform 
to bring it into line with internationally recognised standards of corporate governance. On the basis of 
the comparative analysis and examination detailed in Chapter 4 of this paper, a list of recommendations 
to the Jordanian Government is set out below. The central purpose of this paper was to formulate 
recommendations pertaining to the Jordanian Companies Law. Accordingly, the deficiencies in the 
Australian legislative regime that were noted in Chapter 4 have not been repeated.   
 
2.1 General Recommendations 
 
(a) There is no specific translation of the phrase ‘governance’ in Arabic. This dilemma of 
terminology is an ongoing difficulty in the discussion and implementation of corporate 
governance measures in Jordan. If increasing the strength of corporate governance 
foundations in Jordan is on its agenda, then the Jordanian Government must reach a 
consensus on a precise translation. Such action would facilitate understanding of the topic 
and constructive discussions could then be held without confusion. The issue should be 
moved to the forefront of the corporate governance movement in Jordan because of its 
logical importance. 
 
(b) There are countless spelling and grammatical errors in the formal English translation of 
the legislation. Complications regarding the translation process must be resolved so that 
the legislation can be properly and precisely compared with the corporate governance 
legislative regimes of other countries.  
 
(c) Policymakers in Jordan must draft and implement a non-binding code of corporate 
governance in line with the ASX Principles of Corporate Governance 2003. This task 
should be undertaken by a multidisciplinary working group consisting of stakeholders, 
regulators and international experts. The establishment of such a code is particularly 
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important for properly defining the role and duties of the board, and effectively protecting 
the rights of minority shareholders. The founding of the Jordanian Corporate Governance 
Association and its involvement in the recent MENA-sponsored corporate governance 
technical assistance workshop693 are positive steps forward. The second workshop, which 
is scheduled to be held in Jordan later this year, will provide the perfect landscape to 
begin the drafting of a code. 
 
(d) To ensure an effective corporate governance framework, it is important to improve the 
enforcement of existing laws and regulations. Chapter 1 of the OECD Principles 2004 
calls on policy makers to give the regulatory authorities within each country the power 
and resources necessary for effective enforcement of corporate governance initiatives. 
The enforcement function in Jordan is too fragmented. The most significant difficulties 
arise because of the separate disclosure statements that each of these bodies require of 
listed companies. The Jordanian authorities need to review the roles of the Controller of 
Companies, the CBJ, the JSC, and the Insurance Commission and organise them into a 
more coordinated and consistent scheme. 
 
2.2 Shareholder Protection 
 
(a) It is too difficult for shareholders to remove directors from the board. According to 
Article 165 of the Companies Law, removing directors from the board requires a signed 
request of shareholders holding at least 30 percent of the company’s share capital. The 
request must be submitted to the board, who must then call an extraordinary meeting of 
the general assembly within 10 days of the request. The general assembly must then vote 
on the request by secret ballot.694  A simpler procedure is required. The Jordanian 
                                                 
693 As discussed in the introduction to Chapter 4 of this paper. 
694 Presumably the dismissal request requires at least a majority share of the votes to be accepted, although this is not 
specified in the Companies Law. 
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authorities should take steps to ensure that the right of shareholders to remove the board 
of directors without any exceptions is protected by legislation.695   
 
(b) Article 175 of the Companies Law, regarding the procedure for an ‘extraordinary’ general 
meeting, should be clarified and simplified in line with the relevant Australian provisions, 
and the percentage share capital requirement for shareholders to call an extraordinary 
general meeting should be lowered to 5 percent. Further, the Jordanian authorities should 
remove the remuneration limitations on directors and amend the legislation so that 
shareholders are responsible for determining and approving their remuneration.696 
 
(c) The Companies Law lacks clearly detailed provisions in the area of regulating markets 
for corporate control, such as those necessary to regulate takeover bids. It is 
recommended that the Jordanian authorities take steps to address this issue in similar 
terms to the Australian Corporations Act.697 
 
(d) A legislative regime should be introduced into the Companies Law to encourage 
institutional investors acting in a fiduciary capacity to disclose their corporate governance 
policies (including how they manage conflicts of interest) and their voting records on 
important issues where the value of the investment has been affected or where the board’s 
recommendation has been voted against by the fund. Furthermore, institutional investors 
should be encouraged to consult with each other on issues of corporate governance.698 
 
(e) The Companies Law does not address the rights of minority shareholders in any real 
depth. Appropriate legal provisions, in line with those in the Australian Corporations Act, 
should be drafted and enforced. This recommendation is discussed in detail in Chapter 5 
of this paper. Also, steps should be taken to draft appropriate provisions that deal with the 
                                                 
695 For more detail see Chapter 4, Section 2. 
696 For more detail see Chapter 4, Section 3. 
697 For more detail see Chapter 4, Section 5. 
698 For more detail see Chapter 4, Section 6. 
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issues surrounding voting by custodians or nominees, and that remove any impediments 
to cross border voting.699 
 
(f) The Jordanian authorities should draft appropriate amendments to the Companies Law 
that clarify and define related party transactions more broadly, and more clearly define 
the relevant procedures in line with the relevant Australian provisions.700    
 
2.3 Stakeholder Protection 
 
(a) The Companies Law does not provide a definition of stakeholders. Further, it does not 
properly reinforce the role of the stakeholders, particularly with regard to the position of 
the employee in the corporate governance framework. The Jordanian authorities need to 
provide a functional definition of stakeholders and create a legislative framework that 
gives appropriate recognition to the interests of stakeholders and their contribution to the 
long-term success of the corporation.701  
 
(b) The Companies Law does not introduce effective mechanisms for employees to obtain 
redress for violation of their rights. Accordingly, the Jordanian authorities should develop 
appropriate statutory provisions to protect the rights of employees in a more effective 
way and introduce new mechanisms for employees to seek redress for violations of their 
rights.702  
 
(c) The rights of whistleblowers in Jordan are not recognised and protected by the law. The 
Jordanian authorities must act to draft appropriate provisions to protect the rights of 
                                                 
699 For more detail see Chapter 4, Section 7. 
700 For more detail see Chapter 4, Section 9. 
701 For more detail see Chapter 4, Section 10. 
702 For more detail see Chapter 4, Section 11. 
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whistleblowers to freely communicate their concerns about illegal and unethical practice 
within companies.703 
 
2.4 Disclosure and Transparency 
 
(a) The disclosure procedures outlined in Articles 140-143 of the Companies Law must be more 
detailed, in line with the relevant Australian provisions.704 
 
(b) The requirement in Article 3 of the JSC Instructions for Disclosure, Accounting and Auditing 
Standards of Issuing Companies 2004 for a listed company to publish its preliminary 
business results within 45 days of the end of its fiscal year should be removed. The reason for 
this is that if earnings are reported before the completion of the audit, auditors may be subject 
to increased pressure from the company not to make adjustments that would result in profit 
figures that are lower than those previously released in the unaudited financial statement. 
Further, any significant difference between the figures released in the preliminary report and 
those reported in the audited annual report has the potential to mislead investors.705 
 
(c) Monitoring compliance with financial reporting standards in Jordan is a difficult issue 
because the monitoring function is too fragmented and not effectively coordinated. The 
function is effectively shared between the Controller of Companies, the CBJ, the JSC, and 
the Insurance Commission. The relevant Jordanian authorities need to review the disclosure 
requirements from all these sources and organise them into a single scheme so as to make 
compliance with the requirements less of an administrative burden for companies. This 
process would require the relevant laws that establish the monitoring function of each of 
                                                 
703 For more detail see Chapter 4, Section 14. 
704 For more detail see Chapter 4, Section 16. 
705 For more detail see Chapter 4, Section 16. 
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these bodies to be amended to make them compatible with the new monitoring and 
enforcement legislative platform.706 
 
(d) There needs to be an increased effort in Jordan to educate the media about the corporate 
governance legislative framework to enable them to whistleblow and publish the names of 
violators. The current trend of simply relying on company-supplied press releases must 
stop.707 
 
(e) A significant problem in terms of adherence to international standards in Jordan is that 
translations of the relevant documents issued by the International Accounting Standards 
Board are not widely available. Accordingly, a lot of firms and auditors have difficulty 
interpreting the standards. This situation needs to be remedied immediately by the 
establishment of a body responsible for maintaining and distributing accurately translated 
versions of the international standards. In conjunction with this development, a regular 
consultative process must be introduced and maintained to keep the relevant persons and 
bodies informed in relation to any changes or developments in the international standards.708 
 
(f) The Accountancy Profession Law 2003 should be amended to make the High Council for 
Accounting and Auditing responsible for monitoring and enforcing accounting and auditing 
standards. Membership of the Council should not be dominated by professional accountants 
and auditors and should include representatives from the office of the Controller of 
Companies, the JSC, the CBJ and the Insurance Commission.709  
 
(g) The High Council for Accounting and Auditing should be made responsible for issuing 
formal instructions on the practical application of international standards and holding regular 
                                                 
706 For more detail see Chapter 4, Section 16. 
707 For more detail see Chapter 4, Section 16. 
708 For more detail see Chapter 4, Section 17. 
709 For more detail see Chapter 4, Section 18. 
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consultative sessions to brief all relevant parties on international developments related to 
improving the standard and transparency of financial reporting.710  
 
(h) The general requirements for auditor independence listed in Article 197 of the Companies 
Law must be considerably expanded and effectively enforced. 
 
(i) The quality of public university education in Jordan in accounting and auditing courses 
requires significant improvement.711 
 
(j) Legislative measures need to be introduced that require practicing auditors to take regular 
training under a continuing professional education scheme.712  
 
(k) An appropriate supervision scheme needs to be established so professional accountants have 
sufficient practical training under the supervision of an experienced audit practitioner before 
receiving an audit practice certificate.713 
 
(l) The development of an internet-based electronic filing and data retrieval system would 
significantly improve company information dissemination in Jordan. This should be a top 
priority.714  
 
2.5 Responsibilities of the Board 
 
(a) The Jordanian authorities should consider drafting the duties of directors in more explicit 
terms, similar to the Australian provisions. Further, it is recommended that the restriction 
requiring directors to possess a certain number of shares to be eligible for board 
                                                 
710 For more detail see Chapter 4, Section 18. 
711 For more detail see Chapter 4, Section 18. 
712 For more detail see Chapter 4, Section 18. 
713 For more detail see Chapter 4, Section 18. 
714 For more detail see Chapter 4, Section 18. 
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membership should be removed.715 This move would encourage independent and 
technical expertise on boards rather than the current situation of boards being dominated 
by the controlling family. 
 
(b) The Jordanian authorities should consider drafting appropriate provisions to address the 
issue of boards applying high ethical standards.716  
 
(c) The Jordanian authorities should consider drafting more explicit and detailed provisions 
requiring the board to take measures to review and guide corporate strategy, and to 
monitor the effectiveness of corporate governance practices.717 
 
(d) Whilst simple in administrative terms, the Jordanian method of setting the remuneration 
of directors as a percentage of the company’s annual net profit will not always be 
effective in ensuring that appropriate salaries are paid to directors in line with the best 
interests of company. Accordingly, the Companies Law should be amended to allow 
shareholders to determine the remuneration of directors.718  
 
(e) The Jordanian authorities should enact legislative provisions that clearly and explicitly 
provide for the role of the board of directors in monitoring and managing conflicts of 
interest, ensuring the integrity of the corporation’s accounting and financial reporting 
systems, and overseeing the process of disclosure and communications.719 
 
(f) The Companies Law should require, in explicit terms, the appointment of independent 
directors to tasks where there is a potential for conflicts of interest. Accordingly, the 
Jordanian authorities must introduce the concept of independent non-executive directors 
                                                 
715 For more detail see Chapter 4, Section 21. 
716 For more detail see Chapter 4, Section 23. 
717 For more detail see Chapter 4, Section 24. 
718 For more detail see Chapter 4, Section 26. 
719 For more detail see Chapter 4, Section 28. 
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to the Companies Law or through a code of corporate governance similar to the ASX 
Principles of Corporate Governance 2003.720  
 
(g) The Jordanian authorities must enact provisions that emphasise and clearly provide for 
the statutory right of directors to have full access to relevant information on a timely and 
regular basis.721    
 
3. FINAL REMARKS 
 
The comparative analysis outlined in this paper has served to reinforce that the Jordanian Companies 
Law 1997 is in desperate need of a complete overhaul. The vast majority of the provisions, of which 
there are less than 300 in total, are drafted in very broad terms and lack the necessary detail to deal with 
the complex area of corporate law. Whilst the specific recommendations outlined in the section above 
identify the ‘main’ deficiencies in the legislation, the reality is that almost every provision requires 
expansion and clarification. If the Jordanian Government is serious about strengthening its corporate 
governance framework, and it should be, then it is necessary to put all of its weight behind the recently-
established Jordanian Corporate Governance Association to bring the legislative reform process into 
action.  
 
Company law in Jordan has already undergone significant changes in recent years. The implementation 
of the privatisation program under the guidance of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
prompted the creation of the ASE, the JSC and the SDC, and there can no doubt that these institutions 
have fuelled the general improvement of corporate governance practices in Jordan to some extent. But 
these changes have merely scratched the surface of necessary reform. The time has come for the relevant 
authorities in Jordan to establish extensive and detailed legislative measures to ensure that the systems 
of corporate governance in Jordan are in line with internationally recognised standards and practices 
such as those evidenced in the OECD Principles 2004. 
                                                 
720 For more detail see Chapter 4, Section 29. 
721 For more detail see Chapter 4, Section 30. 
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APPENDIX 
 
OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2004 
 
Chapter 1: Ensuring the Basis for an Effective Corporate Governance Framework 
 
The corporate governance framework should promote transparent and efficient markets, be 
consistent with the rule of law and clearly articulate the division of responsibilities among 
different supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities.  
 
A.  The corporate governance framework should be developed with a view to its impact on 
overall economic performance, market integrity and the incentives it creates for market 
participants and the promotion of transparent and efficient markets. 
 
B. The legal and regulatory requirements that affect corporate governance practices in a 
jurisdiction should be consistent with the rule of law, transparent and enforceable. 
 
C. The division of responsibilities among different authorities in a jurisdiction should be 
clearly articulated and ensure that the public interest is served. 
 
D.  Supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities should have the authority, integrity 
and resources to fulfil their duties in a professional and objective manner. Moreover, 
their rulings should be timely, transparent and fully explained.  
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Chapter 2: The Rights of Shareholders and Key Ownership Functions 
 
The corporate governance framework should protect and facilitate the exercise of shareholders’ 
rights.   
 
A.  Basic shareholders’ rights should include the right to: (1) secure methods of ownership 
registration; (2) convey or transfer shares; (3) obtain relevant information on the 
corporation on a timely and regular basis; (4) participate and vote in general 
shareholder meetings; (5) elect and remove members of the board; and (6) share in the 
profits of the corporation. 
 
B.  Shareholders have the right to participate in, and be sufficiently informed on, decisions 
concerning fundamental corporate changes such as: (1) amendments to statutes, or 
articles of incorporation or similar governing documents of the company; (2) the 
authorisation of additional shares; and (3) extraordinary transactions, including the 
transfer of all or substantially all assets, that in effect result in the sale of the company. 
 
C.  Shareholders should have the opportunity to participate effectively and vote in general 
shareholder meetings and should be informed of the rules, including voting procedures, 
that govern general shareholder meetings. 
 
(1)  Shareholders should be furnished with sufficient and timely information 
concerning the date, location and agenda of general meetings, as well as full and 
timely information regarding the issues to be decided at the meeting.  
(2) Shareholders should have the opportunity to ask questions to the board, including 
questions relating to the annual external audit, to place items on the agenda of 
general meetings, and to propose resolutions, subject to reasonable limitations.  
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(3) Effective shareholder participation in key corporate governance decisions, such 
as the nomination and election of board members, should be facilitated. 
Shareholders should be able to make their views known on the remuneration 
policy for board members and key executives. The equity component of 
compensation schemes for board members and employees should be subject to 
shareholder approval. 
(4) Shareholders should be able to vote in person or in absentia, and equal effect 
should be given to votes whether cast in person or absentia. 
 
D.  Capital structures and arrangements that enable certain shareholders to obtain a degree 
of control disproportionate to their equity ownership should be disclosed.  
 
E.  Markets for corporate control should be allowed to function in an efficient and 
transparent manner.  
 
(1)  The rules and procedures governing the acquisition of corporate control in the 
capital markets and extraordinary transactions such as mergers and sales of 
substantial portions of corporate assets should be clearly articulated and 
disclosed so that investors understand their rights and recourse. Transactions 
should occur at transparent prices and under fair conditions that protect the 
rights of all shareholders according to their class.  
(2) Anti-takeover devices should not be used to shield management and the board 
from accountability.  
 
F.  The exercise of ownership rights by all shareholders, including institutional investors, 
should be facilitated.  
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(1)  Institutional investors acting in a fiduciary capacity should disclose their overall 
corporate governance and voting policies with respect to their investments, 
including the procedures that they have in place for deciding on the use of their 
voting rights.  
(2)  Institutional investors acting in a fiduciary capacity should disclose how they 
manage material conflicts of interest that may affect the exercise of key ownership 
rights regarding their investments.  
 
G. Shareholders, including institutional shareholders, should be allowed to consult with 
each other on issues concerning their basic shareholder rights as defined in the 
Principles, subject to exceptions to prevent abuse. 
 
 
Chapter 3: The Equitable Treatment of Shareholders 
 
The corporate governance framework should ensure the equitable treatment of all shareholders, 
including minority and foreign shareholders. All shareholders should have the opportunity to 
obtain effective redress for violation of their rights. 
 
 A. All shareholders of the same series of a class should be treated equally. 
 
(1)  Within any series of a class, all shares should carry the same rights. All investors 
should be able to obtain information about the rights attached to all series and 
classes of shares before they purchase. Any changes in voting rights should be 
subject to approval by those classes of shares which are negatively affected. 
(2)  Minority shareholders should be protected from abusive actions by, or in the 
interest of, controlling shareholders acting either directly or indirectly, and 
should have effective means of redress. 
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(3)  Votes should be cast by custodians or nominees in a manner agreed upon with the 
beneficial owner of the shares. 
(4)  Impediments to cross border voting should be eliminated. 
(5)  Processes and procedures for general shareholder meetings should allow for 
equitable treatment of all shareholders. Company procedures should not make it 
unduly difficult or expensive to cast votes. 
 
B.   Insider trading and abusive self-dealing should be prohibited. 
 
C.   Members of the board and key executives should be required to disclose to the board 
whether they, directly, indirectly or on behalf of third parties, have a material interest in 
any transaction or matter directly affecting the corporation.  
 
 
Chapter 4: The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance 
 
The corporate governance framework should recognise the rights of stakeholders established by 
law or through mutual agreements and encourage active cooperation between corporations and 
stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound enterprises.  
 
A.  The rights of stakeholders that are established by law or through mutual agreements are 
to be respected. 
 
B.  Where stakeholder interests are protected by law, stakeholders should have the 
opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their rights. 
 
C.  Performance-enhancing mechanisms for employee participation should be permitted to 
develop. 
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D.  Where stakeholders participate in the corporate governance process, they should have 
access to relevant, sufficient, and reliable information on a timely and regular basis.  
 
E.  Stakeholders, including individual employees and their representative bodies, should be 
able to freely communicate their concerns about illegal or unethical practice to the board 
and their rights should not be compromised for doing this.  
 
F.  The corporate governance framework should be complemented by an effective, efficient 
insolvency framework and by effective enforcement of creditor rights. 
 
 
Chapter 5:  Disclosure and Transparency  
 
The corporate governance framework should ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is made 
on all material matters regarding the corporation, including the financial situation, 
performance, ownership, and governance of the company.  
 
A.   Disclosure should include but is not limited to, material information on: 
 
(1)  The financial and operating results of the company. 
(2) Company objectives. 
(3)  Major share ownership and voting rights. 
(4) Remuneration policy for members of the board and key executives, and 
information about board members, including their qualifications, the selection 
process, other company directorships, and whether they are regarded as 
independent by the board. 
(5)  Related party transactions. 
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(6)  Foreseeable risk factors.  
(7)  Issues regarding employees and other stakeholders. 
(8)  Governance structures and policies, in particular, the content of any corporate 
governance code or policy and the process by which it is implemented. 
 
B.  Information should be prepared and disclosed in accordance with high quality standards 
of accounting and financial and non-financial disclosure. 
 
C.  An annual audit should be conducted by an independent, competent, and qualified 
auditor in order to provide an external and objective assurance to the board and 
shareholders that the financial statements fairly represent the financial position and 
performance of the company in all material respects.  
 
D.  External auditors should be accountable to the shareholders and owe a duty to the 
company to exercise due professional care in the conduct of the audit. 
 
E.  Channels for disseminating information should provide for equal, timely and cost-
efficient access to relevant information by users. 
 
F.  The corporate governance framework should be complemented by an effective approach 
that addresses and promotes the provision of analysis or advice by analysts, brokers, 
rating agencies and others, that is relevant to decisions by investors, free from material 
conflicts of interest that might compromise the integrity of their analysis or advice. 
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Chapter 6: The Responsibilities of the Board 
 
The corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic guidance of the company, the 
effective monitoring of management by the board, and the board’s accountability to the company 
and the shareholders. 
 
A.  Board members should act on a fully informed basis, in good faith, with due diligence 
and care, and in the best interests of the company and the shareholders. 
 
B.  Where board decisions may affect different shareholder groups differently, the board 
should treat all shareholders fairly. 
 
C.  The board should apply high ethical standards. It should take into account the interests 
of stakeholders. 
 
D.  The board should fulfil certain key functions, including: 
 
(1)  Reviewing and guiding corporate strategy, major plans of action, risk policy, 
annual budgets and business plans; setting performance objectives; monitoring 
implementation and corporate performance; and overseeing major capital 
expenditures, acquisitions and divestitures.  
(2)  Monitoring the effectiveness of the company’s governance practices and making 
changes as needed. 
(3)  Selecting, compensating, monitoring, and, where necessary, replacing key 
executives and overseeing succession planning. 
(4)  Aligning key executive and board remuneration with the longer term interests of 
the company and its shareholders. 
(5)  Ensuring a formal and transparent board nomination and selection process. 
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(6)  Monitoring and managing potential conflicts of interest of management, board 
members and shareholders, including misuse of corporate assets and abuse in 
related party transactions. 
(7)  Ensuring the integrity of the corporation’s accounting and financial reporting 
systems, including the independent audit, and that appropriate systems of control 
are in place, in particular, systems for risk management, financial and 
operational control, and compliance with the law and relevant standards.  
(8)  Overseeing the process of disclosure and communications. 
 
E.  The board should be able to exercise objective, independent judgement on corporate 
affairs.  
 
(1)  Boards should consider assigning a sufficient number of non-executive board 
members capable of exercising independent judgment to tasks where there is a 
potential for conflicts of interest. Examples of such key responsibilities are 
ensuring the integrity of financial and non-financial reporting, the review of 
related party transactions, nomination of board members and key executives, and 
board remuneration.  
(2)  When committees of the board are established, their mandate, composition and 
working procedures should be well defined and disclosed by the board. 
(3)  Board members should be able to commit themselves effectively to their 
responsibilities.  
 
F. In order to fulfil their responsibilities, board members should have access to accurate, 
relevant and timely information.  
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